A recent study published by the US Army War College looks at how geography constrained the Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean and the lessons that can be drawn for China’s efforts to become an Indian Ocean power.

Geography has a big impact on the strategic dynamics of the Indian Ocean. It is largely enclosed on three sides with few maritime entry points. The Himalayas also cut off much of the Eurasian hinterland from access to the sea.

This makes it hard for militaries to get access. The semi-enclosed geography of the Indian Ocean creates a premium for naval powers that control the maritime chokepoints and the limited number of deep-water ports for essential logistical support.

There are similar constraints in projecting airpower. Aircraft can access Indian Ocean airspace from, say, Chinese territory only by flying over other countries. Within the region, the sheer size of the Indian Ocean makes it essential to have a network of local airfields for staging and support.

In the Cold War, the Soviets struggled to overcome these constraints. The Soviet Union had no direct access to the Indian Ocean by sea or air and few reliable regional partners. Its navy had to deploy to the Indian Ocean mostly from the Pacific, transiting the straits through Southeast Asia where vessels were subject to interdiction and tracking.

This had a significant impact on the Soviet naval presence. The long transit from Vladivostok to the Arabian Gulf meant that keeping one vessel on station required ships to spend around a third of their time in transit. Long transits also limited the deployment of smaller vessels. Logistical requirements meant that a majority of deployed Soviet vessels were support and other auxiliary vessels.

There were strong imperatives to obtain local bases. The Soviet Navy developed several facilities around the Horn of Africa, and where onshore support wasn’t available, they relied on floating bases in international waters. The quest for bases was pursued opportunistically and often meant relying on politically unstable partners. Access was far from guaranteed and they were evicted from several bases.

Although Soviet ships often outnumbered the US Navy’s in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy didn’t achieve meaningful or lasting naval superiority across the region. The naval balance in favor of the Soviets was quickly reversed in times of crisis.

The composition of the Soviet fleet also differed considerably from the US’s with a large number of auxiliary vessels, including intelligence and research ships.

The Soviet air presence developed with several years’ lag. Operational access was also geographically constrained. Flight distances into the region were long, and aircraft operating from Soviet territory had to fly over other countries. This created a premium for access to local air bases.

The geographic constraints faced by China in the Indian Ocean mirror those faced by the Soviet Union.

For China, the Indian Ocean has secondary importance compared with the Pacific. But Beijing still has several strategic imperatives or missions in the Indian Ocean, starting with the protection of its crucial ocean supply lines for energy. But other missions are just as important in influencing the composition, size and locations of the Chinese military presence. These include protecting Chinese citizens and investments, bolstering soft-power influence, countering terrorism, collecting intelligence, supporting coercive diplomacy towards small countries, and enabling operations in a conflict environment. The People’s Liberation Army must be capable of responding to a range of contingencies.

The PLA Navy has a leading role in the PLA’s Indian Ocean presence, reflecting the imperatives of protecting supply lines and the political advantages of a relatively transient naval footprint.

The size and composition of Chinese naval deployments to the Indian Ocean have evolved. They now include an antipiracy taskforce, hydrographic-survey and intelligence-collection vessels, and submarines. But, although the presence has grown, China has so far been relatively incremental in its approach.

It’s possible that the PLA Navy’s presence could come to resemble the US Navy’s, if Beijing wants to protect the entirety of its Indian Ocean supply lines. That would be a major undertaking, requiring the sustained deployment of large numbers of vessels, including aircraft carriers and submarines, as well as land-based aircraft. It would require multiple naval and air bases in the region.

But Beijing may judge that protecting its supply lines against the US and India is impracticable. It may choose to focus on the Pacific while pursuing limited objectives in the Indian Ocean.

The PLA Navy’s presence in the Indian Ocean over the past decade has focused overwhelmingly on antipiracy, intelligence and naval diplomacy. These will likely continue to be a major focus and might evolve to include limited, coercive diplomacy (for example, disputes over fishing rights), as has been the case elsewhere. PLA Navy assets might be supplemented by vessels from other maritime agencies.

