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Regulation Archives - SHIP IP LTD

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BIMCO aims to publish cyber security clause in spring 2019

Overview

BIMCO is developing a clause dealing with cyber security risks and incidents that might affect the ability of one of the parties to perform their contractual obligations.

The clause is being drafted by a small team led by Inga Froysa of Klaveness, Oslo. Other companies involved include Navig8, the UK P&I Club and HFW, and the project is due to be completed in May 2019.

Planning and protecting is key

The BIMCO cyber security clause requires the parties to have plans and procedures in place to protect its computer systems and data, and to be able to respond quickly and efficiently to a cyber incident.

Mitigating the effect of a cyber security breach is of paramount importance and the clause requires the affected party to notify the other party quickly, so that they can take any necessary counter-measures. The clause is also designed for use in a broad range of contracts. This way, the clause can cover arrangements with third-party service providers, such as brokers and agents.

The liability of the parties to each other for claims is limited to an amount agreed during negotiations. A sum of USD 100,000 will apply if no other amount is inserted.

Two important functions

The clause will fulfill two important functions. The first is to raise awareness of cyber risks among owners, charterers and brokers. The second is to provide a mechanism for ensuring that the parties to the contract have procedures and systems in place, in order to help minimize the risk of an incident occurring in the first place and, if it does occur, to mitigate the effects of such an incident.

In the early stages of development, the drafting team discussed if the clause should also address payment fraud. It was concluded that the risk of this increasingly common fraud is probably best dealt with at a procedural level by companies tightening up their internal payment procedures to require verification of any changes to payment details.


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BWMS type approval !

The Coast Guard Marine Safety Center received its 20th application for Ballast Water Management System type approval for the Aquarius UV Ballast Water Management System manufactured by Wärtsilä Water Systems Ltd.

MSC will review the application for compliance with U.S. Coast Guard regulations in 46 CFR 162.060. Once it has been determined that the application meets the requirements, the MSC will issue a type approval certificate.

BWMS type approval applications and approval certificates are posted on MSC’s website. The list will be updated frequently in order to provide industry and the general public the most current information regarding the status of each application.

 

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What are the challenges of autonomous ships navigation on board masterless vessels?

Autonomous ships, Challenges, whether legislative, sociological or technological, form part of our daily work routine. Contrary to previous decades, innovative models do not require years or even months to cross an ocean. Evolution tends to spread very fast, more so nowadays when millennials are rapidly engaging themselves in managerial roles largely concerned with quick and effective product placement.

The recent emergence of blockchain technologies, the steady infiltration of cryptocurrencies in our lives and the recently introduced GDPR rules have proved that shipping, like any other sector involved in the carriage of persons and goods, is also not immune to such novelties.

Unmanned technology is also gaining particular momentum within the shipping industry. The aim of such technology is clearly that of supporting the ship operator, cargo owner and ultimate consumer by reducing human-derived risks and operational costs connected with the carriage of goods by sea. However, when it comes to ships and navigation one must keep in mind that the lawmaker often ranks the protection of seafarers and of the sea environment at the top of its priorities, ahead of such strictly navigational or commercial aspects which also arise from the use of autonomous ships. It will be interesting to see how these two differing interests can and should coexist next to each other.

Use of driverless means of transport has become common across various sectors of public transportation. Many capital cities have adopted driverless metro systems for years now. The same is happening with respect to the private transportation by car, although the latter is still going through (an advanced) testing phase.

The difference between such means of transport lies mainly on the number of variables that these come across throughout their operation. As metros operate on a one-direction line, collisions can be easily reduced through a number of mechanical and electronic precautions. On the other hand, during their journey, cars come across other cars, buses, trucks, pedestrians, animals and different meteorological events, and so cannot make a linear journey.

What does autonomy mean with particular reference to ships? The International Maritime Organisation has identified four different types of vessel autonomy.

The first are ships with automated processes and decision support where seafarers operate and control systems and functions directly from the vessel and only some operations may be automated. The second are remotely controlled ships where seafarers are on board the vessel although the ship is controlled and operated from another location. The third are remotely controlled ships without seafarers on board where the vessel is controlled and operated from another location with no

seafarers on board. Finally, the fourth are fully autonomous ships where the operation is performed automatically by the vessel’s operating system.

