Dryad and cyber partners RedSkyAlliance continue to monitor the stark upward trend in attempted attacks within the maritime sector.

“Fraudulent emails designed to make recipients hand over sensitive information, extort money or trigger malware installation on shore-based or vessel IT networks remains one of the biggest day-to-day cyber threats facing the maritime industry.”

Dryad Global’s cyber security partners, Red Sky Alliance, perform weekly queries of  backend databases, identifying all new data containing Motor Vessel (MV) and Motor Tanker (MT) in the subject line of malicious emails.  Email subject line Motor Vessel (MV) or Motor Tanker (MT) keyword usage is a common lure to entice users in the maritime industry to open emails containing malicious attachments.

Cyber Featured Image TwitterWith our cyber security partner we are providing a weekly list of Motor Vessels where it is observed that the vessel is being impersonated, with associated malicious emails.

The identified emails attempted to deliver malware or phishing links to compromise the vessels and/or parent companies.  Users should be aware of the subject lines used and the email addresses that are attempting to deliver the messages.

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Malicious Email collection 14-17 Sep 2020

 First Seen Subject Line Used Malware Detections Sending Email Targets
Sep 14, 2020 Re: Bulk Cargo Shipment for saaten-union.de HackTool:Win64/Mimikatz.A “Chen Xin” <felix.chen@longsailing.net> saaten-union.de
Sep 14, 2020 Re: Re: Purchase Purse seiner. Tuna vessel Trojan:Win32/Woreflint.A!cl Lei Yang <49fd2d524@064b6638.cf> de8041c.com
Sep 14, 2020 Fwd:RV and Boat Storage Future Add-on Trojan-Downloader.VBA.Emotet “Charles Shajari” <08fc70@7a904f387a30206b9.com> 42f15e645c23f02ff1dad28eb.com
Sep 14, 2020 RE: Final Permit set – Boat Storage Trojan-Downloader.VBA.Emotet “charles shajari” <ce3f7c@8adcef713a5.mk> 42f15e645c23f02ff1dad28eb.com>
Sep 14, 2020 Fwd:Swain Boat House TROJ_FRS.VSNW0EI20 “Brittney Phillips” <ab8c7e66da21af@5808ec15.com> 27cde66c2a.com
Sep 15, 2020 MV GENCO STAR / ARRIVAL REPORT AT MIRI PORT W97M/Downloader.dbv “star@sea-one.com” <majid@hulumtele.com> kwship.com
Sep 15, 2020 MOL HIROSHIMA – REMINDER Counter-measure for Soot damage to cargo vehicles in MAZDA stock yard-2 Trojan.W97M.POWLOAD.THIADBO “FUKUSHIMA, Hajime” <srashidzada@vicc.co> cidoship.com>
Sep 15, 2020 MV DIVINEGATE / Owners husbandry matter appointment – Yantai Port Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.C!ml “Nicholas Chin” <nicholas_chin@epshipping.com.sg> epshipping.com.sg
Sep 15, 2020 MV. OCEAN LEADER – ARRIVL REPORT AT MIRI TrojanDownloader:O97M/Emotet.PEE!MTB “oceanleader@sea-one.com” <storeag@bwrl.in> kwship.com
Sep 15, 2020 MV KMTC INCHEON – SBP for off Signer – TrojanDownloader:O97M/Emotet.RKC!MTB “KMTC INCHEON” <viviana.ramirez@suministroseimpresos.com>

“Lee Won-gun” <wglee@withuskor.com>

Targets Not Disclosed
Sep 15, 2020 Re: RE: MV KMTC TOKYO – 3/O’s BIO DATA & CRD FORM TrojanDownloader:O97M/Emotet.RKC!MTB “CrewYGN” <edp@veeyesfoundry.com> withuskor.com
Sep 15, 2020 Re: [Operation] – GFO(V090) – Sailing Report at Kashima, Japan – 200316 TrojanDownloader:O97M/Emotet.CSK!MTB “GFOREVER” <compras02@casaguerra.com.mx> skshipping.com
Sep 15, 2020 RE : RE : URGENT!!! 2 x 20ft – SHIPPING DOC BL,SI,INV#462345 // MAERSK KLEVEN V.949E // CLGQOE191781 // Trojan-Downloader.MSWord.Agent.buh “A.P. Moller – Maersk” <noreply@maersk.com> Targets Not Disclosed
Sep 15, 2020 RE: CMA CGM CHRISTOPHE COLOMB – Bridge Trojan-Downloader.VBA.Emotet “CMA CGM CHRISTOPHE COLOMB – Bridge <b0cc76405561ab7f3b1@7689502.com>” <f1d968@55be7fd0a4.za> eae0ec1d660.com
Sep 16, 2020 MV TBN CALL AT DAFENG port / EPDA Trojan:Win32/Agenttesla.TB!MTB “OPS”<ops@esmaritime.com> royaleg.co.kr
Sep 16, 2020 Re: Re: MV DARYA KIRTHI/YANGZHONG -EPDA Trojan:Win32/Agenttesla.TB!MTB “csacjpqsw@cnshipping.com”<csacjpqsw@cnshipping.com> cnshipping.com
Sep 17, 2020 PRE ARRIVAL FORMS FOR SUBJECT VESSEL Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.D7!ml lutfullah.ansary@aplombtechbd.com pacificpatent.com
Sep 17, 2020 Re: [Operation] – GFO(V093) – Sailing report at Port Elizabeth, South Africa – 200805 TrojanDownloader:O97M/Emotet.CSK!MTB “GFOREVER” <finance@centralpoint.team> skshipping.com
Sep 17, 2020 Various spare parts to M.V. Sunrise Ace through Norton Lilly Inter= Trojan.W97M.EMOTET.TIOIBELH “Donald Young” <ag@arzni.com> amosconnect.com>
Sep 17, 2020 One piece of coupling spare part to be delivered to M.V. Heroic Ac= TrojanDownloader:O97M/Emotet.RKC!MTB “Atlas Marine Services” <export@arzni.com> amosconnect.com
Sep 17, 2020 [PR259 BIO-MEG] OIL AND MARINE / RFQ / Toyo Engineering & Trojan:Win32/Woreflint.A!cl nmw_ikram <nmw.ikram@toyo-eng.com> Targets Not Disclosed
Sep 17, 2020 Re: : PO 646900 – freight charge – New York Power TrojanDownloader:O97M/Donoff!MSR <jerome.marionneau@deffeuille.fr> safeguard-technology.com
Sep 17, 2020 HAPAG ,MSC PAYMENT JOB NO:1419-1421-1422-1524-1525–1541 TrojanDownloader:O97M/Emotet.CSK!MTB “Vinod Mudaliar” <c86a7775c664@727aefab.com> 2010546c.biz
Sep 17, 2020 RE: [Operation] – GFO(V093) – Sailing report from Taixing, China – 200607 TrojanDownloader:O97M/Emotet.CSK!MTB “GFOREVER” <contacto@comarlot.com.mx> skshipping.com

I


Top 5 Malicious Senders

Sender Malware Sent
Mr. Astley Huang / MOLSHIP(S)<BR>r Trojan.W97M.EMOTET.TIOIBELH
“A.P. Moller – Maersk” <noreply@maersk.com> Exploit-GBW!3D4258FDCC47, W97M/Downloader.bjx
“GFOREVER” <finance@centralpoint.team> Trojan.W97M.EMOTET.TIOIBELH
“star@sea-one.com” <majid@hulumtele.com> W97M/Downloader.dbv
“oceanleader@sea-one.com” <storeag@bwrl.in> TrojanDownloader:O97M/Emotet.PEE!MTB

In the above collection, we see malicious actors attempting to use vessel names to try to spoof companies in the maritime supply chain. This week we observed a wide variety of maritime-related subject lines. Some of the new vessel names used this week include “MV Divinegate” among others. Analysts observed bad actors leveraging “Maersk Kleven” in malicious email subject lines again this week. Actors have used this vessel name multiple times over the past year. Over the past year, this vessel has been observed in over a dozen malicious email subject lines. The sender continues to use the “’A.P. Moller – Maersk’ <noreply[at]Maersk[.]com>” email address in an attempt to trick the users into thinking they are receiving a legitimate email from the shipping company, Maersk.

