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Member Authorities of the Tokyo and the Paris Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on Port State Control will launch a joint Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on STCW.

This campaign will be held for three months, commencing from 1 September 2022 and ending 30 November 2022. The CIC inspections will be applicable for all ships and conducted in conjunction with the regular Port State Control inspection.

 

The campaign on STCW aims to confirm that:

  • the number of seafarers serving on board and their certificates are in conformity with the relevant provisions of STCW Convention and Code and the applicable safe manning requirements as determined by the Flag State Administration;
  • all seafarers serving on board, who are required to be certificated in accordance with STCW Convention, hold an appropriate certificate or a valid dispensation, or provide documentary proof that an application for an endorsement has been submitted to the Flag State Administration;
  • the seafarers on board hold a valid medical certificate as required by STCW Convention;
  • the watch-keeping schedules and hours of rest indicate compliance with the requirements of STCW Convention and Code;
  • The CIC will assist in raising the awareness of shipowners, operators and crew on the specific requirements in the STCW Convention and Code.

The questionnaire is annexed to the Press Release.

Source : https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Press%20release%20-%20Paris%20MoU%20-%20Concentrated%20Inspection%20Campaign%20on%20STCW.pdf


The board members for the ISAC include the Alabama State Port Authority, Greater Lafourche Port Commission (Port Fourchon), Jacksonville Port Authority (Jaxport), Port of New Orleans, Port of San Diego, Port Vancouver USA, and six other maritime critical infrastructure stakeholders.

David Cordell, cio for the Port of New Orleans, offers, “By correlating cybersecurity information across MTS critical stakeholders, the ISAC provides all of us with the early warning needed to protect our individual organizations from incidents. We see value from our participation in the MTS-ISAC that we could not obtain elsewhere.”

Christy Coffey, MTS-ISAC vp of operations, said: “Response to the MTS-ISAC has been phenomenal. Strong leadership from our board and executive team, early adopter sharing of suspicious and malicious activity targeting their organizations, and quality partnerships have led to an extraordinarily successful launch.”

The Department of Homeland Security recognises the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) as one of the seven critical subsectors within the Transportation System Sector. The American Association of Port Authorities believes the MTS is worthy of cybersecurity protection.

The MTS-ISAC serves as a centralised point of coordination between the private and public sector to share timely and actionable cyber threat information between trusted stakeholders. Information sharing and analysis efforts focus on threats to both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems that stakeholders can use to prevent and/or minimize potential cyber incidents.

The MTS-ISAC’s services assist MTS critical infrastructure stakeholders with understanding and addressing cyber risk areas that are outlined in the 2021 IMO requirements and the recently released US Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 01-20, “Guidelines for Addressing Cyber Risks at Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) Regulated Facilities”.

Source: https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/ports-logistics/us-ports-and-infrastructure-providers-come-together-cyber-security


ASIAN GYPSY MOTH FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

Q1: What are the risks related to the introduction of AGM?
Q2: Why does the maritime industry have a role in managing AGM risks?
Q3: Which ports are infested by AGM and at what time of the year
do the AGM females lay their eggs?
Q4: Which countries regulate and inspect arriving vessels for AGM?
Q5: What are the criteria for classifying a vessel as high risk of AGM?
Q6: What is required from a vessel that is classified as high risk of AGM?
Q7: Are the regulating countries performing AGM inspections all year round?
Q8: What happens if AGM egg masses are detected during port inspections?
Q9: What are the county specific requirements?
United States of America (US)
Canada
Chile
Australia
New Zealand
Q10: How can the crew reduce the vessel’s risk of AGM infestation?
Q11: Are there other relevant sources of AGM information?

The Asian Gypsy Moth (AGM) is a
destructive forest pest known to
spread via ocean-going vessels in
international trade. Vessels calling
at certain ports in the Asia Pacific
between May and September
should therefore be inspected
and “certified free of AGM” prior
to departure, this to minimise the potential for regulatory action when
arriving in a country where the pest is not native.