Trials on autonomous ships have already commenced in Norway and Finland. Denmark has also taken steps to regulate this particular aspect of navigation; with the first autonomous ship to be used for subsea positioning, surveying and environmental monitoring currently registered under the British flag. The European Union has also invested in research projects such as the EU’s FP7 project (Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks).

The introduction of automation, as happened in other industries, would produce an immediate and tangible effect on the workforce on board ships and port operators engaged in the loading and offloading of cargo. On the other hand this would be beneficial for IT developers involved in the creation of software meant to govern navigation and protecting same from the risk of cyber-attacks. Automation might be welcomed by insurers, and a bit less by ship litigators, since with respect to the cargo loading and unloading procedures it will reduce the amount of mistakes deriving from human error.

However, one of the main obstacles faced by autonomous ships lies in the current legal framework within which their manned counterparts operate. In fact most – if not all – maritime conventions (and charter parties) assume that vessels operate with crew on board – this is the case, for example, of the Maritime Labour Convention or the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers – a requirement an autonomous ship would unlikely be able to satisfy.

Another challenging aspect concerning autonomous ships revolves around the implementation of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) in particular when these will be navigating alongside manned ships. The COLREGS often contain provisions referring to the human element; referring for example to “the ordinary practice of seamen” test, that is, what a reasonably competent mariner should do in a given situation (similarly to the bonus paterfamilias test used in civil law).

Automation would require practitioners to start considering accidents which might arise, for example, when an operator makes a poor decision in reliance on wrong information provided by the vessels’ sensors due to a technical failure. Such instances are bound to raise further questions on the apportionment of liability between the operator, manufacturer or software developer and ship- owner.

Moreover, within a shipping ambit different types and degrees of liability already coexist next to each other: that of the ship-owner (or the bareboat charterer) for crew’s actions (i.e. COLREGS); or that of the registered owner (i.e. pollution at sea conventions) while other forms of liability make the ship liable in its own right (e.g. maritime liens).

Apportionment of liability between the ship-owner, software developer and manufacturer is an aspect not to be underestimated even in such a context. How would an autonomous ship be expected to intervene in case should it encounter, throughout her route, another ship in distress? Also, where would responsibility lie in the case of environmental damage? Will the ship-owner be held accountable or will responsibility for the ensuing damage lie on the software provider, for

example, for not having developed a sound algorithm or on the vessel’s sensors’ manufacturer for their technical failure?

Legal clarity around cyber liability and collision regulations is fundamental if autonomous ships want to sail free on our seas and oceans, especially before the maritime industry starts investing in infrastructure and skills needed to for unmanned ships to reach a commercial level.

The answers to these questions are far from clear, and much work needs to be done before international solutions are in place. The Comité Maritime International (CMI), of which the Malta Maritime Association is a proud and active member, has recently established a working group on maritime law for unmanned craft, aimed at analysing how international conventions and regulations can adapt themselves to autonomous ships.

Many in the industry, in view of a lack of clear regulations in this respect, have welcomed this news in a conservative manner. Truth is that you cannot stop innovation from happening. Not, at least, in today’s world where ideas travel at the speed of sound from one corner of the world to another and with such a multitude of players wishing to gain new shares in an often saturated market. The interests in such area are many, from that of ship builders wishing to consolidate or grow their market share, to that of the ship owner wishing to cut costs or that of IT developers wishing to expand their reach in this industry, to that of crew members wishing to safeguard their jobs.

The importance of such a new means of navigation, although still far from becoming an everyday reality, has generated such an interest that even the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee kicked off the procedure leading to the regulation of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS). This exercise aims at regulating aspects concerning safety, security and environment. IMO’s focus is international trade facilitation, analysis of potential costs of the industry and the impact on individuals operating both off and onshore. The IMO will first look into the application of current legislation onto MASS and ascertain whether each specific provision can be applied to it and the regulations that need to be amended or introduced.

A possible key to facilitating navigation of autonomous ships on our seas and oceans could lie in the adoption of a uniform and linear set of rules modelled on the current IMO framework. It is submitted that a mere temporary or piecemeal update of regulation is not sufficient. Rules should, as much as possible, contain self-updating provisions able to cater for current as well as future technological advances. Shipping, more than any other sector in view of its global breadth, requires common and uniform standards and this can clearly only be achieved through the intervention of the International Maritime Organisation.

autonomous ships!

