UK CLUB Archives - SHIP IP LTD

The UK P&I Club, one of the leading providers of P&I insurance and other services to the international shipping community, has appointed William Beveridge as its new Chief Underwriting Officer. He joins the UK Club on completion of his current employment obligations.

Reporting to Chief Executive Officer Andrew Taylor, William will be responsible for oversight of all the Club’s underwriting policies and operations during an exciting period as the Club continues to consider further diversification following the recent collaborative agreement with Thomas Miller Specialty, which created a joined up and market-leading partnership providing a fixed premium P&I product with global reach.

William joins from Newline Underwriting, the international insurance division of Odyssey Group, where he is currently CUO, and worked previously at Advent Insurance and Arch Insurance.

He has previously sat on the Joint Hull Committee and the IUMI Ocean Hull Committee, and currently sits on the Lloyd’s Register Classification Committee.

William replaces Christopher Brown, who is relocating to the Club’s Rotterdam office as part of its strategic long term planning. He is replacing Hugo Wynn-Williams who will be stepping down as CEO of UKNV over the summer. Hugo will continue in his advisory role for Thomas Miller and its clients, including P&I, as President of Thomas Miller Bermuda. UKNV is the company through which the Club writes all European risk and which provides a fronting solution for a number of other Thomas Miller managed Clubs in Europe.

Andrew Taylor, Chief Executive Officer, UK P& I Club, says: “William’s considerable experience of the marine and wider insurance market will be a huge asset to the Club as we pursue our diversification and growth strategy, while maintaining our excellence in disciplined underwriting and quality risk selection.  With the wealth of experience William brings, it is very exciting to be able to warmly welcome him to the UK Club.”

News & resources Press Release: UK P&I Club

A key element of the MARPOL regulations is the requirement to record discharges of shipboard substances and materials which could cause pollution to the environment. Traditionally, these record books have been maintained in paper form.

On 17 May 2019, IMO’s MEPC 74 adopted the resolutions below to allow for ERBs to be used. Guidelines to support the use of ERBs were also adopted by the Committee. These amendments, which will reduce the heavy burden associated with paperwork and which are thus to be welcomed, will enter into force on 1 October 2020;

Resolution MEPC.314(74) – Amendments to MARPOL Annexes I, II and V (Electronic Record Books)
Resolution MEPC.316(74)– Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Electronic Record Books and EEDI regulations for ice-strengthened ships)
Resolution MEPC.317(74) – Amendments to the NOx Technical Code 2008 (Electronic Record Books and Certification requirements for SCR systems)
Resolution MEPC.312(74) – Guidelines for the use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL

The Guidelines are only applicable to the use of ERBs on board to meet the requirements of the following record books and recording requirements under MARPOL Annexes I, II, V & VI and the Technical Code on Control of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine Diesel Engines (NOX Technical Code):

• Oil Record Book, parts I and II (MARPOL Annex I, regulations 17.1 and 36.1);
• Cargo Record Book (MARPOL Annex II, regulation 15.1);
• Garbage Record Book, parts I and II (MARPOL Annex V, regulation 10.3);
• Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book (MARPOL Annex VI, regulation 12.6);
• Recording of the tier and on/off status of marine diesel engines (MARPOL Annex VI, regulation 13.5.3);
• Record of Fuel Oil Changeover (MARPOL Annex VI, regulation 14.6); and
• Record Book of Engine Parameters (NOX Technical Code, paragraph 6.2.2.7).

An ERB is defined in the Guidance as a device or a system used to electronically record entries. When an ERB is to be used as an alternative to an official hard copy record book onboard a ship, the State’s Administration is required to assess the device or system and to issue a “Declaration of Marpol Electronic Record Book”. A copy of this declaration must be kept onboard the ship. The procedures related to the use of ERBs must be documented in the ship’s Safety Management System (SMS).

To comply with MARPOL requirements, an ERB should have the capability to retain all records made for the minimum period as specified in each Annex of MARPOL. The ERB should also have the capability to produce a hard copy of verified records for the master to certify as a true copy, upon request from relevant authorities, and to allow automatic backup of data in its system to offline storage.