BACKGROUND

AGM is an exotic pest with established populations only in countries in the Asia Pacific, such
as Russia, China, Korea, and Japan. If introduced in countries where it does not exist naturally,
it has the potential to seriously affect the country’s agricultural and forest resources. Adult
moths frequently lay their egg masses on vessels and shipping containers, and since these
egg clusters often survive to hatch at ports of call around the world, exclusion efforts are
considered a priority by many local port authorities.
Preventing the introduction and spread of AGM is a shared responsibility that relies on
cumulative efforts at origin, en route and at arrival in port. However, it is the responsibility of
the ship operator to meet all port entry requirements related to AGM and managing the risk
at its origin to ensure that a vessel is free of AGM upon departure from ports in the infested
areas is recognised as the key measure.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ)

General knowledge about the AGM and each country’s requirements on how to manage
AGM risks will minimise the potential for regulatory action and delays during port entries.
The purpose of this FAQ is therefore to provide answers to some of the AGM related
questions raised by Gard’s Members and clients, to summarises the requirements set forth by
each of the regulating countries and provide links to relevant government websites. The FAQ
also contains guidelines for how the crew can carry out systematic self-inspections onboard
the vessel while en route.

Q1: WHAT ARE THE RISKS RELATED TO THE INTRODUCTION OF AGM?

The United States has detected and eradicated many AGM infestations in the past and in an AGM pest alert from April 2016, their Department of Agriculture describes the risks as

follows: “Large infestations of AGM can completely defoliate trees, leaving them weak and
more susceptible to disease or attack by other insects. If defoliation is repeated for 2 or
more years, it can lead to the death of large sections of forests, orchards, and landscaping.
Any introduction and establishment of AGM in the United States would pose a major threat
to the environment and the urban, suburban, and rural landscapes.”

Q2: WHY DOES THE MARITIME INDUSTRY HAVE A ROLE IN MANAGING AGM RISKS?

Attracted to lights, the AGM females often lay their eggs on a vessel’s superstructure.
Vessels and cargo, such as containers, are therefore known to be involved in the artificial
spread of the pest by carrying the egg masses from one port to another. AGM egg
masses tolerate extremes in temperature and moisture, and the larvae can, under the
right conditions, hatch from an egg masse up to a year after it was attached to a vessel’s
structure. After hatching, the larvae travel great distances with the wind to find food and
may colonise in a new country if left unaddressed. It is therefore vital that the maritime
industry and relevant port authorities collaborate on measures to minimise the risk of AGM
incursions and implement procedures and policies emphasising vessel inspections.

Q3: WHICH PORTS ARE INFESTED BY AGM AND AT WHAT TIME OF THE YEAR DO
THE AGM FEMALES LAY THEIR EGGS?

AGM is found in Asia Pacific and there are high density populations in ports in East Russia,
Northeast China, Korea, and Japan. These AGM infested areas are also referred to as the
regulated areas or the risk areas.
The AGM flight season, when females lay their eggs, extends from May to September,
primarily from July to September in East Russia and northern Japan, from June to
September in Korea and China, from mid-May to mid-September in the remaining parts of
Japan depending on the specific port location. The AGM flight season is also referred to as
the specified risk period or the high-risk period in each of the regulated areas.

Q4: WHICH COUNTRIES REGULATE AND INSPECT ARRIVING VESSELS FOR AGM?

Countries where this pest is not native and that are currently known to regulate and inspect
arriving vessels for AGM are: the United States, Canada, Chile, Australia and New Zealand
(the regulating countries) and question Q9 below provides an overview of their relevant
requirements. However, authorities in other countries are also likely to be alert to the risk of
this invasive and destructive pest.

Q5: WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFYING A VESSEL AS HIGH RISK OF AGM?

In general, and since the AGM larvae can hatch from egg masses up to a year after they
were laid/attached to the vessel, a vessel which has called at a port in a regulated area
during the specified risk period of the current or previous calendar year is considered high
risk of AGM. However, there is no uniform international definition of the regulated areas or
specified risk periods and we refer to Q9 and the country specific requirements for further
details.

Q6: WHAT IS REQUIRED FROM A VESSEL THAT IS CLASSIFIED AS HIGH RISK OF AGM?

The regulating countries generally require all arriving vessels to declare whether they have
traded to ports within the regulated areas in the current or previous specified risk period and
the need for an inspection will be determined based on an assessment of the vessel’s overall
AGM risk. Most regulating countries also require vessels to be certified free of AGM. Please
see Q9 for details about each country’s entry requirements.

Q7: ARE THE REGULATING COUNTRIES PERFORMING AGM INSPECTIONS ALL YEAR
ROUND?

Vessels entering a regulating country may be subject to inspection at any time of the year
to verify freedom from AGM. However, as the potential for larvae to hatch from egg masses
attached to a vessel in port, and spread, depends on the local climatic conditions at a
specific port, each of the regulating countries may specify certain periods of the year with
heightened surveillance and more systematic inspection for AGM. Please see Q9 for details
about each country’s inspection procedures.

