MARITIME CYBER SECURITY Archives - Page 34 of 40 - SHIP IP LTD

Cyber-security specialist Naval Dome has reported that maritime and offshore energy companies were facing an increase in cyber security threats during the Covid-19 pandemic. It sad that there’s been a 400% increase in attempted cyber-attacks in these sectors since February 2020.

An increase in malware, ransomware and phishing emails exploiting the Covid-19 crisis were the primary reasons behind the spike, Naval Dome said that travel restrictions, social distancing measures and economic recessions were reducing the ability of companies  to protect themselves to the extent that they would like or need.

Naval Dome CEO Itai Sela  said that “Covid-19 social restrictions and border closures have forced OEMs, technicians and vendors to connect standalone systems to the internet in order to service them”.

The pandemic had prevented OEM technicians flying out to ships and rigs to upgrade and service critical OT systems, resulting in operators circumventing established security protocols. That, Seal said, left them open to attack.

“As budgets are cut and in the absence of service engineers, we are seeing ship and offshore rig staff connecting their OT systems to shoreside networks, at the behest of OEMs, for brief periods of time to carry out diagnostics and upload software updates and patches themselves,” Sela explains.

“This means that their IT and OT systems are no longer segregated and individual endpoints, critical systems and components may be susceptible. Some of these are legacy systems which have no security update patches and are even more susceptible to cyber-attack.”

He said that the increase in OEM personnel working remotely on home networks and personal PCs, which were not well protected, added to the problem.”

“Companies are stretched thin, and this is benefitting the hacker,” Sela said, noting that it was not sufficient to protect only networks from attack. “Each individual system must be protected. If networks are penetrated, then all connected systems will be infected.”

Ido Ben-Moshe, Vice President Business Development, says the problem is particularly acute in the marine and offshore oil and gas sectors. “If hackers penetrate networks, and critical equipment is exposed there could be significant safety, downtime, financial and potential reputational damage.”

Source: https://insurancemarinenews.com/

As the industry becomes increasingly digitalized, cybersecurity threats to ports are very real. Recent cyber attacks have shown the vulnerability of port infrastructure and it is paramount that the port operators and maritime authorities are well prepared and protected against cyber security threats in which if not prevented and managed effectively can lead to negative consequences including  business disruptions, endangerment of port and shipping operations, endangerment of confidentiality, loss of intellectual property, business and information, damage to company reputation and credibility amongst other issues. Building Cyber Resilience and having a Robust Cyber Security Strategy is Critical to Port Operations.

From risk identification to scenario assessment, from information security management to vulnerability assessment and security architecture development, this course covers in breadth and depth all the relevant aspects of information security risk assessment and cyber threats relevant to the ports industry in mitigating cyber risks, building cyber resilience and enhancing information security risk assessment.

Equip Global’s interactive and case study driven 4-day Cyber Security for Ports Masterclass will provide port operators and maritime authority attendees with the tools and know-hows of how to plan and strategically develop a cyber security strategy. Through applications on real cases, lessons learned from case studies, project exercise discussions and blueprint strategies and techniques, attendees will find out how they can overcome pertinent challenges to cyber security management whilst practically ensure that they develop the required security architecture and technology to counter cyber risks and threats.

Source: https://www.equip-global.com/

Norway’s Kongsberg Maritimehas signed its first contract for its ROV launch & recovery system (LARS) specifically designed to handle remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) from unmanned vessels.

The contract has been signed with Ocean Infinity, who will install the system on their Armada fleet of robotic ships.

To remind, US-based seabed survey and ocean exploration company Ocean Infinity in February launched Armada, a new marine technology and data company boasting the industry’s largest fleet of unmanned surface vehicles (USV).

Armada, with a focus on combining technology and environmental sustainability, will initially add 15 bespoke designed marine robots to Ocean Infinity’s current fleet of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV).

Commenting on the LARS deal, Kongsbers says its LARS is an essential component in a system designed to ensure that no people are required at sea while carrying out subsea operations.

“This innovation enables the deployment of remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) by teams based onshore,” Kongsberg explains

Caption: Kongsberg Lars – Credit: Kongsberg

The system uses a pure electric drive system, making it more environmentally sustainable and significantly reducing the need for maintenance. Launch & recovery will happen through the moon pool, with the release and capture of the ROV occurring beneath the sea surface. This eliminates the possibility of damage to the ROV from impact with the vessel hull. Another benefit is that launching and recovery can be carried out in higher sea states,” Kongsberg says.