Source: ukpandi

During April, there were zero new detentions of foreign flagged vessels in a UK port.

1. In response to one of the recommendations of Lord Donaldson’s inquiry into the prevention of pollution from merchant shipping, and in compliance with the EU Directive on Port State Control (2009/16/EC as amended), the Maritime and Coastguard agency (MCA) publishes details of the foreign flagged vessels detained in UK ports each month.

2. The UK is part of a regional agreement on port state control known as the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MOU) and information on all ships that are inspected is held centrally in an electronic database known as THETIS. This allows the ships with a high risk rating and poor detention records to be targeted for future inspection.

3. Inspections of foreign flagged ships in UK ports are undertaken by surveyors from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. When a ship is found to be not in compliance with applicable convention requirements, a deficiency may be raised. If any of their deficiencies are so serious, they have to be rectified before departure, then the ship will be detained.

4. All deficiencies should be rectified before departure.

5. When applicable, the list includes those passenger craft prevented from operating under the provisions of the EU Directive on a system of inspections for the safe operation of Ro-Ro passenger ships and high-speed passenger craft in regular service and amending directive 2009/16/EC and repealing Council Directive 1999/35/EC (Directive EU 2017/2110).

Notes on the list of detentions:

• Full details of the ship: The accompanying detention list shows ship’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) number which is unchanging throughout the ship’s life and uniquely identifies it. It also shows the ship’s name and flag state at the time of its inspection.
• Company: The company shown in the vessel’s Safety Management Certificate (SMC) or if there is no SMC, then the party otherwise believed to be responsible for the safety of the ship at the time of inspection.
• Classification society: The list shows the classification society responsible for classing the ship only.
• Recognised organisation: Responsible for conducting the statutory surveys: and issuing statutory certificates on behalf of the flag state.
• White (WL), grey (GL) and black lists (BL) are issued by the Paris MoU on 01 July each year and shows the performance of flag state.
• Deficiencies: The deficiencies listed are the ones which were detainable. Further details of other deficiencies can be provided on request.

SHIPS DETAINED IN APRIL 2020
DETENTIONS CARRIED OVER FROM PREVIOUS MONTHS
Vessel Name: LIVA GRETA
GT: 851

IMO: 8801072

Flag: Lativa (white list)

Company: Liepajas Trading & Shipping Agency Ltd

Classification society: RINA

Recognised organisation: RINA

Recognised organisation for ISM Doc: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: RMRS

Date and place of detention: 11th January 2020 at Birkenhead

Summary: Nine deficiencies with two grounds for detention

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020

Vessel Name: KUZMA MININ
GT: 16257

IMO: 7721263

Flag: Russian Federation (Grey list)

Company: Murmansk Shipping Co

Classification society: RMRS

Recognised organisation: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM Doc: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: RMRS

Date and place of detention: 18th December 2018 at Falmouth

Summary: Thirteen deficiencies with six grounds for detention

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020

Vessel Name: POSEIDON
GT: 1412

IMO: 7363217

Flag: Iceland (White list)

Company: Neptune EHF

Classification society: NA

Recognised organisation: NA

Recognised organisation for ISM Doc: DNV-GL

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: DNV-GL

Date and place of detention: 19th July 2018 at Hull

Summary: Ten deficiencies with two grounds for detention

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020

Vessel Name: TECOIL POLARIS
GT: 1814

IMO No: 8883290

Flag: Russian Federation (Grey list)

Company: Tecoil Shipping Ltd

Classification society: RMRS

Recognised organisation: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM DOC: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: RMRS

Date and place of detention: 6th June 2018 at Immingham

Summary: Twenty-seven deficiencies with eight grounds for detentions

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020

Vessel Name: CIEN PORCIENTO (General Cargo)
GT: 106.

IMO No: 8944446.

Flag: Unregistered.

Company: Open Window Inc.

Classification society: Unclassed.

Recognised organisation: Not applicable.

Recognised organisation for ISM DOC: Not applicable.