China may also develop additional capabilities to create local superiority; respond to a limited distant blockade; provide support for local interventions; or undertake limited sea-denial operations. All of these missions would be broadly analogous to the Soviet Union’s Indian Ocean strategy. These could provide options to respond to certain contingencies at a fraction of the cost of a full sea-control strategy.

As with the Soviets, constraints on China’s access create imperatives for local support facilities. But the nature and extent of China’s basing requirements would also depend on its overall strategy. Many needs could be satisfied by relying on a ‘places not bases’ approach of using commercial facilities while minimising the need for dedicated bases. But any significant and sustained Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean would likely require dedicated support facilities comparable to traditional bases.

China’s approach to securing local facilities is much more deliberate and comprehensive compared with the Soviet approach. China may be seeking to build what some analysts call strategic strong points as part of a network of supply, logistics and intelligence hubs across the Indian Ocean.

But whether that would yield assured access to support facilities under wartime conditions is uncertain. Despite many ‘feelers’ for facilities in the Indian Ocean region, no potential host country has offered permanent facilities to the PLA Navy (with the exception of Djibouti). Indeed, several potential hosts have pushed back on proposed port developments.

The port at Gwadar, Pakistan, is often identified as the most likely location of another Chinese naval base in the northwestern Indian Ocean (although it has not been used by the PLA). But any comprehensive Chinese naval presence would likely also require assured access to facilities in the southwestern, central and eastern Indian Ocean.

China also needs to develop its regional airpower capabilities. Support for sustained naval operations would require substantial airpower, including maritime surveillance and strike aircraft. But the PLA Air Force doesn’t have assured airfield access in the Indian Ocean, although it could potentially use the new 3,400-meter airfield at Dara Sakor, Cambodia. China’s lack of air capabilities in the Indian Ocean places it at a major tactical disadvantage. That could become a bottleneck limiting the PLA’s strategic power projection.

One clear lesson from the Cold War is that securing local bases can be costly and uncertain. China’s relationships with Pakistan and Sri Lanka demonstrate how much Beijing has to spend, even without securing assured access. Like the Soviet Union, China may find that relationships with some countries—particularly, corrupt and autocratic regimes—are less than reliable.

The Soviet experience also suggests that the size and composition of the PLA in the Indian Ocean will principally be a function of China’s unique interests in the region. It should not be assumed that China’s future military presence and security relationships will necessarily resemble those of the US.

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


Russian river-sea product tanker KARAKUZ collided with small boat in Dardanelles off Burhanli at around 1800 UTC Aug 25, while transiting the Strait in southern direction, en route from Novorossiysk to Perama, Greece. 2 people in boat weren’t injured, boat sustained some damages. Tanker moved further south and was anchored at Kumkale anchorage, southern Dardanelles. Remained at anchor as of 0330 UTC Aug 26.

Source: https://www.fleetmon.com/maritime-news/2022/39297/russian-tanker-collided-boat-dardanelles/

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


Consultancy Rystad Energy expects a drop-off ahead for Russian oil production and exports as the cutoff date for the planned EU oil embargo approaches. At the end of this year, the European Union will not allow further imports of Russian crude, depriving western Russia of access to its primary export market.

Over the span of the summer, Russia’s oil sector has been buoyed by high domestic demand, even as exports to Europe have fallen. Russian tourists are staying nearer to home due to the withdrawal of foreign airlines, and they are driving to their vacation destinations – thereby consuming more gasoline and creating demand for higher refining runs. This has helped offset the drop in demand from traditional European customers.

However, there are signs that the picture may not be so pleasant for Russia’s energy sector going forward. Rystad notes that crude exports shrank in June and July – including exports to buyers in Asia, who have been absorbing oil that would ordinarily be sold into European markets. The reason for Asian buyers’ declining interest is not known, but Rystad suggests that it could be that Russia has reduced the discount against Brent it is offering to its customers. These sales are private and undisclosed, but the pricing may have shifted from the previously-reported $30 per barrel discount to a more modest $15.