Analysts observed the malicious subject line “RE: [Operation] – GFO(V093) – Sailing report from Taixing, China – 200607” being used this week. Notably, the phrase “Re: [Operation] – GFO(V093)” is contained in multiple malicious subject lines this week. This subject line mentions the Taixing Port in China, but the other subject lines reference ports in South Africa and Japan.

The email starts off with a generic “Good day” greeting. Typically, this would indicate that the attackers are using a generic spam template for use against multiple targets. However, in this case, there is a specific schedule laid out in the email indicating that this email is referencing a specific vessel/voyage. The message is signed by the “Master of M/V G. Forever Capt. Sin Jong Hwan.” This captain’s signature is listed in all three emails. This indicates that the captain is being impersonated to commit cyber-attacks and may potentially indicate that their account has been taken over by attackers to be used in cyber-attacks.

All these email look very similar and appear to use the voyage schedule as a lure to entice victims to open the malicious attached documents. Although the emails reference ports in different countries, the attachments are all titled with the following filenames written in Japanese:

• からの変更.doc (Changes from.doc)
• 変化-2020_09_16.doc (Change-2020_09_16.doc)
• に修_2020_09_15.doc (Osamu _2020_09_15.doc)

Although each email targets a separate employee at the company, all the emails target employees of SK Shipping, a major South Korean shipping company. The employees’ positions could not be identified using open source and the targeted email addresses do not appear anywhere on the company website.
The company is being targeted by Emotet malware (attached to all three malicious emails). This malware has evolved and become a significant threat to companies as it currently can steal sensitive information and leverage infected devices in attacks against other networks.


 

These analysis results illustrate how a recipient could be fooled into opening an infected email.   Doing so could cause the recipient to become an infected member of the maritime supply chain and thus possibly infect victim vessels, port facilities and/or shore companies in the marine, agricultural, and other industries with additional malware.

Fraudulent emails designed to make recipients hand over sensitive information, extort money or trigger malware installation on shore-based or vessel IT networks remains one of the biggest day-to-day cyber threats facing the maritime industry.  These threats often carry a financial liability to one or all those involved in the maritime transportation supply chain.   Preventative cyber protection offers a strong first-line defence by preventing deceptive messages from ever reaching staff inboxes, but malicious hackers are developing new techniques to evade current detection daily.  Using pre-emptive information from Red Sky Alliance-RedXray diagnostic tool, our Vessel Impersonation reports, and Maritime Blacklists offer a proactive solution to stopping cyber-attacks.    Recent studies suggest cyber-criminals are researching their targets and tailoring emails for staff in specific roles.  Another tactic is to spoof emails from the chief executive or other high-ranking maritime contemporaries in the hope staff lower down the supply chain will drop their awareness and follow the spoofed email obediently.  Analysts across the industry are beginning to see maritime-specific examples of these attacks.

Pre-empt, don’t just defend

Preventative cyber protection offers a strong first-line defense by preventing deceptive messages from ever reaching staff inboxes, but malicious hackers are developing new techniques to evade current detection daily. Using preemptive information from Red Sky Alliance RedXray diagnostic tool, our Vessel Impersonation reports and Maritime Blacklists offer a proactive solution to stopping cyber-attacks. Recent studies suggest cyber-criminals are researching their targets and tailoring emails for staff in specific roles. Another tactic is to spoof emails from the chief executive or other high-ranking maritime contemporaries in the hope staff lower down the supply chain will drop their awareness and follow the spoofed email obediently. Analysts across the industry are beginning to see maritime-specific examples of these attacks.


The more convincing an email appears, the greater the chance employees will fall for a scam.  To address this residual risk, software-based protection should be treated as one constituent of a wider strategy that also encompasses the human-element as well as organizational workflows and procedures.

It is imperative to:

  • Train all levels of the marine supply chain to realize they are under constant cyber-attack.
  • Stress maintaining constant attention to real-world cyber consequences of careless cyber practices or general inattentiveness.
  • Provide practical guidance on how to look for a potential phishing attempt.
  • Use direct communication to verify emails and supply chain email communication.
  • Use Red Sky Alliance RedXray proactive support, our Vessel impersonation information and use the Maritime Black Lists to proactively block cyber attacks from identified malicious actors.

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September 25, 2020 IMO

The “bunker”, which is the main consumable for ships, is Fuel Oil obtained by the distillation of crude oil. Crude oil contains sulfur, which causes harmful emissions after combustion in ship machinery. Sulfur oxides (SOx) are extremely harmful to human health. It is known to cause respiratory distress symptoms and lung diseases. SOx in the atmosphere contributes to acid rain that can harm all living creatures, crops, forests, all kinds of water basins, as well as those living in these waters, without minding wild or modern.

 

In general, limiting SOx emissions caused by the use of fossil fuels will increase the air quality in the atmosphere and protect living things and the environment.

IMO regulations to reduce sulfur oxide (SOx) emissions from ships first came into force in 2005 under Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (known as the MARPOL Convention). Since then, the limitations on sulfur oxides are getting stricter.

 

Simply put, limiting sulfur oxide emissions from ships reduces air pollution and provides a cleaner living environment. The reduction of SOx also helps to reduce the small harmful particles that are generated when fuel is burned.

IMO monitors the sulfur content of fuel used in ships globally. The latest figures show that the annual average sulfur content of residual fuel oils tested in 2017 was 2.54%. In 2017, the worldwide average sulfur content for distillate fuel was 0.08%.

 

Since 1 January 2015, the sulfur limit for Fuel Oil used by ships operating in the Emission Control Areas (ECA) designated by IMO for the control of sulfur oxides (SOX) has been 0.10% m / m. ECAs for SOx created under MARPOL Annex VI are: Baltic Sea region; North Sea region; North America region (includes designated coastal areas other than the United States and Canada); and the United States Caribbean Sea region (waters around Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands).

 

 

Since 1 January 2015, the sulfur limit for Fuel Oil used by ships operating in the Emission Control Areas (ECA) designated by IMO for the control of sulfur oxides (SOX) has been 0.10% m / m. ECAs for SOx created under MARPOL Annex VI are: the Baltic Sea area; the North Sea area; the North American area (covering designated coastal areas off the United States and Canada); and the United States Caribbean Sea area (waters around Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands).