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: Not applicable

Date and place of detention: 4 March 2010, Lowestoft

Summary: Thirty deficiencies including seven grounds for detention

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020
Source: UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency

Source:
https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/foreign-flagged-ships-detained-in-the-uk-during-april-2020/

This Circular is an update on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) sanctions enforcement Circular published in January 2019. This serves as an update following the recently published 2019/2020 UN Panel of Experts of North Korea Sanctions Report (see Report).

Background

The report notes that the DPRK regime has not taken steps to end its nuclear programme, which continues in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Stringent sanctions measures have therefore remained in force. According to the Panel of Experts, the DPRK regime has continued to raise revenue for its ballistic missile programme through the illicit import of refined petroleum and export of commodities such as sand and coal. Maritime activities have been identified as facilitating this revenue stream for DPRK.

The message from the UN and national enforcement agencies is clear. Shipowners are strongly advised to take note that sanctions monitoring, and surveillance continues at a pace and through the co-operation of UN Member States more evidence is being collated and reported where there has been such a breach.

Evidence of use of non-DPRK vessels

The report notes a continuing use of non-DPRK flagged vessels that are used to perform illicit ship-to- ship (STS) cargo transfers at sea. The report further notes that DPRK has changed its trading methods to evade detection using STS transfers between non-DPRK flagged vessels in international waters and subsequent delivery of unlawful cargo direct to Nampo. Such vessels have conducted operations several times over before they are detected. These operations have amounted to the DPRK receiving almost three times the UN specified total cap of 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum (paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017)). With the assistance of a UN Member State, 14 vessels were designated, though none are entered with an International Group Club. To conceal the true identification of the ownership and financial interests behind the vessels carrying out these activities, it was reported that most of the vessels’ registered owners were dissolved or struck off company registers or were operating under false or fraudulent flags.

The Panel noted the need for regulators, enforcement agencies and the maritime industry to remain vigilant and maintain proper and effective due diligence. Tanker operators in particular should make every effort to identify and confirm the true intended destination of cargoes carried on board. STS transfers frequently take place at night with the automatic identification systems (AIS) being disabled and subsequent transfers of cargo are made to smaller vessels without IMO numbers.

The report notes that the DPRK is continuously innovating and adapting to avoid detection of its activities and a further trend reported by the Panel was the exploitation of the scrap vessel market where onward sale of vessels of larger bulk carriers (destined for scrap) were being used to transfer coal, as opposed to the previous use of smaller vessels.

Exercise Caution when fixing contracts

On 3 May, 2019, the United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) published a “Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments” (the “Compliance Framework”), which sets out OFAC’s views of the essential elements of an effective sanctions compliance programme.

All clubs in the International Group issued a Circular at the time drawing attention to its publication emphasising the importance for any shipowner, charterer or trader to adopt measures that mitigate the risk of breaking sanctions.

In the light of the most recent UN report, the Club once again advises all members to continue to apply the highest level of due diligence to mitigate the risk of performing activities with a DPRK nexus. The penalties for doing so could result in designation, asset freezing and listing by the UN, OFAC and other enforcement agencies.

Any trade with a DPRK nexus will be subject to surveillance and scrutiny by monitoring agencies, including vessel movements, using AIS and long-range identification tracking, satellite imagery and other assets. Vessels that are suspected of breaching sanctions against DPRK may be listed by national authorities and/or subject to search and detained at ports whilst investigations are carried out.

Ramifications on Club cover

Any activity assessed to be in breach of sanctions will result in the withdrawal of insurance cover. Even if it were possible to undertake legitimate trade with DPRK and/or DPRK interests, members should consider that an International Group Club is unlikely to be able to support vessels trading to DPRK, with payment of claims and fees and the provision of security liable to be delayed and perhaps completely prohibited.

All Members are therefore strongly urged to mitigate the risks of undertaking any business with DPRK or which may have a DPRK nexus, including but not limited to STS operations, and exercise the fullest possible due diligence to ensure that they do not knowingly or inadvertently perform prohibited activities with DPRK entities.

All International Group Clubs have issued a similarly worded Circular.
Source: Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Limited

Source:

https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/uk-report-on-dprk-sanctions/