Whatever the cause, declining interest from Asia and the cutoff in Europe could reduce Russian crude exports by about 550,000 barrels a day by the end of December.

“Russia’s upstream sector has rebounded but this resilience is short term. Domestic consumption has helped fill the gap during the peak demand season, but overseas demand for Russian blends has dipped spelling trouble further ahead. The upcoming EU embargo remains an unknown factor, when and where it will impact is not yet clear, but it will hasten the decline expected this autumn,” said Daria Melnik, senior analyst at Rystad Energy, in a new researech note.

An impending economic downturn will likely add to the impact domestically. Russia’s own central bank predicts a severe economic contraction of about 10 percent in the fourth quarter. The resulting reduction in demand for energy will weigh on domestic refining runs, taking another 700,000 bpd bite out of domestic oil consumption, according to Rystad.

“Russia will have to cope with a national economic crisis as well as source new markets for its oil and oil products when the EU embargo comes into force. After the summer ramp-up, crude production is expected to fall again by 1.1 million bpd, but further recovery will be more challenging and will take more time,” predicted Rystad.

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


Widespread container shipping trade recovery in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic has boosted the global terminal capacity outlook, supported by global terminal operators’ (GTOs) increased appetite for higher-risk greenfield projects to deliver long-term growth, according to Drewry’s latest Global Container Terminal Operators Annual Review and Forecast report.

Global container port capacity is projected to increase by an average annual rate of 2.4% to reach 1.38 billion teu by 2026.  However, the worsening economic and geopolitical situation has led to a downgrading of the cargo demand outlook, and as a result container port utilization is now projected to moderate to 70% in 2025 compared to last year’s projection of 75%.

While the majority (70%) of GTO investment plans remain focused on existing assets, there has been a notable increase in the number of greenfield projects – with CMA Terminals, Hutchison and TIL all expected to add 4 mteu or additional greenfield capacity by 2026.

Eleanor Hadland, author of the report and Drewry’s senior analyst for ports and terminals said: “The renewed appetite for greenfield projects shows improved confidence in the market outlook. However, the ability of CMA Terminals and TIL to secure volume guarantees from CMA CGM and MSC gives these companies an advantage over non-carrier affiliated operators.”

Global supply chain disruption resulted in increased cargo dwell times in 2021 which generated additional storage charges, lifting terminal operators’ revenue growth above that which could be justified on the basis of volume recovery alone.

Port congestion does not appear to have adversely impacted financial performance, despite the widespread decline in productivity levels. The revenue raising mechanisms (i.e., paid-for overtime, storage charges) have so far proven to be sufficient to offset the additional congestion-related operating costs. Operators also cite the continuing cost control measures implemented in response to Covid as having a positive impact on margins.

“Once global supply chain disruption eases, which is now expected in 1H23, there is heightened risk that revenue gains will retreat as dwell times return to pre-pandemic levels,” added Hadland.

Capital expenditure bounced back in 2021, rising 31% YoY, but operators now face the twin challenges of longer lead time for handling equipment and rapidly rising costs. Drewry’s research also identifies that the pace of fund raising has slowed since 2020, with rising interest rates putting a brake on the market.

In general, favorable terminal operator financial performance has translated into robust balance sheets. With the exception of COSCO Ports and ICTSI, net debt fell, leading to a reduction in net gearing by 8.5 percentage points to 54.7%.

Looking back at 2021, the number of companies that qualified as GTOs fell from 21 to 20, with K Line dropping out of the rankings following the sale of its US operations in 4Q20. Growth in equity-adjusted throughput for the remaining 20 companies classified by Drewry as GTOs was 7.0%, marginally higher than the 6.8% growth in global port handling recorded in 2021. The leading operators handled over 48% of the global port volumes on an equity-adjusted basis, stable on a like-for-like basis vs. 2020.

APM Terminals reported the largest absolute increase in equity-adjusted volumes, with volumes up 4.7 mteu (10.3%) YoY.

