The National Transportation Safety Board issued three safety recommendations Thursday following an investigation into the Feb. 1, 2021, engine room fire aboard the bulk carrier Roger Blough.

The Roger Blough was docked in winter layup at the Fincantieri Bay Shipbuilding facility on Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin when a fire started in the engine room. The cargo-unloading conveyor belts then ignited, causing extensive damage throughout the aft section of the vessel. The shipkeeper on board departed the vessel without injury. No pollution was reported. Damage to the Roger Blough exceeded $100 million.

NTSB investigators determined the fire originated at the burner for the diesel oil-fired furnace, which had been installed in the engine room to heat the space during the winter. The burner assembly was mounted onto the furnace’s air tube with an aluminum coupling. Investigators determined the coupling broke, allowing the burner to drop and fracture the fuel line supplying it.

About a month before the fire, the chief engineer believed the furnace was not working and thought the ignitor was not properly set. The vessel’s two engineers removed and reinstalled the furnace’s burner several times in their attempts to repair the furnace, which were unsuccessful. They contacted the furnace company’s technical representative who repaired the furnace. NTSB investigators concluded the repeated removal and reinstallation of the burner assembly during attempts to repair the furnace may have damaged the mounting coupling and led to its eventual failure.

When the fire erupted at night, the wireless monitoring and notification system, which was installed for winter layup, activated the alarm panel in the crew’s accommodation spaces and then notified the designated contacts. The shipkeeper was the only person on board but was not listed among the contacts.

The shipkeeper was not awakened until 7 minutes later when the smoke detector inside his stateroom sounded as thick black smoke filled the room. According to the report, had the shipkeeper on board been listed among the designated contacts to receive system alerts, he likely would have been awakened earlier and may have had an opportunity to extinguish the fire before it spread through the vessel.

NTSB determined that the probable cause of the engine room fire aboard the Roger Blough was likely the repeated removal and reinstallation of the furnace’s burner that led to the failure of its mounting coupling, resulting in the operating burner dropping to the bottom of its enclosure and fracturing the fuel supply line, which allowed diesel fuel to ignite. Contributing to the fire was the absence of a fire-activated automatic fuel oil shutoff valve on the fuel oil inlet piping before the burner, which would have stopped the fuel feeding the fire shortly after it started and limited the spread of the fire.

Marine Investigation Report 22/19 identified three safety issues:

Lack of regulations governing furnace installation and operations on board certain vessels,
Inadequate notification to onboard personnel of a fire, and Lack of fire-activated valve on the fuel oil piping to the burner on the furnace in the engine room.

As a result of the investigation, the NTSB issued one recommendation each to the U.S. Coast Guard, the American Bureau of Shipping, and Key Lakes Inc. NTSB recommended that the U.S. Coast Guard require that furnace installations on vessels be inspected to comply with National Fire Protection Association recommendations and to develop standards requiring installation of other types of shutdown mechanisms or safety alarms.

A similar recommendation was issued to the American Bureau of Shipping, which conducts oversight examinations for vessels like the Roger Blough. NTSB’s recommendation to the vessel owner, Key Lakes Inc. was to ensure that their designated contacts list includes each shipkeeper living and working on a vessel during layup.

“There are no regulations regarding winter layup procedures for commercial vessels operating in the Great Lakes,” the report said. “The lack of regulations or classification standards related to diesel oil-fired air heating furnace construction, installation, safety shutdowns, and system alarms poses a risk to life and property if the equipment is not installed and maintained to standards similar to those in place for other oil-fired equipment.”

“The National Fire Protection Association recommends that burner assemblies like the type installed on the Roger Blough have a fire-activated quick-closing valve on the inlet fuel oil piping next to the burner,” the report said. “When installed, this type of valve has a thermally activated mechanism that shuts the valve in the presence of fire to stop further flow of fuel to the burner. Had the burner assembly on the Roger Blough been fitted with a fire-activated quick-closing valve on its inlet fuel oil piping, the fuel feeding the furnace fire would have been stopped and thus the fire likely would not have spread so rapidly.”

The public docket for the investigation contains factual information, including interview transcripts, photographs and other investigative materials.

Survitec has launched a new Marine Evacuation System (MES) designed to the meet the emergency evacuation requirements of small to medium size passenger vessels, according to a press release.

Targeted at vessels with passenger capacities ranging from 300 to 1,500 persons, the new MES solution will be officially introduced to ship operators during the SMM Trade Fair before being rolled out for full market availability from early 2023.

The new MES solution builds on Survitec’s growing market share in the larger cruise ship market, the company said, where the company has installed some of the largest dry-shod MES systems on the most advanced cruise ships in the world.

“We were aware that there was demand for an extended service MES solution with high functionality to serve the ferry and small passenger cruise market. We went back to the drawing board and took a fresh look at how we could drive innovation to meet this need,” said Richard McCormick, AES and MES Product Manager, Survitec.