The time IMO adopted regulations to control air pollution

from ships

 

IMO has been working to reduce harmful impacts of shipping
on the environment since the 1960s. Annex VI to the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention) was adopted in 1997, to address air pollution from shipping. The regulations for the
Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships (Annex VI) seek to control airborne
emissions from ships (sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), ozone
depleting substances (ODS), volatile organic compounds (VOC) and shipboard incineration) and their contribution to local and global air pollution, human health issues and environmental problems. Annex VI entered into force on 19 May 2005 and a revised Annex VI with significantly strengthened requirements was adopted in October 2008.

These regulations entered into force on 1 July 2010. The regulations to reduce sulphur oxide emissions introduced a global limit for sulphur content of ships’ fuel oil, with tighter restrictions in designated emission control areas. Since 2010, further amendments to Annex VI have been adopted, including amendments to introduce further Emission Control Areas.

Energy efficiency requirements entered into force in 2013.

 

IMO 2020

 

Until 31 December 2019, for ships operating outside Emission Control Areas, the limit for sulphur content of ships’ fuel oil is 3.50% m/m (mass by mass). The 0.50% m/m limit will apply on and after 1 January 2020.

 

The date of January 1, 2020 is set in the regulations adopted in 2008. However, a provision was adopted requiring the IMO to review the availability of low sulfur fuel oil for use by ships to help Member States determine whether the new lower global limit exists. IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 70), in October 2016, decided that the 0.50% limit shall apply from 1 January 2020.

 

What does the new limit mean for ships?

 

Under the new sulphur limit, ships will have to use fuel oil on board with a sulphur content of no more than 0.50% m/m, against the current limit of 3.50%, which has been in effect since 1 January 2012. The interpretation of “fuel oil used on board” includes use in main and auxiliary engines and boilers. Exemptions are granted in cases involving the safety of the ship, or saving lives at sea, or if a ship or its equipment is damaged. Another exemption allows a ship to experiment with the development of ship emission reduction and control technologies and machine design programs. This requires a special permit from the Flag State of interest.

How can ships meet lower sulfur emission standards?

 

Ships may have got engines able to burn different fuels that contain low or zero sulfur that meet the requirement of consuming low sulfur compliant fuel. For example, liquefied natural gas or biofuels.

An increasing number of ships are also using gas as a fuel as when ignited it leads to negligible sulphur oxide emissions. This has been recognised in the development by IMO of the International Code for Ships using Gases and other Low Flashpoint Fuels (the IGF Code), which was adopted in 2015. Another alternative fuel is methanol which is being used on some short sea services. 3 Ships may also meet the SOx emission requirements by using approved equivalent methods, such as exhaust gas cleaning systems or “scrubbers”, which “clean” the emissions before they are released into the atmosphere. In this case, the equivalent arrangement must be approved by the ship’s Administration (the flag State).

 

IMO has adopted a MARPOL amendment to prohibit the transport of non-compliant fuel for propulsion or combustion on board a ship unless an exhaust gas cleaning system (“scrubber”) is installed on board.

 

Controlling the discipline

 

Implementation is the duty and responsibility of the Administrations (flag States and port / coastal States). Ensuring that the 2020 0.50% m / m sulfur limit is implemented consistently and effectively is a high priority. Ships must be issued an International Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate from Flag States.

 

This certificate includes a section stating that the ship is using fuel oil with sulfur content not exceeding the applicable limit value documented on bunker delivery note or using an approved equivalent regulation. They could also use surveillance, for example air surveillance to assess smoke plumes, and other techniques to identify potential violations.

 

If the rules are not respected, sanctions are determined by individual parties of MARPOL as flag and port states. IMO does not set sanction penalties, its sanctions are up to each State Party.

 

What is IMO doing to ensure proper fuel availability?

 

 

Implementation is the responsibility of the Member States who are contracting Parties to MARPOL Annex VI. The decision by MEPC in October 2016 to affirm the effective date of 1 January 2020 (more than three years before entry into effect of the 0.50% limit) is intended, in part, to provide sufficient time for Member States and industry to prepare for the new requirement, Regulation 18 of MARPOL Annex VI covers both fuel oil availability and quality. As regards the availability of fuel, the regulation requires that each Party “take all reasonable steps to promote the availability of fuels conforming to this Annex and inform the Organization of the availability of compatible fuels at its ports and terminals.

 

Parties are also required to inform IMO when a ship provides evidence that suitable fuel is not available. IMO Global Integrated Transport Information System (GISIS) urged the Organization to inform the Organization about the availability of compatible fuels at its ports and terminals well before January 1, 2020 through the MARPOL Annex VI module. MARPOL Annex VI Rule 18.1.

Why are ships less harmful than other modes of transport?

 

Ships emit pollutants and other harmful emissions. But they also transport large quantities of vital goods across the world’s oceans, and trade by sea continues to increase. According to UNCTAD, in 2016, ships traded over 10 billion tons for the first time.

 

Therefore, ships have always been the most sustainable way to transport goods. Ships are getting more and more energy efficient. IMO regulations on energy efficiency are updating themselves to support the demand for greener and cleaner transport than ever before. A ship that is more energy efficient burns less fuel and causes less air pollution.

In some articles it is cited that only a few large ships emit much more harmful air pollutants than all cars in the world.

 

However, this worst case scenario does not take into account the amount of cargo carried by the ships and the relative efficiency. It is important to consider the amount of cargo transported and the emissions per tonne of cargo transported per kilometer traveled. Studies have shown that ships are the most energy efficient mode of transport compared to other methods such as aviation, road trucks, and even railways.

 

On the other hand, it is also important to remember that shipping is responding to the demands of large volumes of world trade. As the world trade volume increases, more ship capacity will be needed.

 

 

Ships are the largest engines on the planet, and almost the largest diesel engines in the world are found on cargo ships. These machines have over 100,000 horsepower, compared to a mid-size car around 300 horsepower. Large container ships can transport more than 20,000 containers, and bulk carriers can transport more than 300,000 tons of goods such as iron ore. Very powerful engines are needed to float ships of this size. It is important to calculate how much energy is used to transport every ton of cargo per kilometer. When you look at the relative energy efficiency of different modes of transport, ships are the most energy efficient. Ships therefore burn less fuel, are more energy efficient, less air pollutants, and their emissions are lower.

Can low sulfur fuels cause problems for ship engines?

 

All Fuel Oil intended for combustion on a ship must meet the required fuel oil quality standards as specified in IMO MARPOL Annex VI (regulation 18.3). For example, fuel oil must not contain any additives or chemical waste that endanger the safety of ships or adversely affect the performance of the engine.

IMO discusses how to identify potential safety issues related to fuel mixes. It is recognized that if these fuels are not properly managed, compatibility and stability issues can occur. If necessary, additional guidance can be developed for crew and ship operators.

 

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard (ISO 8217) determines and circulates maximum and minimum international standards for fuels used in diesel marine engines and boilers.

 

A study commissioned by IMO for the “assessment of fuel availability” concluded that the refinery sector has the capacity to supply a sufficient amount of marine fuels with a sulfur content of 0.50% m / m or less and a sulfur content of 0.10 m.

Do small ships also have to comply with the sulfur limit?

 

Yes they do, MARPOL rules apply to all ships. Vessels of 400 gross tons and over sailing to ports or offshore terminals under the jurisdiction of other countries must have an International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate issued by the ship’s Flag State. However, ships of all sizes must use fuel oil that meets the 0.50% limit as of January 1, 2020.