Source: Times of Malta

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The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has published nine of its 12 recommendations on cyber safety for ships.

IACS initially addressed the subject of software quality with the publication of UR E22 in 2006.  Recognizing the huge increase in the use of onboard cyber-systems since that time, IACS has developed this new series of recommendations with a view to reflecting the resilience requirements of a ship with many more interdependencies. They address the need for:

•     A more complete understanding of the interplay between ship’s systems
•     Protection from events beyond software errors
•     In the event that protection failed, the need for an appropriate response and ultimately recovery.
•     In order that the appropriate response could be put in place, a means of detection is required.

Noting the challenge of bringing traditional technical assurance processes to bear against new and unfamiliar technologies, IACS has launched the recommendations in the expectation that they will rapidly evolve as a result of the experience gained from their practical implementation. So, as an interim solution, they will be subject to amalgamation and consolidation.

More than 90 percent of the world’s cargo carrying tonnage is covered by the classification design, construction and through-life compliance rules and standards set by the 12 member societies of IACS.

The 12 Recommendations are:

Recommended procedures for software maintenance of shipboard equipment and systems (published)

Shipboard equipment and associated integrated systems to which these procedures apply can include:
– Bridge systems;
– Cargo handling and management systems;
– Propulsion and machinery management and power control systems;
– Access control systems;
– Ballast water control system;
– Communication systems; and
– Safety system.

Recommendation concerning manual / local control capabilities for software dependent machinery systems (published)

IMO requires through SOLAS that local control of essential machinery shall be available in case of failure in the remote (and for unattended machinery spaces, also automatic) control systems. For traditional mechanical propulsion machinery, this design principle is well established. The same design requirement applies to computerized propulsion machinery, i.e. complex computer based systems with unclear boundaries and with functions maintained in the different components.

Contingency plan for onboard computer based systems (published)

Computer based systems are vulnerable to a variety of failures such as software malfunction, hardware failure and other cyber incidents. It is not possible for all failure risks to be eliminated so residual risks always remain. In addition, a limited understanding of the operation of complex computer based systems together with fewer opportunities for manual operation can lead to crews being ill-prepared to use their initiative to responding effectively during a failure.

IMO and Classification Society rules contain many context specific examples of requirements for independent or local control in order to provide the crew with the means to operate the vessel in emergencies or following equipment failures. These requirements have generally been introduced when automation or remote control is introduced to individual pieces of equipment or functions and address concerns regarding its possible failure of the new features. The introduction of technologies which integrate different vessel’s functions creates the opportunity for two or more systems to be impacted by a single failure simultaneously.

Where, due to high computer dependence, manual operation is no longer practical or where the number of systems simultaneously affected is too high for manual operation to be practical with existing crew levels then the value of local control as a form of reassurance is limited, however the crew will still need to be provided with practical options to try to manage threats to human safety, safety of the vessel and/or threat to the environment.

If the practical options are not considered during the design and installed during construction of the vessel then the vessel and its crew could be, due to the introduction of new technologies, exposed to risks which they cannot manage.

Practical options could include limiting the extent of potential damage so that manual control is still achievable or providing backup systems which could be used in a worst case systems failure. Whatever form of contingency is provided to address failures it is important that it is well documented, tested and that the crew is aware and trained.

Requirements related to preventive means, independent mitigation means, engineered backups, redundancy, reinstatement etc. are dealt with in the other relevant recommendations.

Network Architecture (published)

Ship control networks have evolved from simple stand-alone systems to integrated systems over the years and the demand for ship to shore remote connectivity for maintenance, remote monitoring is increasing.

Incorporation of Ethernet technology has resulted in a growing similarity between the once disconnected fieldbus and Internet technologies. This has given rise to new terms such as industrial control networking, which encompasses not only the functions and requirements of conventional fieldbus, but also the additional functions and requirements that Ethernet-based systems present.

The objective of the present recommendation is to develop broad guidelines on ship board network architecture. The recommendation broadly covers various aspects from design to installation phases which should be addressed by the Supplier, system integrator and yard.

Data Assurance (published)

Regulation strongly focuses on system hardware and software development, however, data related aspects are poorly covered comparatively. Data available on ships has become very complex and in a large volume, meaning a user is unlikely to spot an error and it would be unreasonable to expect them to do so. Cyber systems depend not only on hardware and software, but also on the data they generate, process, store and transmit. These systems are also becoming more data intensive and data centric, often used as decision support and advisory systems and for remote digital communication.