Source: https://maritimefairtrade.org/greenfield-container-port-projects-back-in-favor-with-terminal-operators-says-drewry/

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Momsen (DDG 92) departed Singapore, Aug. 10, after a scheduled port call.

Momsen’s visit to the country is reflection of the longstanding partnership between the United States and Singapore, as well as their combined willingness to protect a free and open Indo-Pacific.

“This was a tremendous opportunity for our crew to be able to further international relations with Singapore on behalf of our country, and I am proud to be a part of it,” said Cmdr. Erik Roberts, commanding officer of Momsen.

“We’re committed to strengthening interoperability with like-minded regional partners to ensure our forces can operate together effectively and reinforce our roles in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”

Sailors aboard Momsen were provided with the opportunity to experience and enjoy Singapore’s vibrant culture. Routine port visits such as this further partnering nations’ mutual interests and build upon longstanding relationships.

“I was glad to have the chance to see Singapore again after visiting almost a decade ago,” said Yeoman 2nd Class Ma Selina Sison, from San Francisco, California.

“It was incredible to see the way in which the country had changed and grown. I would never have expected to be back in Singapore. Coming back to their diverse cuisine was certainly a highlight. Getting away from our usual workdays and taking time for ourselves is much needed, and I think, well deserved. It’s nice to be able to spend some time in port to recharge and be ready to continue our mission.”

The U.S. Navy has a long history of support from the Republic of Singapore. The host nation provides basing and logistics support to U.S. Navy’s rotationally-deployed littoral combat ships (LCS) and, recently, the P-8A Poseidon aircraft. This defense relationship builds upon the credibility of conventional deterrence by enhancing interoperability.

The U.S. Navy has operated in the Indo-Pacific region with the support of partnering nations for more than 70 years. Routinely operating in the region, under the recognition of international law, is essential to the U.S. Navy’s dedication to maintaining peace and allowing all nations to utilize vital sea lanes without fear or contest.

Momsen departed Singapore Aug. 10 to continue operations in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

Momsen is assigned to Task Force 71/Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 15, the Navy’s largest forward-deployed DESRON and the U.S. 7th fleet’s principal surface force.

 

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


Helix Robotics Solutions Limited, the U.K. Robotics division of Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., and Volstad Maritime AS announced five-year charter extensions for both the Grand Canyon II and Grand Canyon III construction support vessels to continue working on projects across multiple energy sectors.

The Grand Canyon II and Grand Canyon III have been under long-term charter with Helix since 2015 and 2016, respectively. The extended charter for the Grand Canyon II runs from January 2023 through the end of 2027, while the extended charter for the Grand Canyon III runs from May 2023 through May 2028, with a further option to extend.

Under the extensions, Volstad has committed to upgrade both vessels with a new battery hybrid in an effort to reduce fuel consumption and emissions and to improve the environmental footprint of vessel operations.

Scotty Sparks, Helix’s Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, stated, “Helix is a global leader in subsea robotics and trenching, and we continue to expand our specialty services to support offshore wind farm developments during their pre-construction, construction and operations phases. We are pleased to extend the charter agreements with Volstad for the Grand Canyon class vessels as we are committed to supporting a responsible energy transition, increasing offshore renewables activity and promoting reduced emissions technology.”

The vessels are designed for operation under severe weather conditions with high manoeuvrability and superior station keeping capabilities, which enable them to work efficiently and reliably with results consistently reducing downtime during critical operations.

Each vessel is equipped with a 250 MT AHC subsea crane, moonpool, integrated ROV deck space and removable bulwarks. With clear deck areas up to 1,650 m2 each, the vessels are well suited for subsea construction, Inspection, Repair & Maintenance (IRM) and offshore renewables activities.

In addition, two 3,000m rated 250hp UHD ROVs are mobilized onboard the Grand Canyon II, while two 3,000m rated 200hp UHD ROVs together with the T1500 jet trenching system and iTrencher are mobilized onboard the Grand Canyon III.