 

Some smaller ships may be using a suitable marine distillate for their engines. Like the small vessels operating in predetermined emission control areas may use fuel oil that meets the 0.10% limit in these emission control areas for instance.

IMO 2020 Update: The Impact We See So Far (Agust 2020)

 

Now that the deadline for January 1 has come and gone, we wanted to share an update on the real-world implications of IMO’s mandate.

 

With steamship lines beginning to purchase low-sulfur fuel in early November 2019, there was definitely an increase in fuel surcharges. There were many speculative fears that fuel wages would double or triple, but that is currently not the case.

 

In the first quarter of the year, the dry cargo market suffered from the financial burden brought by IMO 2020. Since the charter rates are inversely proportional to the maximum 0.5% sulfur marine fuel prices in important bunkering ports, the increased fuel costs after IMO 2020 were not reflected in the freight rates. Charter rates for ships (T / C time charter $ / day) rose in direct proportion to VLSFO prices and / but freight gains fell.

In fact, there were no stable inrease in T / C ratios as well, temporary fluctuations were experienced. As the fuel price rose, it was seen that shipowners had to lower the daily charter rates of their ships to keep their voyage rates constant. However, over time, freight and T / C rates settle in direct proportion.

 

The availability of products, that will have to be used as the day-by-day approaches 2020, the refineries’ ability to produce these products, and the rhetoric that these fuels will be too expensive and even that most ships may supposed to consume MGO, all have affected the chemistry of the maritime industry. However, with this pessimistic state of mind, while a stable balance is not expected to be established in a short time, VLSFO prices have started to decrease rapidly. For example, between January 6 and January 17, the price of 0.5 percent sulfur-containing marine fuel (VLSFO) supplied to ships at the port of Singapore fell from $ 740.00 / mt to $ 645 / mt, down 12 percent. Fuel supplying sources have confused the fuel demanders and the maritime market in general with alternative practices. Equilibrium could not be mentioned in such a climate. It was surely unfair forcing the buyers get alarmed and causing them to buy fuel in a panic due to fuel shortage. However, it should not be too strange to experience these negativities, as these are known behaviors and attitudes displayed in transition periods.

 

This wind blew hard for a while. Some rushed without looking at the price, in order not to have a nightmare of not finding out the fuel, no matter expensive or not, while others expected the prices to drop to reasonable levels as soon as the panic calms down, till the prices settle at a new balance. Because, the managerial risks that the decision mechanisms will face and the scandals they will create within the institution come before losing money in some cases.

 

It’s time to take a look at the chart below before continuing to discuss the impact of IMO 2020 on the industry!

It is good to take a look at the status of two important international oil criteria since November 2019. Brent crude oil and US West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil turned upside down. Nevertheless, the fearful prediction has not come true, the price of fuel also plumped.  Unfortunately, this has not happened with a cooperation, contribution, ingenuity or victory of any industry.

 

While the world’s leading oil producers, exporters, importers, consumer countries bullied each other with the geopolitical advantages granted by the world at the end of 2019 and early 2020, while the endless conflicts of various superiority and interests of the muscular world countries continue, a health monster that says I am coming in the last quarter of 2019 It affected the realm. As of March 2020, the coronavirus pandemic Covid-19 has become a nightmare for people breathing. People quickly infected each other, filled hospitals, many people got sick, there were deaths. The remedy was that human interaction should be minimized and social distance rules must be followed. Travels between countries were stopped, businesses were closed, people were advised to stay at their homes. Even mandatory retrictions were
applied. After all these measures, the lockdowns were gradually eased in summer 2020, but Covit-19 is still active.

 

The returns from the last quarter of 2019 till so far, which we have summarized roughly, have not been surprising. It was known, lived and continues to be experienced. IMO 2020 is the product of an industry awareness. We have brutally betrayed our world. IMO 2020 set out with strict rules to fulfill its duty. And he succeeded in that.

The crashes that came with Covid-19 proved how much harm the emissions caused to all living things in the world. In the process, data on pollution in the atmosphere dropped tremendously. Locks increase again as they are eased.

 

These deadlocks have dropped global oil demand. The leading oil producers, exporters, and importers of the world, which have fallen into each other, have suddenly entered into a friendly, cooperative, attitude and attitude to increase demand.

 

So lessons had to be learned!

 

 

Covid-19 and demand concerns remain, crude oil and distillate prices are still falling. IMO 2020 has reached its goals, it is no longer a scapegoat.
Source: bunkerist


The global bunker industry’s smooth transition into the low-sulfur era mandated by the International Maritime Organization has sent a strong signal to the sector that it can achieve its next goal of decarbonization equally free of hurdles, industry sources said.

“The IMO deserves credit as it was a [role] model to implement the regulation on an international basis,” Mitsuyasu Kawaguchi, general manager of crude oil and tanker department at Japanese refiner Cosmo Oil said at the 36th Annual Asia Pacific Petroleum Virtual Conference, or APPEC 2020.

In 2019, there were numerous discussions in the marine industry over how the transition to 0.5% fuels would pan out, with a lot of skepticism around VLSFO availability and VLSFO blends as it was expected they would increase operational problems and quality claims.

“What we’ve heard is that they [VLSFOs] burn better, they are cleaner and overall as long as you don’t have compatibility issues on your ship and are not unfortunate enough to get one of the fuels with sediments or unstable trends, they have been very good fuels,” Unni Einemo, director at International Bunker Industry Association, said at the same event.

Meanwhile, Gard, member of the international group of protection and indemnity clubs, said in a statement on Sept. 10 that the most commonly experienced problems with fuel reported to it were high total sediment potential and marginal exceeding of sulfur while the most common operational problems faced onboard was an increase in sludge formation in purifiers and filters.

However the operational problems have not led to a high frequency of major breakdowns or engine damage cases, it said. “Our data for fuel related machinery damage claims shows that the first six months of 2020 saw fewer claims than the same period in 2018 and 2019.”

“On the defence side, the number of case files opened this year on contractual bunker disputes is similar to previous years. So, from Gard’s perspective, the more dire predictions regarding potential engine damage, and a deluge of litigation between owners and charterers have not materialized, at least in this first six-month period,” it added.

So far this year, among all the samples tested by Lloyd’s Register, only 4% of VLSFO and 1.7% of MGO’s has been off-spec, Douglas Raitt, regional advisory services manager Asia at marine classification society Lloyd’s Register, told Platts earlier in September.

This is lower compared to the same period in the preceding year, Raitt added then.

Another aspect was the timely preparation.

“One of the key challenges was actually the maritime industry accepting that the IMO 2020 is here and rather than giving excuses, [one needs to] start early because it is the right thing to do,” Rajalingam Subramaniam, AET’s President & CEO said at APPEC 2020.

“We started using the LSMGO much earlier than the regulatory day,” he added.
Compliance to IMO 2020

Compliance to the rule has also been fairly good despite the challenges posed by coronavirus, or COVID-19, pandemic, industry sources said.

In the first six months of 2020, the number of port state control, or PSC, inspections dropped by nearly 40% due to the COVID-19 outbreak, Gard said.

“Despite that, detentions relating to SOx [sulfur oxides] regulations of MARPOL Annex VI were in double digits in the Tokyo MoU region, with the majority of those being for high sulfur content in the fuel,” it said.

PSC officers are generally aware of and following the IMO guidelines, Gard added, citing its involvement in some of those cases.