Data Assurance may be intended as the activity, or set of activities, aimed at enforcing the security of data generated, processed, transferred and stored in the operation of computer based systems on board ships. Security of data includes confidentiality, integrity and availability; the scope of application of Data Assurance covers data whose lifecycle is entirely within on board computer based system, as well as data exchanged with shore systems connected to the on board networks.

Physical Security of onboard computer based systems (to be published Q4, 2018)

Network Security of onboard computer based systems (published)

Network security of onboard computer-based systems consists in taking physical, organizational, procedural and technical measures to make the network infrastructure connecting Information Technology and/or Operational Technology systems resilient to unauthorized access, misuse, malfunction, modification, destruction or improper disclosure, thereby ensuring that such systems perform their intended functions within a secure environment.

Vessel System Design (to be published Q4, 2018)

Inventory List of computer based systems (published)

For effective assessment and control of the cyber systems on board, an inventory of all of the vessel’s equipment and computer based systems should be created during the vessel’s design and construction and updated during the life of the ship: tracking the software and hardware modifications inside ship computer based systems enables to check that new vulnerabilities and dependencies have not occurred or have been treated appropriately to mitigate the risk related to their possible exploitation.

Integration (published)

Integration refers to an organized combination of computer-based systems, which are interconnected in order to allow communication and cooperation between computer subsystems e.g. monitoring, control, Vessel management, etc.

Integration of otherwise independent systems increases the possibility that the systems responsible for safety functions can be subject to cyber events including external cyberattacks and failures caused by unintentionally introduced malware. Systems which are not directly responsible for safety, if not properly separated from essential systems or not properly secured and monitored in an integrated system, can introduce routes for intrusion or cause unintended damage of important systems. It is necessary to have a record and an understanding of the extent of integration of vessels’ systems and for them to be arranged with sufficient redundancy and segregation as part of an overall strategy aimed at preventing the complete loss of ship’s essential functions.

Remote Update / Access (published)

Information and communications technology (ICT) is revolutionizing shipping, bringing with it a new era – the ‘cyber-enabled’ ship. Many ICT systems on-board ships connect to remote services and systems on shore for monitoring of systems, diagnosis and remote maintenance, creating an extra level of complexity and risk. ICT systems have the potential to enhance safety, reliability and business performance, but there are numerous risks that need to be identified, understood and mitigated to make sure that technologies are safely integrated into ship design and operations.

Communication and Interfaces (to be published Q4, 2018)


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Marine incident reporting

AMSA – Marine Safety Awareness Bulletin  Issue 8 — September 2018

Incident reporting is essential to maritime safety. When you report a marine incident to AMSA, you help shape the way maritime safety is improved.

Benefits of marine incident reporting
The information obtained from marine incidents enable us to:
 identify issues, patterns and trends
 respond to concerns
 share information with the maritime industry
 learn and improve maritime safety

Case study one
Faulty emergency generator
During routine maintenance onboard a bulk carrier, it was discovered that the emergency generator wasn’t working and needed replacing.

Case study two
Knowledge of rescue helicopters
Following a number of incident reports submitted to AMSA from vessels operating in remote areas around Australia, it became clear that the limited range of rescue helicopters was not widely known among vessel operators.

The incident reporting process

Report a marine incident that has affected, or is likely to affect, the safety, operation or seaworthiness of the vessel1. The alerts let us know that a serious event has occured. The incident report provides us detailed information about the incident, in particular the measures put in place to prevent reoccurrence.

 

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AMSA – Annual Regulatory Plan 2018–19

Our regulatory plan is produced annually and contains planned changes to our regulatory instruments.

Our regulatory plan provides details of planned changes to our regulatory instruments, such as marine orders and the National Standard for Commercial Vessels, to make it easier for business and the community to take part in the development of those instruments.

The regulatory plans contain information on:

  • legislative or other action planned for the current financial year that could lead to changes in business regulation.
  • a five-year outlook of future action, including for specific industry issues, international developments, priorities for standards and legislative expiry.
  • changes to business regulation that occurred during the previous financial year.