Source: https://www.maritimeeconomy.com/post-details.php?post_id=aGloZg==&post_name=Helix%20Robotics%20Solutions%20Announces%20Five%20Year%20Charter%20Extensions%20for%20Grand%20Canyon%20II%20%20III%20Vessels&segment_name=16

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


nThe UK’s Department of Transport, through the Maritime & Coastguard Authority (MCA), has set a target date 22 November has been set to pass the Merchant Shipping (Nuclear Ships) Regulations into law.

As shipping seeks zero carbon future fuels there is growing interest around the use of atomic power and MCA consultation in 2021 concluded that there is an appetite for nuclear ships over the next 10 years.

According to Core Power the Regulations will transpose Chapter VIII in the Annex to the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (‘SOLAS’) together with the Safety Code for Nuclear Ships (res. A.491.XII) into UK law.

“This is an important milestone in the regulatory progress for New Nuclear in Maritime,” said Mikal Boe, Founder and CEO of Core Power.

Core Power is seeking to develop and commercialise molten salt reactors (MSRs) for shipping and offshore power production.

Source: https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/regulation/uk-set-pass-maritime-law-nuclear-powered-ships

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


The deceased body of an employee who fell into the sea was discovered on 24 August, two days after a portion of a concrete pier he was on suddenly collapsed at the Keppel Shipyard based in Tuas.

In a statement published on Wednesday, the Keppel Shipyard shared condolences to the family members of the subcontract worker, who was a Bangladeshi. The firm mentioned that it is in touch and cooperating with relevant authorities to conduct a thorough inspection and review.

The firm mentioned that Keppel Shipyard values the lives and safety of its workers and that they deeply regret the tragic incident.

On Wednesday, the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) mentioned that it was able to retrieve a body that was floating in the water close to the incident site, adding that the worker was declared dead by a paramedic at the scene.
Keppel Shipyard
Image for representation purpose only

Per the police, the dead body was recovered on Wednesday around 8.30 am.

The accident occurred on Monday morning when a portion of the concrete pier where a crane was on reportedly collapsed, making the crane topple onto a vessel berthed beside the dock, a spokesperson associated with the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) said.

The employee (aged 38 years), who was on the pier, fell into the sea. He was reported as missing. Kumaran Marine employed the victim.

The incident at Keppel Shipyard’s 51 Pioneer Sector 1 caused the crane to submerge underwater.

Four other employees – one Chinese national, two Bangladeshis, and one Singaporean – also suffered some minor injuries and are stable, reported the spokesperson associated with the MOM.

MOM mentioned investigating the cause of the accident and stopping activities at the pier.

Source: https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/scdf-found-the-body-of-bangladeshi-subcontract-worker-who-fell-into-the-sea-at-keppel-shipyard-tuas/

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


  • HSA Group, Yemen’s largest private company, becomes the first private sector organisation to donate to the UN’s appeal
  • Funding will go towards the UN’s plan to transfer over one million barrels of crude oil from FSO SAFER and prevent a humanitarian, economic, and ecological disaster in Yemen and the Red Sea region.

HSA Group, Yemen’s largest private company, has today announced a US$ 1.2 million donation to support the United Nations (UN) efforts to avert a major humanitarian, economic, and ecological disaster in the Red Sea. The donation is the first committed by a private sector organisation.

The FSO SAFER oil tanker is one of the world’s largest shipping vessels. Carrying over one million barrels of crude oil, FSO SAFER has been moored off Yemen’s Red Sea coast for over 30 years. The vessel has recently deteriorated beyond repair and could disintegrate or explode at any time, with its oil cargo spilling into the Red Sea.

HSA Group’s contribution will go towards the UN’s US$ 80 million target to fund an emergency operation to remove the tanker’s oil cargo and safely transfer it to another vessel. To date, the UN has received US$ 64 million in pledges from over a dozen governments. Less than US$ 16 million is now required to help ensure the critical mission can occur.

According to the UN, failure to reach the targeted amount could likely result in a major oil spill in the Red Sea.