The narrowing HSFO-VLSFO price spread brought about by COVID-19, has also prompted shipowners to use more LSFOs, aiding compliance, some industry sources said.

The huge amount of gasoline demand destruction brought large amounts of vacuum gasoil to the middle distillates pool, easing VLSFO prices, Kawaguchi said.

However, Kawaguchi noted that the spread had likely bottomed out. Some sources also resonated this sentiment as, with the easing of lockdown restrictions in many countries, a recovery was underway.

Decarbonization

Meanwhile, with the IMO greenhouse gases emission cut targets looming, decarbonization has become a focal point for the industry, some sources said.

The IMO, in April 2018, laid out its strategy, aiming to reduce the shipping industry’s total GHG emissions by at least 50% from 2008 levels, by 2050, and to reduce CO2 emissions per transport work by at least 40% by 2030.

Ammonia, hydrogen, LNG were among the various alternatives being discussed by several sources at APPEC 2020 to tide over this regulatory challenge.

AET Tankers, for its part, has already invested in dual-fueled LNG technology although LNG was still a transition fuel, Subramaniam said.

The parent company of AET Tankers — the MISC Group — is also part of a joint development project, or JDP, for an ammonia-fueled tanker to advance shipping’s drive towards decarbonization, he said.

“COVID-19 is a massive reset in the industry, It is like a safety car coming in the F1 [Formula 1] race,” Subramaniam said.

Moving forward, the industry will have to adopt a more collaborative approach to stay relevant, he added.
Source: Platts


At the “Future of Shipping: Decarbonisation” webinar jointly organised by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Singapore today, leaders from maritime administrations and industry came together to share insights on decarbonisation for shipping in the new normal post-COVID-19. Over 500 participants from 63 countries tuned in to the webinar.

Speaking at the opening of the webinar, Singapore Minister for Transport, Mr Ong Ye Kung, said, “While the world deals with the COVID-19 crisis, it must keep up with the fight against climate change. No one can do this alone. It is a global ambition, to be accomplished by the international maritime community. But we all have capabilities, expertise, and resources to contribute to this endeavour. Singapore will do our part, and we look forward to the maritime community coming together, under the leadership of the IMO, to redouble our efforts and build a better, greener world.” Please refer to the Annex for his full speech.

IMO Secretary-General Mr Kitack Lim called for more action to speed up research into zero carbon marine fuels. The Secretary-General said, “To achieve this, IMO is stepping up its efforts to act as a global forum and promoter in R&D in zero carbon marine fuels, bringing together interested stakeholders from public and private sectors, and also private and development banks and other potential donors around the world.”

The strong turnout at the webinar demonstrated that decarbonisation remains a key priority for the international shipping community despite the COVID-19 pandemic. An important underlying theme in the webinar was the importance of collaboration and coordination amongst all stakeholders across the energy and maritime transport value chains, to achieve IMO’s ambition of reducing total annual Greenhouse Gas emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 2008.

To co-ordinate and spur global efforts, the IMO and Singapore introduced “NextGEN”, a concept for a collaborative global ecosystem of maritime decarbonisation initiatives. “NextGEN” will facilitate information sharing on decarbonisation initiatives across stakeholders such as IMO Member States, industry and academia, identify opportunities and gaps for decarbonisation in the global shipping ecosystem, and create important networks and platforms for collaboration.

Mr Andreas Sohmen-Pao, Chairman, BW Group and Co-Chair of Singapore’s International Advisory Panel on Maritime Decarbonisation (IAP), Mr Wong Weng Sun, President and CEO of Sembcorp Marine Ltd and Co-Chair of the IAP, and Ms Quah Ley Hoon, Chief Executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) spoke on the approach needed to successfully transition global shipping to future green energy sources and meet IMO’s 2050 target.

The “Future of Shipping: Decarbonisation” webinar is the third webinar under the Maritime Perspectives series organised by MPA. IMO and Singapore will co-organise another webinar – “Future of Shipping: Digitalisation”, on 8 October 2020, where experts will discuss the potential that digitalisation has for shipping. Both webinars lead up to the main IMO-Singapore Future of Shipping conference to be held during Singapore Maritime Week 2021.
Source: Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore


Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries has delivered the world’s first very large containership powered by liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Singapore’s Eastern Pacific Shipping (EPS), the South Korean shipbuilder announced Wednesday.

The LNG-powered, 14,800 twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) capacity CMA CGM Tenere is one of six containerships in a series being built for EPS by Hyundai Samho, a unit of shipbuilding giant Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering Co.

The six neo-Panamax box ships are each powered by dual-fuel MAN B&W 11G90ME-GI main engines capable of running on LNG or traditional diesel bunker fuel.

The 366-meter-long vessels were ordered by EPS in April 2018 and will be delivered by the third quarter of 2022. They will be chartered by French container shipping company CMA CGM.

CMA CGM will soon take delivery of even larger LNG-powered containerships, stating with the 400-meter-long, 23,000-TEU capacity CMA CGM Jacques Saadé from Shanghai Jiangnan-Changxing Shipyard. The Chinese shipyard is building nine vessels in the series for CMA CGM, who aims to operate at least 20 LNG-fueled containerships by 2022.

Increasingly, shipowners in various segments—from bulk carriers to cruise ships—are looking to LNG-powered vessels to meet the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) environmental regulations that call for ship emissions to be reduced by more than 30% by 2025 from 2008 levels. The IMO rules also target 40% emissions reductions by 2030 and by 70% reductions by 2050.

In addition, the IMO regulations that took effect at the start of this year lowered the sulfur cap on bunker fuel content from 3.5% to 0.5%.

The number of LNG-fueled ships is expected to more than double from less than 400 currently to more than 1,000 by 2030, a senior executive at Malaysia’s Petronas said on Wednesday.

Source: maritimeprofessional


Jabatan Laut Malaysia, known as Marine Department Malaysia, on Monday (11 November) released a shipping notice regarding the implementation of IMO 2020 sulphur regulations for the country.

Manifold Times has obtained a copy of the notice Implementation of Sulfur Limits Under Rule 14.1 Appendix IV, MARPOL 73/78; its contents are as follows:

Purpose

  1. This Notice is to inform the shipping community about the requirement of 0.50% m/m Sulphur Content limit on Regulation 14.1, Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78.
  2. The sulphur content of any fuel oil used on board ships shall not exceed 0.50% m/m on and after 1 January 2020 (for ships operating outside an emission control area).
  3. Furthermore, the shipping community are advise to comply to related IMO amendments and guidelines as in Appendix 1
  4. From 1 January 2020, a Malaysia ship which has to procure non-compliant fuel oil due to the unavailability of compliant fuel would need to complete and submit a Fuel Oil Non-Availability Report form (FONAR) to the Malaysia Marine Department, the Port Authorities where the non-compliant fuel was purchased and the destination Port Authorities. Detail information as in Appendix 2.
  5. All Malaysia Ship using new type of 0.5% m/m sulphur compliance fuel oil and plying International Voyages is encourage to submit the Ship Implementation Plan (SIP) for Achieving Compliance with The 0.50% Sulphur Limit as per Appendix 1 in MEPC.1/Circ.878 to Recognised Organisations for verification before 01 January 2020.
  6. Malaysia will enforce the MARPOL Annex VI, Regulation 14.1 on 1 January 2020. All Malaysian ships and Foreign ships plying in Malaysian Waters are required to comply with the regulation.