Q8: WHAT HAPPENS IF AGM EGG MASSES ARE DETECTED DURING PORT
INSPECTIONS?

Actions imposed on the vessel depend on each country’s regulation, taking into account
climatic conditions at the time of entry as well as the degree of AGM infestation, and the
stage of development of the egg masses detected.
In some cases the vessel may be allowed to berth before being cleaned and handled with
insecticide spraying whilst alongside. In other cases, if the vessel’s itinerary indicate that the
presence of AGM life stages are possible and large amounts of egg masses that appear fresh
and viable for hatching are detected, the risk may be considered too high and the vessel can
be ordered to leave the country’s territorial waters immediately. In extreme cases, vessels
may be refused entry for up to two years during the AGM risk periods in that country (e.g.
Canada).

Q9: WHAT ARE THE COUNTY SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS?

Below is a summary of available information from each of the countries known to regulate
and inspect arriving vessels for AGM. Each country’s definition of AGM regulated areas
and specified risk periods as well as entry requirements and inspection procedures are
emphasised.

 

 

 


USCG

USCG The Coast Guard District 8 Outer Continental Shelf Officer in Charge, Marine Inspections recently released two Marine Safety Information Bulletins regarding marine casualty reporting and the requirements for installed data plates on lifesaving appliances.

• MSIB 19-01 updates marine casualty reporting guidance and procedures for OCS units operating within the Gulf of Mexico. Compliance with MSIB 19-01 will ensure timely initial notifications to the appropriate Coast Guard unit.
• MSIB 19-02 reiterates that data plates are required for lifesaving appliances, as outlined in MSIB 17-02. To allow the offshore industry time to verify compliance, deficiencies will not be written until July 1, 2019.

source read full article click here


USCG NOAD Schema

As part of ongoing efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness, we continue to improve handling of essential data contained within Notices of Arrival and Departure (NOAD). On Tuesday, 13 November 2018, an updated NOAD schema, versioned 3.6, will be released and will contain various schema improvements, updates to our ports list and retirement of the NVMC workbook as a means of submission for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) NOAs.

Please note that while every effort is being made to ensure all information is accurate as of this posting, there exists the possibility for additional changes as needed or at the direction of the program office. Any such changes or additions will be made available as soon as they are provided to or identified by the NOAD team.

Schema Change Details

Standard Schema Update Changes

  • NOTICE/NOTICE_DETAILS/VERSION will be “3.6”

Element Case Name Changes

  • NOTICE/Source changes to NOTICE/SOURCE
  • NOTICE/Source/Organization_Name changes to NOTICE/SOURCE/ORGANIZATION_NAME
  • NOTICE/Source/Software_Application_Name changes to NOTICE/SOURCE/SOFTWARE_APPLICATION_NAME
  • NOTICE/Source/Software_Application_Version changes to NOTICE/SOURCE/SOFTWARE_APPLICATION_VERSION
  • NOTICE/Source/Contact changes to NOTICE/SOURCE/CONTACT
  • NOTICE/Expansion changes to NOTICE/EXPANSION
  • NOTICE/Expansion/Data_Field changes to NOTICE/EXPANSION/DATA_FIELD
  • NOTICE/Expansion/Data_Field/Name changes to NOTICE/EXPANSION/DATA_FIELD/NAME
  • NOTICE/Expansion/Data_Field/Data_Type changes to NOTICE/EXPANSION/DATA_FIELD/DATA_TYPE
  • NOTICE/Expansion/Data_Field/Data_Content changes to NOTICE/EXPANSION/DATA_FIELD/DATA_CONTENT

Element Removals

  • NOTICE/VESSEL/ISM_CODE element is being removed

Element Relocations

  • The element NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/LONGSHOREMAN_WORK_DECLARATION, which currently appears at the end of the CREW section is being relocated to be the SECOND element in the CREW section. This will place it between NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/POSITION and NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/LAST_NAME