Lisa Edvardsen Haugan, Executive Vice President, Deck Machinery & Motion Control, Kongsberg Maritime: “We believe this will be a game-changer.”

“The cost of ROV operations can be drastically decreased through the use of this system. We expect to see more companies transition to using unmanned vessels to reduce operational costs and increase safety.”

Armada’s fleet is currently under construction and is expected to be deployable by the end of 2020.

Each unmanned surface robot will serve a wide range of industries by being fully equipped to perform a multiplicity of offshore data acquisition and intervention operations down to a depth of 6,000 meters.

These robot ships will be capable of remotely deploying a wide range of the latest sensors as well as AUVs and remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROV) for visual and acoustic data acquisition.

Armada’s fleet will require neither people on board nor a host vessel nearby. Instead, the vessels will be controlled and operated by experienced mariners via satellite communications from onshore facilities in both Austin, Texas, and Southampton, England.

The fleet approach produces up to 90% less CO2 than other conventional survey vessels, Ocean Infinity said.

Source: https://www.marinelink.com/

Cyber security threats continue to be one of the top threats facing governments, businesses, and private individuals around the globe with attacks increasing exponentially on vessels and the maritime industry.

State and non-state actors perpetrate these attacks constantly around the clock and around the globe. Over the past few years, we have discussed cyber security-related issues in this column and their effect on the maritime industry. The IMO (International Maritime Organization) has put cyber security regulations in place for compliance by 2021. Many experts believe these will be the first of many regulations for the maritime industry when it comes to cyber security.

There are two specific documents the IMO has put forward regarding cyber security. The first document is MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3; Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management. This document is a guide on the basics of cyber risk management.

The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its 98th session in June 2017, adopted Resolution MSC.428(98). This specifically addresses maritime cyber risk management as part of the vessel’s Safety Management System (SMS). The resolution encourages flag administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in existing safety management systems (as defined in the ISM Code) no later than the first annual verification of the company’s Document of Compliance after Jan. 1, 2021. This means that vessels that have an active ISM plan must address cyber security within that plan by their first flag inspection after Jan. 1, 2021. There are tools and reference documents the IMO cites to help vessels develop the cyber management plan as part of their ISM.

Specifically, there are three reference documents the IMO recommends when putting together the cyber security part of an ISM plan. The first document was put together by a coalition of maritime organizations called Guidelines on Cyber Security. The second reference document is published jointly by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). It is the ISO/IEC 27001 standard on information technology, security techniques, and information security management systems. The final guidance document is published by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) called The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (the NIST Framework). There is a lot of information within each of these reference documents.

The primary focus of cyber security programs is to put measures in place to protect both OT (Operational Technology) and IT (Integrated Technology) onboard a vessel. OT is defined as a system we use in our normal day-to-day operations such as navigation equipment, radar, GPS, etc. IT is the system that integrates those devices and connects them eventually to the internet.

Putting an effective shipboard cyber security plan in place is more difficult than land-based operations and requires coordination between multiple devices and support organizations. IT and OT technology being deployed onboard large yachts continues to expand as new software technology is being developed and launched to reduce onboard workloads.

The reference document most maritime organizations, flag states and vessels use to develop their cyber security program is the NIST framework. This framework has five basic parts: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. This framework is easy to develop into a basic cyber security plan for a vessel.

In part two of this column, I will explore the framework and some of the basic parts that should be included in an ISM plan as part of a vessel’s overall SMS.

Corey D. Ranslem is CEO at International Maritime Security Associates (www.imsa.global). With more than 24 years of combined Coast Guard and maritime industry experience, he aims to enhance the way mariners handle security threats and risk management. Comments are welcome below.

Source: https://www.the-triton.com/2020/05/secure-at-sea-is-your-vessel-ready-for-imos-cyber-security-compliance/

There is no future without development, and this is not achieved without a digital environment and integrated technologies. In this scope there are no borders between countries or between the public and private sectors neither between the various economic and industrial activities. There is only customized knowledge, communication, interaction, progress and evolution. As a consequence, there is a challenge concerning security and risk reduction in the operation and maintenance process.