We publish an annual regulatory plan early in each financial year. While there may be some regulatory activities that we are unable to forecast, these activities will involve consultation with affected parties and will be recorded in future regulatory plans.

AMSA – Annual Regulatory Plan 2018–19

Marine order Description Consultation Proposed date
Marine Order 5 (Alcohol and Drugs) 2020 Proposed new Marine Order to prescribe the kinds of alcohol and drug tests for seafarers and pilots under the Navigation Act 2012, Chapter 2, Part 6. Q1 2020 1 July 2020
Marine Order 11 (Living and working conditions on vessels) 2015 Implement 2016 Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) amendments related to bullying and harassment. Q4 2018 8 January 2019
Marine Order 27 (Safety of Navigation and Radio Equipment) 2016 Full review and implement International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution MSC.450(99) replacing INMARSAT as the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) service provider with the term ‘recognised mobile satellite service’. Also reference IMO Resolution MSC.434(98) in Schedule 2 (enters into force 1 January 2021). Q3 2019 1 January 2020
Marine Order 31 (Vessel surveys and certification) 2015 Full review to clarify and incorporate the existing survey and certification requirements for government vessels (currently in Marine Order 62). Proposed change will cover all vessels including special provision for vessels under 7.5 metres. Repeal Marine Order 62. Q1 2019 1 June 2019
Marine Order 44 (Safe Containers) 2002 Full review and reissue to modernise drafting style under the Navigation Act 2012. Replace schedule 24 of Marine Order 4. Q4 2018 1 April 2019
Marine Order 47 (Mobile offshore drilling units) 2012 Review and reissue the Order under the Navigation Act 2012 and modernise the drafting style. Amalgamate with Marine Order 60. Replace schedule 25 of Marine Order 4. Q1 2019 1 June 2019
Marine Order 52 (Yachts and Training Vessels) 2016 Review to determine whether the new Red Ensign Group Code (combining the Large Yacht Code 3 and the Passenger Yacht Code), which comes into effect on 1 January 2019, affects the Order. Q4 2018 1 January 2019
Marine Order 60 (Floating Offshore Facilities) 2001 Review and reissue the Order under the Navigation Act 2012 and modernise the drafting style. Amalgamate with Marine Order 47. Replace schedule 36 of Marine Order 4. Q1 2019 1 June 2019
Marine Order 62 (Government Vessels) 2003 Repeal this Order following the review of Marine Order 31. Q1 2019 1 June 2019
Marine Order 63 (Vessel Reporting Systems) 2015 Implement IMO Resolution MSC.450(99) replacing INMARSAT as GMDSS service provider with the term ‘recognised mobile satellite service’. Amendments to the Australian ship reporting system ‘REEFREP’ reporting area. Q3 2019 1 January 2020
Marine Order 97 (Marine pollution prevention – air pollution) 2013 Amendment to cover adoption of IMO Resolution MEPC.304a(73) banning use, and carriage for use, of fuel oil with sulphur content >0.5%m/m. Enact the exemption provisions in Regulation 13.5.4 and 13.5.5 of Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Q3 2019 1 January 2020
Marine Order 503 (Certificates of survey – national law) 2018 Apply float-free EPIRB requirements to certain kinds of new, transitional and existing vessels required to be in survey. 31 October 2017 – 2 February 2018 1 January 2019
Marine Order 505 (Certificates of competency – national law) 2013 Review to simplify the qualifications framework. The NSCV Part D will be incorporated into Marine Order 505. Q4 2018 1 July 2019
HideRegulatory program of National Standard for Commercial Vessels (NSCV)
NSCV Description Consultation Proposed date
NSCV Part B – General requirements Amendment to definition of ‘smooth waters’ and ‘partially smooth waters’ to recognise waters designated as such by laws in force in a state or territory, to support the implementation of a new Ordinance under the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act 1955 to designate the waters in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands lagoon as ‘partially smooth waters’ (Category D). 25 May – 1 June 2018 27 July 2018
NSCV Part C2 – Watertight and Weathertight Integrity A new standard to specify requirements for watertight and weather tight integrity (removing existing references to the Uniform Shipping Laws Code). Q1 2019 1 July 2019
NSCV Part C5B – Design and Construction—Engineering—Electrical Full review to incorporate AS/NZS 3004—Electrical Installations—Marinas and Recreational Boats. Q3 2018 1 November 2018
NSCV Part C7A – Safety Equipment Review of Scale D, E, F medical kit guidance notes in view of codeine becoming prescription-only medication. Deal with any outstanding issues from ‘transitional’ changes to require all vessels to comply with contemporary safety equipment standard. Q3 2018 1 January 2019
NSCV Part D – Crew Competencies Review to simplify the qualifications framework. NSCV Part D will be incorporated into Marine Order 505. Q4 2018 1 July 2019

 

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The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its 99th session, adopted the Amendments in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Procedures for amending and updating the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual. The Committee agreed that the amendments should become applicable on July 01, 2019.