Addition of String Length Limitations

  • NOTICE/VOYAGE/VOYAGE_TYPE will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/ID_TYPE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/CLASS will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/TYPE will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/SUBTYPE will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/FLAG will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/FLAG_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/CLASS_SOCIETY will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/COMP_CERT/AGENCY will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/SFTYMGMT_CERT/AGENCY will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/ISSC/ISSC_TYPE will have a maximum length restriction of 30 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/ISSC/INTERIM_ISSC will have a maximum length restriction of 35 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/ISSC/RSO will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/VESSEL/OCE will have a maximum length restriction of 30 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/ARRIVE/PORT_OR_PLACE will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/ARRIVE/STATE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/DEPART/PORT_OR_PLACE will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/DEPART/STATE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/NEXT_PORT/NEXT_PORT_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/NEXT_PORT/NEXT_PORT_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/NEXT_PORT/NEXT_PORT_STATE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/NEXT_PORT/NEXT_PORT_NAME will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/NEXT_PORT/NEXT_PORT_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 5 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/LAST_PORT/LAST_PORT_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/LAST_PORT/LAST_PORT_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/LAST_PORT/LAST_PORT_STATE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/LAST_PORT/LAST_PORT_NAME will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/ARRIVE_DEPART/LAST_PORT/LAST_PORT_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 5 characters added
  • NOTICE/CDC_LIST/CDC/DESTINATION_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/CDC_LIST/CDC/DESTINATION_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/CDC_LIST/CDC/DESTINATION_STATE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/CDC_LIST/CDC/DESTINATION_PORT_NAME will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/CDC_LIST/CDC/DESTINATION_PORT_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 5 characters added
  • NOTICE/PREVIOUS_FOREIGN_PORT_LIST/PREVIOUS_FOREIGN_PORT/PREVIOUS_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/PREVIOUS_FOREIGN_PORT_LIST/PREVIOUS_FOREIGN_PORT/PREVIOUS_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/PREVIOUS_FOREIGN_PORT_LIST/PREVIOUS_FOREIGN_PORT/PREVIOUS_PORT_NAME will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/PREVIOUS_FOREIGN_PORT_LIST/PREVIOUS_FOREIGN_PORT/PREVIOUS_PORT_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 5 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/POSITION will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/NATIONALITY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/NATIONALITY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/COUNTRY_RESIDENCE will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/COUNTRY_RESIDENCE_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/ID_TYPE will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/ID_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/ID_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/EMBARK_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/EMBARK_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/EMBARK_STATE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/EMBARK_PORT_NAME will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/EMBARK_PORT_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 5 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/DEBARK_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/DEBARK_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/DEBARK_STATE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/DEBARK_PORT_NAME will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/CREW_LIST/CREW/DEBARK_PORT_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 5 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/NATIONALITY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/NATIONALITY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/COUNTRY_RESIDENCE will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/COUNTRY_RESIDENCE_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/ID_TYPE will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/ID_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/ID_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/EMBARK_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/EMBARK_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/EMBARK_STATE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/EMBARK_PORT_NAME will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/EMBARK_PORT_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 5 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/DEBARK_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/DEBARK_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/DEBARK_STATE will have a maximum length restriction of 50 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/DEBARK_PORT_NAME will have a maximum length restriction of 150 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/DEBARK_PORT_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 5 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/SECONDARY_ID_TYPE will have a maximum length restriction of 100 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/SECONDARY_ID_COUNTRY will have a maximum length restriction of 255 characters added
  • NOTICE/NONCREW_LIST/NONCREW/SECONDARY_ID_COUNTRY_CODE will have a maximum length restriction of 2 characters added

 

SOURCE READ FULL ARTICLE CLICK HERE


Notice of Arrival/Departure (NOAD)

NEW NOAD WORKBOOK VERSIONS RELEASED 12TH JUNE 2018
NOAD WORKBOOK VERSION 7.5.1
and
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS) VERSION 1.5.1

 

Overview:
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) at Title 33 Part 160 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
requires that ships arriving to and departing from a port (or OCS) in the United States file a NOA/D with
the NVMC. There are three methods available for filing NOA/D, which are:

1. Emailed submission of either of the latest two published NVMC Workbooks located at
www.nvmc.uscg.gov under the Downloads Tab and sent to enoad@nvmc.uscg.gov .

2. Via the NVMC eNOAD website.

3. Via Third-party application submissions conforming to standards found at www.nvmc.uscg.gov under the Developer Tab and sent to enoad@nvmc.uscg.gov. This option pertains to XML submissions made by means of third party software.

Current NOA/D Workbooks:

The current new versions of the workbook may be downloaded via the USCG’s NVMC website:
www.nvmc.uscg.gov where you can click the “Downloads” button followed by the “NOAD Workbook”
button on the left side of the page.