“The 30-month service interval this technology affords, brings convenience to the customer. This is because all of the complex logistics around servicing only have to be undertaken roughly every two and a half years. The cost savings for vessel owners are obvious,” added McCormick.

Using the fully enclosed, dry-shod helical (spiral) slide design of the company’s popular Marin Ark 2, the new MES solution ensures safe, rapid and intuitive descent for people of all ages and abilities. There is no restriction on the size of individual users, and crew can ascend the slide to assist passengers if necessary.

“The revolutionary helical slide technology from our Marin Ark 2 MES, trusted by major cruise operators for unrestricted, improved passenger experience and enhanced safety, is now available for ferries and small expedition-type passenger ships,” he added.

Fully enclosed single and double helical slide options are available in an asymmetric arrangement, the new MES solution comprises self-righting approved liferafts for 50, 100, 150 persons, with  SOLAS A, B and HSC emergency packs.

Survitec welcomes discussions with cruise and ferry operators on the new MES solution at SMM on Stand 428, in Hall B5, which takes place in Hamburg between the 6th and 9th of September 2022.

Source: https://www.cruiseindustrynews.com/cruise-news/28163-survitec-launches-new-mes-for-small-ships.html

Lithium-ion batteries are having an increasingly important impact on maritime safety. This is evidenced by the occurrence of fires on ro-ro ships, vehicles and container ships. According to a new report from the maritime insurer Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (Agcs), the fight against these accidents, especially at sea, is proving to be particularly difficult. The only way to deal with these dangers is to take preventive measures as he explains Rahul Khanna, Global Director of Maritime Risk Advisory at Agcs. “Companies – she says – must do their best to adopt, implement and apply solid preventive measures. Indeed, with the rise of the electric car, more and more vehicles containing lithium-ion batteries will be transported by sea in the future ”.

The report, “Lithium Ion Batteries: Fire Risks and Loss Prevention Measures in Shipping“, Highlights four main risks: fire (lithium-ion batteries containing electrolyte, a flammable liquid); explosion (resulting from the release of flammable vapors and gases in a confined space); thermal runaway (rapid self-heating which can cause an explosion); and the toxic gases these accidents can cause. to produce. The most common causes of disasters are the production of accumulators and batteries that do not comply with the standards, the overcharging of accumulators or overheating due to a short circuit. Deterioration of accumulators or batteries, particularly related to poor packaging, incorrect handling or slippage of a poorly protected charge, can also be the cause of a disaster.

“Batteries are not only a potential cause of fire when they are damaged, overloaded or subjected to high temperatures. They can also exacerbate other sources of fire at sea and cause hard-to-extinguish fires, which can reignite several days or weeks later.In most accidents that occur aboard a ship, thermal runaway can be a factor. significant fire, if the crew does not take immediate action, such as extinguishing the fire by using large amounts of water for an extended period of time. Furthermore, this operation can be extremely difficult, especially if early diagnosis is difficult, if there are not enough seafarers or if the firefighting capabilities are inadequate ”.

Electric vehicle loss prevention measures on vehicle carriers and container ships

To mitigate the fire risk related to lithium-ion batteries when transporting electric vehicles on ships and containers, Agcs experts presented several recommendations for businesses, particularly in two sectors: storage and transport.

First, the personnel must be trained in packing and handling procedures and the sailors must be trained in fire fighting with lithium-ion batteries. Where possible, it should be checked that the state of charge of the batteries is suitable for transport. Electric vehicles with low ground clearance should be labeled, as this feature can cause problems with charging and discharging. Finally, ensuring that all electric vehicles are properly secured helps prevent slippage during transport. Any arrangements that can help with early diagnosis along the way are also essential. Fire safety bullets, thermal scanners, gas detectors and heat / smoke detectors are especially needed, as well as video surveillance cameras.

The report also lists several measures that can contribute to the safe storage of lithium-ion batteries. Also in this case, Agcs experts recommend staff training in packaging and handling procedures. In addition, an emergency response plan for damaged or overheated batteries and a risk control plan should be established to manage the receipt, storage, shipping and monitoring of packaged lithium-ion batteries. Finally, the prevention of exposure of batteries to high temperatures and their separation from other combustible materials, as well as the rapid removal of damaged or defective lithium-ion batteries, must be addressed.

“To limit accidents related to the transport of lithium-ion batteries in the maritime sector, the actors in the supply chain must understand the risks, causes and problems associated with commercial transport,” he said. Randall Lund, Senior Marine Risk Consultant at Agcs and author of the report with Miguel Herrera and Justin Kersey, also their maritime risk consultants at Agcs – There are specific regulations and instructions regarding these batteries that aim to prevent most accidents. However, they can only be effective if they are disseminated and applied. Only through a concerted effort by all stakeholders in the supply chain can we hope to reduce the number of accidents. “

Source: https://news.italy-24.com/trends/63545/fire-caused-by-batteries-a-risk-that-should-not-be-underestimated.html