A spill on the scale predicted by the UN would result in indispensable global shipping lanes being blocked and some of Yemen’s most critical ports being closed. These port closures would cut off food, fuel, and life-saving supplies from reaching millions of Yemenis who already suffer from the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Additionally, a spill of this magnitude would cause serious, perhaps irreparable, damage to the Red Sea’s marine life and biodiversity. Hundreds of thousands of jobs in the region’s fishing industry would be lost as fish stocks would take around 25 years to recover. This would impact communities across the Red Sea region reliant upon trade and economic activity in the area for their livelihoods.

It is estimated that the cost of a clean-up would be US$20 billion, with the ultimate cost to the global economy many more times that amount.

Nabil Hayel Saeed Anam, Managing Director, HSA Group – Yemen region, said:

“HSA Group is gravely concerned by the impending threat of an oil spill from FSO SAFER.

“A spill on the scale projected by the UN would have a devastating impact on Yemen. It would aggravate the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, threaten millions with starvation, and destroy livelihoods. It would also be an unimaginable ecological catastrophe.

“HSA has closely followed the campaign led by the UN and the generous donations pledged by the international community. Given that there remains a large funding shortfall, and time is running out, HSA believes that the private sector must step forward.

“We are making this contribution to support international efforts to prevent a disaster that would both tip Yemen further into humanitarian and economic crisis and impact the wider Red Sea region, which plays a critical role in the global economy and the world’s biodiversity.

“We hope that this first donation from the private sector may serve to encourage other companies across the world to contribute to the UN’s response and avert this potentially catastrophic crisis.”

Reference: Cision PR Newswire

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


A fisherman from Indonesia was shot within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Papua New Guinea (PNG). The report from news sources is that some members associated with the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF) carried out the shooting that killed the victim on Monday, 22 August. Per reports from the media, an Indonesian-flagged fishing vessel named the KMN Calvin 02 was approached within the PNG territorial waters by a PNGDF patrol boat that reportedly opened the fire, taking the life of one.

While the sequence of events remains unclear until now, media reports in Indonesia initially mentioned that an Australia-based warship had opened fire. However, the Australian Government has denied this.

A member of the Indonesian fishing boat crew, who discussed with KabarPaupa.com, mentioned that if he was not mistaken, the warship PNGDF had a hull number, 401, that corresponds to the HMPNGS Ted Diro.

Sources further confirmed to the Overt Defense that, during this time, works to arm PNG’s Guardian-class vessels are yet to start.

Efforts to track the KMN Calvin 02 and Ted Diro via open-source means, including AIS data, were unsuccessful. However, photos released by the US Coast Guard (USCG) highlight that two of the three Guardian-class patrol vessels were in the port at the Manus Naval Base when the USCGC Oliver Henry reached on 14 August.

Given that Guardian-class patrol boats of the PNG are not so far armed with any big calibre weapons, it seems possible that the shooting was carried out by the PNGDF officers who were empowered with small arms.

Overt Defense tried contacting Australia’s Department of Defence and the PNG government for comments. However, they didn’t reply with answers to questions before the publication.

Illegal fishing carried out by Indonesia’s fishers has exploded within PNG EEZs and Australia with the onset of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, several Indonesia-based Fishing Boats were also burnt off the coast of Australia, resulting in a diplomatic incident.

On 24 August, a Defence spokesperson reported to the Overt Defense that the Defence department knows about the media reports published this week regarding the death of a fisherman from Indonesia off New Guinea’s south coast. Australian personnel and vessels weren’t involved in the incident.

References: Tempo.CO, Indonesia Posts, Overt Defense

 

CREWEXPRESS STCW REST HOURS SOFTWARE - Paris and Tokyo MoU have announced that they will jointly launch a new Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) from 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022


Company DETAILS

SHIP IP LTD
VAT:BG 202572176
Rakovski STR.145
Sofia,
Bulgaria
Phone ( +359) 24929284
E-mail: sales(at)shipip.com

ISO 9001:2015 CERTIFIED