Inquiries concerning the subject of this Notice should be directed to:

bksas@marine.gov.my ,or

Director
Maritime Safety, Security and Marine Environment Division,
Marine Department Of Malaysia, HQ
P.O. Box 12, Jalan Limbungan
42007 Port Klang, Selangor, Malaysia

Source: manifoldtimes


  • Over the past two years, the United States has built an increasingly fruitful security relationship with the Republic of Cyprus. Our two countries have been working to train teams from Mediterranean countries in a variety of security fields. For example, the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) has held a number of training events in the Republic of Cyprus, most notably for Lebanese and Egyptian government officials.
  • To expand this cooperation and to support capacity-building in nations where in-country training is impossible, our two countries have agreed to construct a regional border security training hub in the Republic of Cyprus — the Cyprus Center for Land, Open-seas, and Port Security (CYCLOPS).
  • CYCLOPS will allow the United States and our partners to provide technical assistance in more areas related to security and safety, including customs and exports control, port and maritime security, and cybersecurity.
  • The training facility will include a number of different hands-on training platforms, including a mock land border crossing, passenger screening area, and a mobile cyber security training lab, which will enable regional partners to learn best practices for securing critical infrastructure and to engage in cross border, counterproliferation cyber investigations.
  • CYCLOPS will support our efforts to curb the proliferation risks posed by malign regional actors and violent extremist organizations.
  • The construction and ongoing support for CYCLOPS is a true partnership. The United States will provide equipment, trainers, and other capacity-building support, while the Republic of Cyprus will contribute land, facilitate travel, and provide trainers.
  • Construction of the training facility is expected to begin later this year.Source: state.gov

As mentioned the cabin switch appeared to be the key to all our access requirements. From that we could get to the trunk network, and all those TV, VOIP, and Wi-Fi services, a raft of different VLANs that are very interesting to an attacker.

Physically the big problem was that cabin switch was located in the narrow passageway corridor between cabins. In that small space  I had to open a panel, open the box it was in then physically unscrew the switch and then connect to it to mess about with it. It meant being in the way of foot traffic.

As only a few of the ship’s crew knew what we were onboard for we really needed to stay incognito. That’s quite a challenge on a vessel with 500 CCTV cameras and plenty of people walking about, we’re getting in their way and getting noticed. The solution to staying under the radar was to do it all from inside our cabin, which was no mean feat.

First we unplugged the ethernet cables from the back of our TV and VOIP phone. We then went to the cabinet in the wall in the passageway, where we bridged directly onto the trunk with those cables. This meant that we had taken our cabin switch out of the network so it was feeding into our cabin via this structured cabling that was already installed. That solved part of the problem.

We then put our own switch into that loop so now we were part of that VLAN trunk, nicely connected to that big loop. It meant we could intercept all of the traffic on the VLANs and we could connect to all of the devices on those VLANs too. While we managed to get the TVs default passwords we couldn’t really do much apart from stopping them working. The VOIP phones also had default passwords, but again we were limited to changing their settings so they didn’t work. The Wi-Fi was quite secure so there wasn’t much we could do to that either.

The CCTV was different though. The CCTV and Video Management System (VMS) connected out to all of the cameras using RTSP, a plain text protocol. The cameras required a properly authenticated login, but we could intercept this and so connect to the cameras- all of the cameras on the ship. Now we could watch all the video feeds from the comfort of our cabin.

After that we reviewed the cabin control system for the lighting, HVAC, door, and water. Most systems like this with hundreds of nodes will connect back to a service. They usually make a connection from the device through to the server, but this one was a different as it worked the other way around.

Here the cabin control server established connections out to the controls in the cabins. While this was unusual it meant we didn’t have to compromise the cabin control server to interact with the cabin controls. We were on the VLAN that they were all on so we could come along with our switch and directly compromise all of the cabin controls. We could turn the lights on and off, we could mess about with the aircon, we could lock people out of their cabins, and we could even open doors on the accessibility cabins- the ones with automated doors.

With all of these areas covered we could negatively affect the passengers, to make them uncomfortable or even cause some distress. This means that they will complain, en masse, and that is going to be very expensive to manage.

The other thing we thought would be amusing would be writing something on the side of the ship using cabin lighting, by turning certain cabin’s lights on or off to create a pattern or word viewable from a distance outside. Some ships have this functionality where through the cabin control system uses them as a sort of grid through which you can write things on the side of the vessel.

The serious issue here is that the switches were physically accessible to us. Of course we had to be in the passageway for physical access but there’s a common attack that we regularly carry out against switches. Most Cisco switches have a password recovery mode. It means that you can reboot the switch, and through its serial console dump the config file.

That config file contains information on existing VLANs, such as hashes or possibly even encrypted versions of the passwords. After dumping a config off one of the cabin control switches (taking two or three minutes) we had the hashed passwords. Once transferred to our cracking rig it took about two days to recover them:

The password here was reasonably good, it wasn’t “cisco” or “ship” for example.

We tried it against the cabin switches but none of them had a network logon. However we could plug in via serial and connect that way but that’s not particularly bad. However, as we’ve got access to this trunk we’ve also got access to those RDPs. We found that one of the RDPs had its management interface left exposed to the trunks that we could access, and that RDP had left the web interface enabled, which is bad.

That username and password we recovered from one cabin switch worked on that single RDP. It appeared that during commissioning that particular single RDP hadn’t fully been commissioned- they hadn’t changed the password. We gained access to that RDP and that allowed us to intercept all of the traffic on that fibre trunk. We weren’t just able to access the things on the cabin switch loops anymore, we could see pretty much everything on the vessel, excluding the ICMS industrial control systems.

These VLAN trunks run all over the ship. You can connect from inside the cabin using the TV and phone cables, get access to many systems as well as sniff to get any plain text auth. So, not using https actually had a serious impact here. One brute forcible password that worked on just one part of the core network allowed us to intercept all of the VLAN trunks. That is a significant compromise.

Now this was just an omission, and it did take quite a lot of effort to get to this point but it was a problem of vulnerability.

Issue 4: I Am The Captain Now!

If you’ve been on a cruise recently you’ll have seen crew carrying tablet devices. When there’s a muster or safety drill they’ll be taking muster on a tablet. If you order in one of the restaurants it will be on a tablet. If they come to your room with room service they will have a tablet.

This is usually called a Passenger Management System (PMS) and it deals with cabin assignment and access control. As a result it’s linked to access control system, to allow the management of cabin key cards. It also does booking and billing in the restaurant, it does mustering, and it also can hold your passport details for Immigration. It’s core to how the vessel operates.

All the tablets on this vessel used 8021x certificates for the Wi-Fi, and the tablets were actually quite well hardened. We couldn’t get anything off them easily so we couldn’t get those certificates to gain access to the Wi-Fi. We could have spent time doing something to possibly root one of the tablets or gain the credits from somewhere else.

But why go to those lengths when we’ve already got access to every VLAN on the vessel including the VLAN that carries the Wi-Fi traffic from all of the tablets? We can intercept that traffic, which is what we did.

The tablet’s 8021x was implemented by the cruise company as they wanted to layer that layer of security. However the PMS used http so there was no encryption between the tablets and the server. That let us sniff credentials amongst other the network traffic. What we found was an SQL server which was passing its username and password in the plain, across this network. Once we gained access to those VLAN trunks we could get this username and password:

We could then add our own user into the PMS and we could pretty much do what we want. For example, I could book myself into the best restaurant on the ship and not have to pay for it.