​Cyberattacks in 2018 are ranked among the top three threats facing the world, according to the World Economic Forum.

​Cyber security should be seen as an integral part of overall management against the increasing trend of threats both in scope and complexity.

Maritime sector

Cyber security is now a priority in the shipping sector, as it is an interesting yet sensitive target for cyber attacks.
It is proven that 90% of global trade is transported by merchant ships, increasingly dependent on digital and operational technology, coupled with the vast network of service providers, while port management also plays a central role in the supply chain of the globalized market and real impact in the daily lives of most of the world’s population.

​Oil & Gas sector

Cybersecurity is a top priority for Upstream, Midstream and Downstream functions in the Oil & Gas industry.
From wells to terminals & fuel stations, throughout the full value chain, a huge attack surface is created which could lead to economic or life losses up to very serious environmental incidents.

​Energy sector

Cyber Security in the energy sector is a major concern. From conventional or renewable production, transportation, storage and distribution, energy is inarguably one of the most critical assets in modern society. It is all about its stability and prosperity.

Our effort is to include the following Key Topics for discussion:

• EU CyberSecurity strategy
• CyberSecurity regulations & standards
• Cyber strategy assessments
• CyberSecurity information sharing & collaboration
• CyberSecurity awareness, training, exercising, guidance
• Cyber risk and threat identification and assessment
• CyberSecurity, business intelligence, and data analytics
• CyberSecurity implications for IT-OT, Scada/ICS, Big Data
• Cyber-physical systems and Internet of Things
• CyberSecurity and artificial intelligence (AI)
• CyberSecurity and blockchain
• CyberSecurity and the human factor

More info about the online event: https://www.cypber.com/

Author: Ewan Robinson, director of maritime communications and solutions provider Yangosat. 

We hacked a ship. The Owner is Liable.

Well, we hacked the communications system of the ship. Technically we have been doing this for a few years.

This time we did it like a “bad guy” would.

We got into the vessel, belonging to a multinational company, and found out everything possible about the system, the setup, the manufacturers information.

This is a very specialised vessel that was alongside in the capitol city of a major European country, carrying out cargo discharge.

We could have broken the system so badly, the vessel would have been back to Sat-C and flag signals.

Any information going through that satcomm would have been able to be collected, checked and used.

As we are Ethical Hackers, we are obliged to act in certain ways. One of them is that we have to tell everyone involved if we did something during testing.

We did. Well, we tried to.

The Owners operators, when we finally managed to get someone in the overworked operations department to listen, didn’t care and ignored us.

The manufacturers didn’t even bother to respond.

All of the test was documented, peer reviewed and otherwise substantiated by trusted persons.

The lawyers are going to have a field day and be very happy.

Ship owners are not.

Owners and operators are being badly supported and advised by these super providers, who use third party engineers, or poorly trained engineers, and leave systems in an exposed state. Equipment manufacturers and developers are so guilty of poor techniques and security that using “industry best practice” is a total contradiction.

Lawyers, P&I and Class are going to be so busy refusing claims in the event of a cyber incident, that the poor owners are not going to know where to turn.

Owners are forced into accepting sub-standard equipment. This equipment cannot be made secure in its current format, and yet the manufacturers and developers, fail to update and secure them.

The providers supply this equipment, along with the bandwidth and engineers who install them, and then incorrectly configure and allow public access to them. The Owner is still liable.

So how were they failed?

We have been presenting at various conferences over the last few years, highlighting how exposed we are as an industry to ‘hackers’ and bad actors.

It normally consisted of a prepared victim vessel, using a system that had been poorly configured by the provider, or the providers appointed/trained engineer, and accessing the equipment onboard, normally the antenna or satcomm system. It’s a quick way to display to an audience just how much we are ‘displaying publicly’.

recently someone asked “what could someone actually do?”

A relevant question we thought, so we tested to see what we could actually do.

As a basic attack, an intruder could lock out all the users from accessing the equipment. They could turn off the satcom, or prevent systems and users onboard gaining access to the internet or to systems onshore or stop onshore reaching the vessel.

OK, so this is annoying and disruptive, costing from a few hundreds to several tens or hundreds  of thousands if the charterer deems “off hire” status due to lack of communications.