There are two new versions of Workbooks, as follows:

1. For ships arriving or departing US Ports: Version 7.5.1dated 12th June 2018

2. For ships operating in the US OCS – Oil and Gas Fields: Version 1.5.1 dated 12th June 2018

 

The official NVMC XLS workbook for submitting a Notice of Arrival/Departure (NOAD). This updated workbook contains corrections for port lists not populating when the country of Georgia is selected. It is requested that the worksheets/workbook are completed electronically and sent via email or imported into the eNOAD Web Application. Alteration of the official workbook will result in significant delays in processing.

 

SOURCE DOWNLOAD NEW WORKBOOKS


Concentrated inspection – Different PSC regimes have announced their concentrated inspection campaigns (CICs) for auxiliary machines starting 1 June and for MARPOL VI from 1 September. The US Coast Guard carries out a CIC from May 2018 to 2019 on open lifeboats of US-flagged ships.

 

CICs are periodical inspections that focus on a specific topic. They are carried out during routine PSC inspections, with an additional checklist, for a period of three months. A brief summary:

1. Black Sea MoU, Indian Ocean MoU, Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU CIC on MARPOL VI starting on 1 September

The CIC will start in these PSC regimes on 1 September and last until 30 November. The additional questionnaire is expected to be published at the beginning of August to raise awareness for compliance with requirements on the prevention of air pollution from ships. Once the additional questionnaire is published, we will issue an additional news.

The goal of the CIC is to check the actual status of ships regarding conformity with air pollution prevention requirements. It also aims to enforce awareness of new maximum limits for sulphur in ship fuel oil, which will enter into force on 1 January 2020.

Usually, this additional questionnaire for the CIC focuses on the main deficiencies in the area(s) found during previous years. World statistics for the last three years show main deficiencies related to incinerator and record book of engine parameters (with deficiency code):

  • (14206) Record book of engine parameters
  • (14608) Incinerator including operations and operating manual
  • (01124) International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate (IAPP)
  • (14611) Ozone-depleting substances
  • (01125) Engine International Air Pollution Prev. Cert.
  • (01328) Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan
  • (14610) Operational procedures for engines or equipment
  • (01138) International Energy Efficiency Certificate
  • (14604) Bunker delivery notes
  • (14615) Fuel changeover procedure

The majority of detainable deficiencies for DNV GL-classed vessels are related to the incinerator and sulphur content/quality of fuel used (deficiency codes 14617 and 14607).

Considering the above deficiencies, we assume the questionnaire items will mainly be related to operational questions and certificates or manuals. In particular, the ship-specific fuel changeover procedure is assumed to be targeted. In some ports, fuel samples may be taken and analyzed on short notice.

Another relevant topic is related to the cooling mediums from freezers and air condition plants and the related documentation, recorded as ozone-depleting substances (deficiency code 14611).

We would like to remind you that all these operational deficiencies are often related to the Safety Management System (SMS) and will likely trigger an ISM-related deficiency, especially in case of numerous or repeated deficiencies.

 

SOURCE DNV-GL


MARITIME CYBER RISK !

The insurance losses and liabilities arising from cyber risks is an increasing area of focus for both shipowners and their insurers, argues Mr. Adrian Durkin, Director (Claims) and Mr. Colin Gillespie, Deputy

Potentially owners may be exposed to gaps in cover arising from cyber incidents – an unsatisfactory situation in today’s connected world. For example, an owner’s hull and machinery insurance may contain a cyber risk exclusion which mirrors, or is derived from, institute clause 380.

There are also cyber exclusions in war risk policies that relate to computer viruses. The war risks clause is derived from market clause 3039. Many other market insurance policies specifically exclude losses or liabilities arising as a result of cyber risks.

Why is Cyber Excluded?

Cyber risks present a range of issues for insurers. Cyber risks are relatively new – claims data relating to these risks is quite limited. Another difficulty is that cyber security is not yet well established in the maritime industry. The sheer complexity of the information technology, operational technology and internet available across the industry also presents a challenge, as does the potential for cyber problems to spread quickly across the globe. As a result the likelihood, extent and costs associated with claims involving cyber risks are difficult to calculate and potentially significant, hence the reluctance to offer cover.

It is in an owner’s interests to scrutinise their various policies in order to identify potential gaps in their insurance cover. It is possible to close the gaps by working with insurers and brokers. This may require owners to demonstrate that they have robust cyber risk management practices in place both ashore and afloat. An additional premium may be payable. The market is responding to these risks – albeit slowly.