The best bit was being able to log in as the captain! We could go to the restaurant, order the most expensive bottle of wine and bill it to the captain. This is a serious impact. The PMS had good Wi-Fi security that was put in place by the cruise company but the PMS vendor used http for the communications, and that just wasn’t secure enough.

We’ve covered those common SQL creds but we’ve not managed to test them on any other ships. It’s possible they could be the same across other ships, meaning we could arrive on board and pretend to be anyone from the crew.. We could wipe details, we could order things in restaurants. I think we comprehensively owned this ship.

Conclusion

  1. The attacks required detailed knowledge
  2. It was third-parties who introduced most risks
  3. Denial-of-Service is very costly
  4. Cruise ships are fun

These attacks did require detailed knowledge. We had to be on the vessel and we had to have a good level of understanding. One of the problems with a ship is that it’s hard to perform things like intrusion detection remotely. You might be able to sniff traffic but you’ve only got limited amount of bandwidth to send that back to a SoC. On this engagement no-one really noticed us, we dressed smartly and the couple of times that people noticed us opening cabinets and things like that no one said anything. That isn’t always going to be guaranteed though.

Most of the issues we found were introduced by third parties. The cruise company had done a lot to secure those networks but it was third parties putting systems in and making mistakes, and just not doing security properly, that created the problems.

For a ship a Denial of Service is extremely costly. If you can stop a cruise ship leaving its berth (especially in one of the smaller ports where there are only one or two berths) and another ship is waiting to dock, the port can charge huge sums of money. We’re talking tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars per day.

The fallout is that you’ll have passengers complaining, you’re going to possibly have to reschedule flights, maybe get hotels for people, your next cruise may be delayed.

Crashing cruise ships into each other is the stuff of movies, and that’s fine for Hollywood. The real impacts however come from hackers being able to cause your passengers annoyance, discomfort, and distress.

Source: pentestpartners


For years worries about a potential second Cold War between the United States and China have swirled within discussions on the Asia-Pacific. For a while these proclamations seemed overblown, seemingly more the fever dreams of Cold Warriors hoping for a new adversary. But in the last few years it seems these concerns are finally coming true as tensions between the two nations have increased dramatically. While it is still possible that relations between the United States and China could improve and tensions may fall, various regional states are preparing for a new era of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific.

In this new world of enhanced competition between the United States and China, no nation has more reason to be concerned than the island nation of Taiwan. Claimed by China, and largely protected by the United States, Taiwan cannot avoid being drawn into the competition. Because of its unsettled political status, Taiwan could easily become a flashpoint between the two powers. Tensions have risen across the strait recently and it remains to be seen how much more it would take for them to boil over. For this reason, a rise in great power competition will signal a precarious time for Taiwan, where its independence will be threatened more severely than perhaps ever before.

In the naval realm, this has resulted in a shift in how the Republic of China Navy (ROCN) is composed and deployed. A focus on asymmetric warfare has become the mainstay of ROCN defensive plans, with major surface ships becoming much less important for Taiwan’s seaborne defense. Likewise, a new emphasis on integration with the United States and its allies has become more important and has allowed for a new use for Taiwan’s surface fleet.

A Shifting Doctrine

Taiwan’s defense doctrine has had to undergo shifts in recent years. Until recently the ability of China to existentially threaten the island nation was negligible. Taiwan could be confident it could repel a major Chinese attack with the backing of the United States. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 demonstrated the inability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to deter the United States Navy from sailing through the Strait, and a significant American show of force was enough to dissuade the Chinese.

While the crisis demonstrated Taiwanese safety from the mainland, it sowed the seeds of the current climate. It prompted the PLA to undertake wide-reaching reforms and modernization which allowed the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to become larger and more advanced, which has significantly changed the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait as the PLAN now dwarfs the ROCN. This has driven a shift toward a strategy of asymmetric warfare to harass and chip away at the PLAN in the event of war with the goal of inflicting mounting casualties and ideally preventing an invasion fleet from crossing the strait.

Taiwan’s most recent defense plan, the Overall Defense Concept, lays out the concept of asymmetric warfare. The plan calls for a two-phase system to defeat China. Phase one involves harassing a Chinese invasion fleet and weakening it before it hits the beaches. The second phase calls for the invasion to be annihilated as Chinese soldiers wade ashore on Taiwan. This change calls for assets to be lighter and more survivable than what Taiwan has traditionally relied on.

The adoption of this strategy has led the ROCN to recently purchase systems specifically for this task and to focus exclusively on this mission. This meant acquiring small, cheap, and asymmetric assets that can harass the PLAN as it attempts to cross the strait. The Taiwanese Navy has invested in minelayers that will quickly litter the seas with mines to slow down the invasion fleet. Diesel-powered submarines will prowl the Taiwan Strait, a body of water uniquely suited for submarine warfare, looking for Chinese vessels to pick off. Fast attack boats armed with anti-ship missiles will also harass the incoming fleet and wreck havoc on the landing ships crossing the strait.

However, as Taiwan procures new force structure to pursue these operating concepts, there still remains the question of how its older force structure will figure into the equation.

The Surface Fleet: Holdover or Essential?

Despite seemingly not fitting into its latest doctrine, the Taiwanese Navy maintains a number of large surface ships, and is continuing to construct or purchase more. In the event of war, these ships would likely either be sunk quickly or would be forced to flee Taiwanese waters, perhaps taking shelter at American or allied ports. Plans for the ships to regroup to wreak havoc during a PLA landing are highly optimistic, and even if successful, would still not be an ideal role. If these ships are so ill-suited for high-end warfighting only miles away from the Chinese coast then why spend valuable resources on them?

This shift to asymmetric warfare is well-suited when it comes to preventing an invasion, but offers little for patrolling Taiwan’s territorial waters or exerting power at any significant distance from Taiwan’s shores. For this, Taiwan relies on its surface fleet, made up of four destroyers and 22 frigates. Although the Chinese threat is primarily depicted as a naval invasion, Beijing could take other actions to subjugate or pressure Taiwan. In particular, a naval blockade or more distant naval skirmishes could be options. In this case, the surface fleet with its range would be invaluable. Likewise, in normal times, Taiwan’s surface ships provide security in the island’s territorial waters, a task that small missile boats and minelayers cannot perform well.

The surface fleet also serves to lend a level of prestige to Taiwan, which helps explain the Taiwanese government’s continued buildup of it. While an asymmetrical fleet is more efficient for protecting Taiwan, switching over to an entirely asymmetrical fleet focused on littoral warfare would signify a degradation of Taiwan’s power and prestige via-a-vis mainland China. This would only serve to enhance mainland China’s diminishment of Taiwan, allowing China to more effectively portray the island not as a sovereign nation but as a rebellious province.

The Taiwan Navy’s ‘Friendly Fleet’ is welcomed home at Zoying Naval Base in Kaohsiung, southern Taiwan, on April 15, 2020. (Photo via South China Morning Post)

Finally, the surface fleet can conduct goodwill tours to bolster Taiwan’s international profile. Taiwan’s dwindling amount of official relations still play an important role in legitimizing the nation against China’s claims of its status. By paying visits to overseas nations the ROCN is able to make diplomatic efforts that can have positive effects on these countries’ relations with Taiwan.