Well, that’s quite expensive, potentially.

But what can we learn from the systems we can get at?

A lot.

Given the amount of systems that are exposed to the internet, with poor configuration, it is relatively easy to find a ‘victim’, and to maximise the information gained by using the tools available and exposed by the simplest of mistakes.

Default admin passwords.

There is a need for it, but no excuse for it.

Service Providers, who manage several thousands of vessels, still use engineers who leave default admin usernames and passwords.

So, it’s a fault on one vessel, but it cant really hurt can it?

It can. And it does.

Our target vessel was found.

That took 7 minutes to locate.

It belonged to a very large multinational corporation. The default username and password was still in effect on the VSAT system.

Access was made to the administration area, so all usernames and passwords could be changed. Also available was access to the system by FTP. Even if this had not already been enabled, as we were in the Admin area, we could have enabled it.

This is where major security flaw #1 was found. The FTP access gave access to the entire operating system of the device, not just the FTP area.

Major security flaw #2 was putting a text file in every folder with a map of the entire structure of the operating system.

This allowed for finding and copying the ‘hidden’ password file to our local machine. It was actually encrypted.

2 hours later, it wasn’t.

So now we had all the manufacturers usernames and passwords.

Now we can access the publicly available machines where they have changed the default admin username and password, by using the manufacturers. They have these so the engineers can always get in. Great for business and support, not so for security.

The network connections listed in the antenna setup were then investigated.

The VSAT Modem was accessed, again using default connections on SSH, with publicly available usernames and passwords.

Command line access to the modem was achieved, allowing us to take control and alter the configuration. In effect we could now control the communications in 2 different places.

Such systemic failures, at the developmental and operational level, are going to have huge issues when Cyber 2021 comes into force next year.

Class and P&I will be left wondering who to refuse claims and who to sue for negligence when there are events, while the operators are trusting the providers to implement correctly, and the manufacturers and developers are failing at such basic levels, they will likely be left with the legal responsibility in the first instance.

The lesson of life in todays marine communications environment?

Don’t trust what’s being given to you.

Unless you have had your own trusted IT check what’s gone before, why would you blindly trust a stranger with your vessels now?

The Owner is Liable.

Yangosat is a maritime communications and solutions provider, helping shipowners and providers realise new systems and invigorate existing ones. This article has been reproduced with the author’s permission. 

Terminal operator DP World has become the latest supply chain stakeholder to join the TradeLens blockchain-based digital container logistics platform, jointly developed by Maersk and IBM.

DP World says that it aims to connect all of its 82 marine and inland container terminals, as well as feeder companies and logistics divisions, with TradeLens. In 2019 DP World’s terminals handled 71.2 million TEU containers from around 70,000 vessels.

From the terminal operator’s standpoint, better access to data via the platform will provide improved visibility of container flows across multiple carriers, allowing for more efficient planning at its facilities. The move will also strengthen its own digital offerings via the Digital Freight Alliance, founded by DP World earlier this year to bring together logistics providers using the SeaRates.com, LandRates.com, and AirRates.com platforms.

“Our decision to team up with TradeLens is driven by our vision for intelligent logistics, reducing costs and creating value,” said Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Group Chairman and Chief Executive Office of DP World.

“DP World is working to deliver integrated supply chain solutions to cargo owners, backed by our global network of ports, terminals, economic zones and inland operations. By working with TradeLens we will accelerate the digitisation of global trade.”

“Modernising the processes by which logistics operate is critical to building more robust and more efficient supply chains which will help economic development and generate more prosperity.”

DP World has already connected Cochin Port in India with TradeLens via API. Plans to collaborate with other DP World business units, including the feeder line Unifeeder, have also been initiated. More than 110 different operators’ ports and terminals are now directly integrated with the blockchain platform.

“It is very encouraging to see the continued adoption of the TradeLens platform among global logistics players as it helps global supply chain customers expand and explore the benefits of digital documentation flows,” said Vincent Clerc, CEO of Ocean and Logistics, Maersk.

“In turn, the broadened geographic scope of the platform provides new opportunities for TradeLens ecosystem participants to innovate and develop digital offerings on the platform.”