SOLAS regulation V/21 requires all ships to carry an up-to-date copy of IAMSAR Manual Volume III. A new point 1.8 has been included in the Manual for the search and rescue operations (SAR) by maritime rescue services in time of armed conflict.

Recognizing the important role search and rescue operations play in implementing its provisions, GC II extends protection to small coastal rescue craft and fixed coastal rescue installations used by such craft, such as rescue coordination centres, repair boats, sickbays and hangars for their humanitarian mission, including for SAR operations concerning civilians.

Such craft and their associated fixed coastal rescue installations, when employed by a State that is party to a conflict (whether by its armed forces or by civilian governmental agencies) or by officially recognized lifeboat institutions (i.e. the institution must have been approved or authorized by a governmental authority or other public body to perform coastal rescue functions, which presupposes the existence of a legal or administrative framework in the State in which the lifeboat institution operates to provide for its prior approval or authorization in peacetime) “shall be respected and protected, that is, may not be attacked, captured or otherwise prevented from performing their humanitarian tasks, so far as operational requirements permit“.

International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual

 


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GDPR TMSA Cyber Security

 

Tanker owners should be prepared for new EU and IMO cyber security regulations as they must already comply with maritime security requirements under OCIMF’s TMSA 3, writes Martyn Wingrove

There are increasing amounts of cyber security-related regulations that shipping companies will have to comply with, but tanker owners are already ahead of the game. Ship operators will need to include cyber in ship safety and security management under the ISM Code from 1 January 2021.

Before that, they need to be aware of cyber and data security regulations, including the EU general data protection regulation (GDPR) and the EU directive on the security of networks and information systems (NIS).

Much of the requirements under these forthcoming or new regulations are already within Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)’s third edition of the Tanker Management and Self Assessment (TMSA) best practice guidelines. This came into force on 1 January this year, with a new element on maritime security and additional requirements of key performance indicators and risk assessments.

Regulation changes were outlined at Riviera Maritime Media’s European Maritime Cyber Risk Management Summit, which was held in London on 15 June. The event was held in association with Norton Rose Fulbright, whose head of operations and cyber security Steven Hadwin explained that “data protection and cyber security needs to be taken seriously from a legal point of view.”

Data, such as information on cargo and charterers, could “become a considerable liability”. If data is lost “then GDPR could be in play” said Mr Hadwin. Regulators “could impose a fine of up to 4% of that organisation’s global annual turnover.”

PwC UK cyber security director Niko Kalfigkopoulos explained the legislation and reasoning behind the NIS Directive, which went into full effect in May this year.  “These regulations have teeth” he said because of the potential size of fines and damage to a company’s reputation from being a victim of a cyber attack. This is one of the reasons why boardroom executives should be aware and understand what is required for compliance.

Class support

During the summit, class societies provided cyber security guidance as they collectively attempted to define cyber secure ship notations. Lloyd’s Register cyber security product manager Elisa Cassi said shipping companies should have a third party monitor their IT network and the operational technology (OT) and employ staff to “stop people sharing data or compromising procedures”.

Tanker owners “need to identify any compromise before an attacker tries to penetrate”, Ms Cassi explained, noting that shipping companies need to “investigate the vulnerabilities through analytics and machine learning”, understand the behaviour of potential threats and use predictive analysis.

ABS advanced solutions business development manager Pantelis Skinitis said shipowners need to change passwords on operational technology, such as ECDIS and radar, as some remain unchanged since they were originally commissioned on the ship. He also advised owners to verify vendors and service engineers and that their USB sticks are clean of malware.

ABS has created cyber safety guidance for ship OT, particularly for ships coming into US ports and terminals. In its development, ABS identified the risks, vulnerabilities and threats to OT. “Managing connection points and human resource deals with the biggest threat to OT systems on board,” said Mr Skinitis.