The United States: An Indispensable Ally 

Both the Obama and Trump administrations have pushed traditional allies of the U.S. to spend more on defense so as to shoulder their fair share of the burden, and this focus on burden-sharing has upset some of America’s traditional allies. But unlike Germany or Japan, Taiwan is far more reliant on the United States for its survival. The threat of American intervention is perhaps the only truly credible deterrent that could foreclose the PRC’s military options against Taiwan. As such, Taiwan can at times be portrayed as a burden for the United States, and there is worry that Taiwan’s future could be a bargaining chip in a grand settlement between the two powers.

Since relations between the United States and China began to deteriorate, Taiwan’s importance has increased. It is now being recognized as an especially important bulwark in the First Island Chain that prevents unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean for the Chinese Navy. But due to its lack of official relations or a guarantee stronger than the ambiguously worded Taiwan Relations Act, the island nation’s security has not meaningfully increased. In fact, due to the increased tensions, Taiwan is at a greater risk of conflict than before.

Taiwan’s surface fleet thus serves the important role of garnering American support. By being able to contribute to missions far from Taiwan’s shore, such as maritime security missions and cooperative exercises, these surface ships can contribute to some forms of burden sharing with the United States and demonstrate Taiwan’s value as an ally.

The surface fleet also provides the only area where the ROCN can integrate with the United States Navy (USN) in any real capacity. The United States has not operated diesel submarines since the 1950s and mine-laying and sweeping are not emphasized in the U.S. Navy. Fast attack craft with long-range anti-ship missiles are not utilized in any way by the U.S. Navy. This lack of interoperability is a constant headache for the ROCN as well as the other branches of the Taiwanese military. This may be changing though, as Taiwan has begun to ramp up work on its domestic arms industry. After almost two decades of trying to purchase new diesel submarines, Taiwan has begun construction of its own. Likewise, the island has made great strides in developing domestic anti-ship missiles, which will be used by both the Army and Navy.

Ultimately, Taiwan’s surface fleet can do more to protect Taiwan by assisting and cooperating with the United States than it does by lying in wait for a Chinese invasion force to materialize. By integrating itself into U.S.-led alliance and partnership structures, Taiwan can come to be seen as more than just a burden for the United States. The ROCN has also increased its connections to U.S. allies, most notably Australia and Japan. Like with the United States, the more that Taiwan can make itself a helpful ally, the more it will be seen as indispensable in the region.

Conclusion 

In this new era of great power competition the ROCN is designed to maximize utility with a small budget while facing a much wealthier and larger adversary. The small surface fleet patrols and guards the island’s territorial waters, while the anti-invasion force is designed to ensure that the PLA will not be able to land troops on the beach without paying a heavy toll.

The future of the ROCN is likely one of further bifurcation, with the anti-invasion fleet continuing to dwarf the surface fleet. Pursuant to its hedgehog strategy, the ROCN will concentrate on raising the cost of conflict with China in the years to come in an attempt to prevent Chinese aggression, while the surface fleet will conduct goodwill tours and conduct joint operations with allies to build relationships and raise Taiwan’s image abroad.

Ultimately, it will be the United States that will keep China at bay. The power discrepancy between Taiwan and the mainland has grown too great for Taiwan alone to deter China for much longer. While China likely cannot successfully conduct an invasion of the island just yet, it will not be long until it is capable. The continued freedom of the island lies with its friends and allies. It is only through alliances with the United States and other like-minded Pacific nations that Taiwan can hope to continue to prevent a Chinese invasion.

Some claim that Taiwan’s naval defense strategy doesn’t make sense. While the navy is not singularly designed to repel an invasion, it is still designed with a coherent strategy in mind, one that promises to be more effective at protecting the island than the strategy the navy’s critics insist on. While a purely asymmetric fleet would bring better bang for Taiwan’s buck, this fleet would serve to shrink Taiwan’s international profile and reinforce the idea that Taiwan is wholly dependent on the United States.

Taiwan may come to see this new era of great power competition as a blessing in disguise. Ten years ago, one view saw Taiwan merely as an irritant to better relations with China. This argument was made fairly often, and called for a grand bargain with China that would see the United States relinquish its security commitments to Taiwan in exchange for better relations with China. Today such talk is almost unheard of. With the threat of great power competition rising anew, Taiwan is now seen as an important bulwark in the competition with China, and Taiwan is doing its part to rise to that role. The ROCN is preparing for an era of intense competition and has set out policies to keep Taiwan safe during this turbulent era.

Jonathan Selling is a graduate of Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies with an MA International Affairs. His primary research interests are the rise of great powers and American alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
Source: cimsec


KR issues world’s first cyber security class notation to HHI for very large LPG carriers

The Korean Register (KR, Chairman & CEO, LEE Hyung-chul) has presented Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) with the world’s first Cyber Security (CS Ready) class notation for a very large liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carrier.

The presentation took place at KR’s Headquarters in Busan on 18 September, in the presence of Hyundai LNG Shipping (HLS, President & CEO, LEE Kyu-bong), Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI, President & CEO, HAN Young-seuk) and, Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering (KSOE, CEO, KWON Oh-gap).

Hyundai LNG Shipping is the owner of the very large LPG carrier built by HHI which is scheduled for delivery later this month. KR granted the notation after completing successful document and field inspections, which included Kongsberg Maritime’s ship alarm and monitoring system (AMS) and Hyundai Global Service’s Integrated Smart ship Solution (ISS).

This is the first time the KR cyber security notation has been awarded to a very large LPG carrier, the notation is issued to newbuilding ships that have successfully passed 49 inspection items in a total of 12 categories, including risk and asset management, cyber incident response and recovery.

The four companies have been collaborating on joint research and developments for the past eight months, while working to apply and verify KR’s cyber security Rules for newbuilding ships. HHI and KSOE have built a cyber security network encompassing the main systems, conducting risk assessment and vulnerability diagnosis for cyber security threats and KR has carried out and completed cyber security inspections across the network. As part of the comprehensive technological testing, KR conducted its first MITRE ATT&CK [1]* based penetration test to verify the safety of the cyber security system.

Mr. LEE Hyung Chul, Chairman and CEO of KR said at the presentation event: “The success of this joint research has enhanced our excellent cyber security technology status around the world. KR will continue to strengthen its global cyber security leadership, and will work to increase its unrivalled expertise and widen its certification capabilities.

MR. CHOI Jang-pal, Head of Business Operation Division, HLS said: “We are very pleased to secure the cyber security notation from KR which offers the highest standard of certification capabilities worldwide. Ship cyber security risk management is a top priority, and we will continue to proactively ensure our practices and processes offer the highest level of protection.”

“Through our collaboration with KSOE, we will continue to procure preemptive technology and to build smart ships with industry-leading differentiated cyber security systems, in today’s world, we must deliver ships which are fully certified for maritime cyber security,” added Mr. KIM Jae-eul, HHI Executive Vice President, CTO.

Newbuilding vessels increasingly need cyber security notation as the application of digital technologies such as advanced automation and integrated control systems become more common, in addition, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is expected to strengthen its demands for cyber security risk management as from 2021.

ENDS

[1] * ATT&CK: a model developed by MITRE in the U.S. referring to Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge, which presents attack tactics and infiltration techniques as a framework through case analysis of activities after (or before) penetration of cyber attackers. https://attack.mitre.org


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