Source: https://smartmaritimenetwork.com/2020/05/28/dp-world-joins-tradelens/

Royal IHC (IHC) has been awarded the contract for the engineering and equipment delivery for a new 6,540m³ Trailing Suction Hopper Dredger (TSHD) for Weeks Marine Inc. (Weeks). This is an identical vessel to the MAGDALEN that was delivered in 2017. Part of the contract is the supply of key components as well as the provision of several technical services during the construction process.

The vessel, which will sail under the name R.B. WEEKS, will be built at Eastern Shipbuilding Group’s Allanton Shipyard Panama City, Florida. The new TSHD is designed for beach nourishment and capital dredging works and is highly automated.

IHC is honoured to have been selected by Weeks once again for the vessel design and supply of key components. This repeat order confirms the satisfaction expressed by Weeks about the construction of the MAGDALEN and its performance, and underlines IHC’s proven track record in designing world-class dredging vessels and equipment. Moreover, IHC is very excited and committed to become the partner of choice in a very challenging but promising market, which has all the signs of picking up momentum.

Hans B. Blomberg, Weeks’ Technical Manager Hopper Dredgers, says: “We are excited to be working with Royal IHC again on our sister vessel construction project. IHC’s engineering and hardware supply services will assure that we will once again have a first-class vessel utilising the most modern and innovative technology available on the market.”

His view is shared by Erdinç Açıkel, IHC’s Head of Custom-Built Hopper Dredgers, who adds: “We are proud that Weeks – a long-standing and highly valued customer of ours – has again chosen IHC to be its reliable partner. It underscores the trust that this leading market player in the USA puts in the performance and technology of our engineering and dredging solutions.”

Key components
Like the MADGALEN, the R.B. WEEKS will be equipped with IHC-designed and built equipment, including the complete and highly efficient dredging installation, dredging automation and instrumentation, propulsion and main electrical system. The vessel will again be equipped with IHC’s unique dynamic positioning and tracking (DP/DT) system and eco pump controllers, which will both further enhance its efficiency.

Technical services
IHC will also provide a number of technical services, including the assistance of its qualified engineers for inspection during installation of the delivered equipment at the shipyard, and support during start-up and commissioning of the dredger. The delivery of the R.B. WEEKS is scheduled for early 2023.

Source: https://www.maritimebyholland.com/news/royal-ihc-to-deliver-design-package-and-key-components-for-new-tshd-of-weeks-marine-inc-2/

A consortium of Bouygues, Saipem, and Boskalis has been awarded the contract for design, construction, and installation of 71 concrete Gravity-Based Structures (GBS) which will serve as foundations for the Fécamp offshore wind farm turbines in Normandy, France.

The award was made by Eoliennes Offshore des Hautes Falaises (EOHF), following the launch of the $2,2 billion offshore wind project by EDF Renewables, Enbridge, and wpd on Tuesday.

The contract carries a total value of EUR 552 million (USD 616 million). The contract value split is 40.5% (Bouygues Travaux Publics) 40.5% (Saipem) 19% (Boskalis).

The offshore wind farm will be located between 13 and 22 kilometers off the coast of Fécamp in Normandy. The 71 wind turbines, to be delivered by Siemens Gamesa, will be connected to the gravity-based foundations installed on the seabed at depths between 25 and 30 meters.

Within the consortium, Bouygues, as the leader of the Consortium, and Saipem are tasked with the design, construction, and installation on the seabed of the 71 gravity-based foundations with an individual weight of up to 5,000 tonnes necessary to provide the stability of the 7MW wind turbines. Boskalis is tasked with the design and preparation of the seabed rock foundation prior to GBS installation, and the scour protection and ballasting of the GBS’ after installation on the seabed.

The foundations will be constructed in the Bougainville maritime works yard in the Grand Port Maritime of Le Havre and will be transported by barge to the offshore wind farm site. The works, which will start in the next few days, should be completed by the end of 2022. The commissioning and operational start-up of the wind farm are planned for 2023.

With a total power output of some 500 MW, the Fécamp offshore wind farm should produce the equivalent of the domestic electricity consumption of approximately 770,000 people, representing more than 60% of the inhabitants of the Seine-Maritime department.

Source: https://www.oedigital.com/news/478986-boskalis-bouygues-saipem-jv-to-build-f-camp-owf-gbs