DNV GL has developed new class notations covering cyber security of newbuildings. It has also produced an online video for instructing shipping companies to become more aware of cyber threats. During the summit, DNV GL maritime cyber security service manager Patrick Rossi said ship operators should set up multiple barriers to prevent hackers.

These should include firewalls, updated antivirus, patch management, threat intelligence, intrusion detection, emergency recovery and awareness testing. OT should be segregated from open networks, only official ENC-provider USBs and update disks should be used and cleaned of malware before being inserted into ECDIS and these systems should be segregated from the internet.

Cyber regulations and guidance for shipping

EU General Data Protection regulation (GDPR) came into effect from 25 May 2018

IMO – Resolution MSC.428(98) – from January 2021 cyber security will be included in the ISM Code

TMSA 3 – cyber security was added to tanker management and assessment in January 2018; EU directive on the security of networks and information systems (NIS Directive) from May 2018

EU privacy rule (PECR) of individuals traffic and location data

Rightship added cyber security to inspection checklist

BIMCO – guidelines based on International Association of Classification Societies

 

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Autonomous Ship

Netherlands-based KOTUG has demonstrated what it says is the first sailing of a remotely controlled tugboat from a long-distance location.

For the demonstration, the tug RT Borkum, located in Rotterdam, was controlled from the floor of the International Tug, Salvage & OSV Convention, which was taking place over 700 miles away in Marseille, France.

A KOTUG captain took over control of steering and engine systems using a secured internet connection and live cameras.

KOTUG says it believes that remote-controlled ships are the first step to unmanned and fully autonomous shipping down the road. “Various simple operations in remote locations can already be done from remote controlled stations,” the company stated.

“The real-time sensor technology makes it possible to give the remote control captain the situational awareness that is needed for safe operation,” according to KOTUG. “Combined with the drone technology to connect the towline, unmanned shipping is commercially and technically getting closer.”

One of the hurdles to unmanned shipping, KOTUG says, is establishing rules and regulations specific to autonomous vessels and their operation.

“Unmanned shipping does not yet comply with current rules and regulations. Therefore, rules need to be amended before tugs can actually start doing their tasks fully autonomous,” KOTUG stated.

In May, the International Maritime Organization took what some described as important first steps towards regulating unmanned ships by agreeing to the definition of “Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS)” and establishing an initial framework for regulations.

KOTUG notes that the demonstration of the RT Borkum was part of a joint industry project put on by sponsors without the help of subsidies.

 

 

SOURCE GCAPTAIN

 


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The International Maritime Organization answers the questions of Government Europa on how the next generation of autonomous vessels can be regulated to ensure safety for all involved.

With a myriad of emergent new technologies on the horizon of the maritime industry, such as autonomous vessels, it is vital that regulations are established to ensure the safety, security and efficiency of a new generation of ships. In May, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) – responsible for regulating international shipping – initiated its work into analysing the safety, security and environmental aspects of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS). Under this, IMO will look towards how such vessels can be addressed under the instruments of the organisation. The International Maritime Organization answers the questions of Government Europa on how the next generation of vessels can be regulated to ensure safety for all involved.

How could autonomous vessels transform Europe’s maritime activities? What kind of issues could it eradicate?

This is not really a question we can answer, as there are many variables in Europe’s maritime activities which are outside IMO’s sphere. IMO, as the global regulatory body, sets the regulations for safe, secure and efficient shipping and for prevention of pollution by ships.

It is important to remember that when we talk about integrating new technologies in shipping, we need to balance the benefits derived from new and advancing technologies against:

  • Safety and security concerns;
  • The impact on the environment;
  • International trade facilitation;
  • The potential costs to the industry; and
  • Their impact on personnel, both on board and ashore.

At 2017’s meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), a plan to conduct a series of scoping exercises on MASS was scheduled. As the first stage of that scoping exercise was conducted in May, what safety implications have been identified as a result?

The scoping exercise at the moment is aimed at looking at the current regulations in relation to maritime autonomous surface ships. What we are looking at now is how the rules already adopted could be applied to a ship in various modes of autonomy. So, we are looking at each regulation and seeing whether it would apply to a ship in an autonomous mode, whether it would not apply at all, or do we need to have a new rule specifically for autonomous ships?

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