P&I Cover for Cyber Risks

The International Group of P&I Clubs’ poolable cover does not exclude claims arising from cyber risks.

This means that club members benefit from the same level of P&I cover should a claim arise due to a cyber risk, as they would from such a claim arising from a traditional risk. As always cover is subject to the club rules.

While there are currently no internationally agreed regulations in force as to what constitutes a prudent level of cyber risk management or protection, this does not mean that owners, charterers, managers or operators of ships can ignore the need to take proper steps to protect themselves in the belief that their club cover will always respond.

If a claim with a cyber element arises, an owner may need to demonstrate that they took all obvious steps to prevent foreseeable loss or liability. As more and more potential cyber risks are being identified, clubs will expect to see the operation of sensible and properly managed cyber risk policies and systems both ashore and on vessels.

MARITIME CYBER RISK

Don’t delay – act now

Barely a month goes by without news of a major cyber-attack affecting a large or high profile commercial or government entity. Cybercrime is a rapidly growing global threat in all industries and the maritime supply chain is vulnerable as the problems experienced by Maersk in 2017 have demonstrated. In that incident problems ashore had a knock on effect on vessels, highlighting the fact that as marine transport operations become more connected, the more chance there is of problems impacting across the system both ashore and afloat.

The authorities and large charterers are concerned about the risk to operations ashore and afloat and are taking steps to drive change in the industry. Actively managing cyber risks is now both a commercial and compliance priority.

Cyber Risks & ISM Code

The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) has confirmed that cyber risks should be managed under the ISM Code.

Resolution MSC.428(98) affirms that an approved safety management system should take into account cyber risk management and encourages administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety management systems no later than the first annual verification of the company’s Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021.

TMSA 3

Cyber risk management has been included in TMSA 3 under elements 7 and 13. KPI 7.3.3 includes cyber security as an assigned responsibility for software management in the best practice guidelines. Under element 13 cyber security is specifically identified as a security threat to be managed. It seems clear that the oil industry has recognised the need for action from tanker owners and is encouraging action through commercial pressure via TMSA 3. For tanker operators the time to act is already here.

Rightship Inspections

Cyber risk management now forms part of Rightship inspections and a company’s cyber security maturity may be one aspect dry bulk charterers will take into account.

A Daunting Task?

The prospect of dealing with cyber security will be daunting for many shipping companies. It’s new, involves things that may not be fully understood, and most of us are not likely to have received any formal training in such risks.

What is a definite plus is that shipping companies will be very familiar with the risk management framework suggested by the IMO Guidelines on Cyber Risk Management and industry Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships. We can also use the experience gained in other sectors of industry that have already put cyber security systems in place.

2021 is not far away, but the potential for cyber risks to result in losses or liabilities is clearly already upon us.

Cyber risks can affect almost every part of a shipping company. There will be lots to do to identify risks and vulnerabilities and to take steps to prepare for, and respond to, cyber threats. It’s time for us all to act.

By Adrian Durkin, Director (Claims) & Colin Gillespie, Deputy Director (Loss Prevention), North P&I Club


Activating a Vessel Response Plan
U.S. Coast Guard sent this bulletin at 01/23/2018 02:15 PM EST
The following information is provided to clarify activation of a vessel response plan (VRP), and
when and how deviation from listed response resources may occur.
An increasing number of responses in which VRPs have been used, have resulted in confusion as
to what action taken activates a VRP. Activation is not defined in 33 CFR Part 155.
When a Coast Guard FOSC is told that a VRP has been activated, the assumption is that certain resources identified in the plan have been consulted or mobilized. Once a VRP is activated, the resources identified in the plan must be used unless a deviation is approved by the FOSC.
The implications of VRP activation are significant and a clear understanding of what action activates a VRP is
essential. Failure to activate a plan quickly or failure to use pre-contracted resources can result in
delayed response and exacerbate potential environmental damages.
A VRP must be activated once the vessel’s Master has determined on board resources and
personnel cannot meet the needs of an actual or potential incident. VRP activation occurs when
the person in charge of the vessel contacts the Qualified Individual (QI) identified in the VRP.
The QI and alternate QI are defined in regulation as having the authority to mobilize resources
and consultative services identified in the VRP and to act as the liaison with the FOSC.
Contacting the QI and/or alternate QI activates the VRP.
The QI then assess the situation through consultative services and mobilizes response resources identified in the VRP if the incident
requires.
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