As part of their deployment to South East Asia, Indian Naval Ships Sahyadri and Kamorta, are on a three-day visit to Jakarta. INS Sahyadri is an indigenously built multi-role stealth Frigate and INS Kamorta is an indigenously built ASW Corvette. Frigates and Corvettes are escort ships and Frigates are larger than Corvettes and have a fair mix of offensive and defence capabilities.

During the visit, the Indian Navy personnel will participate in professional interactions with the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) towards further enhancing interoperability and mutual co-operation.

In addition, several social and informal exchanges, aimed at strengthening ties and mutual understanding between the Navies, are also planned.

The visit of IN Ships seeks to enhance maritime co-operation and bolster India’s strong bonds of friendship with Indonesia that would further contribute towards security and stability in the region.

The Iranian Ports and Maritime Organization released a statement saying that Greece has released the disputed crude oil tanker following an appellate court’s order overturning a seizure order. Greek officials did not acknowledge the Iranian reports but repeated their calls for Iran to release two Greek-flagged crude oil tankers it has been holding since late May.

The crude oil tanker now known as Lana became the focus of an international incident between Greece, Iran, and the United States with Russia and the European Union also briefly involved. It started in mid-April when Greece announced it was detaining the Russian-flagged tanker Pegas after it anchored near the island of Evia reporting engine troubles. Greece said it suspected the vessel was in violation of EU sanctions against Russian assets but later reported they would be releasing the tanker because its owner did not appear to be among the sanctioned companies. The tanker however was also being detained after a port state inspection found several deficiencies.

U.S. authorities had previously sanctioned the 115,000 dwt tanker reporting it had violated sanctions against the Iranian oil trade. On that basis, the U.S. went to court in Greece and won an order seizing the oil.

“With the swift and authoritative action of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Greece finally ordered the return of the cargo to its owner, and the Greek government issued the relevant order, and now we are witnessing the lifting of the seizure of the ship and the return of the cargo to its owner,” the PMO said in a statement that has also been widely carried by Iranian media.

The tanker in May had reported a name change to Lana and later began displaying the Iranian flag reporting it was registered in Iran, not Russia. It is unclear if the transfer was made due to the sanctions again Russian interests or to create the incident with the United States. Iran then accused Greece of piracy for seizing its ship and cargo and filed a complaint with the IMO.

AIS data for the Lana shows that the vessel remains at anchor in Greece as of today, June 14, but it now says “waiting for orders.” Two Greek anchor handling tugs also appear to have moved away from the vessel, although another tanker remains anchored nearby. Reported had indicated that the U.S. had hired tankers and had at least partially completed a ship-to-ship transfer removing some crude from the tanker. Reports have not indicated what would happen with the oil that was removed or if there would be an attempt to reload the Iranian tanker.

While Greek officials had said publicly that they viewed the two incidents independently, they quickly reiterated their calls today for the release of the crude oil tankers Delta Poseidon and Prudent Warrior that were stopped in the Persian Gulf in a retaliatory action by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The vessels remain anchored in Iran with their crews aboard. Previously the shipping companies reported that they had contact with the crews and that they were being treated fairly. Iran initially said the vessels were being held for unspecified violations but never detailed its charges.

What are the key elements of TMSA 3 (Tanker Management Self Assessment)?

On the 10th of April 2017, OCIMF (The Oil Companies International Marine Forum) released TMSA 3, the latest edition of the Tanker Management and Self-Assessment (TMSA) programme providing Tanker companies with a means to improve and measure their safety management systems.

TMSA 3 revised and updated all twelve of the existing elements from the previous two editions and introduced a thirteenth – ‘Maritime Security.’

What are the 13 key elements of TMSA 3?

The 13 key elements of TMSA 3 are as follows:

Leadership and the safety management system

Recruitment and management of shore-based personnel

Recruitment, management, and wellbeing of vessel personnel

Vessel reliability and maintenance including critical equipment

Navigational safety

Cargo, ballast, tank cleaning, bunkering, mooring and anchoring operations

Management of change

Incident reporting, investigation, and analysis

Safety management

Environmental and energy management

Emergency preparedness and contingency planning

Measurement, analysis, and improvement

Maritime security

the newest element ‘Maritime Security‘ mainly consists of:

Use of Risk Assessment solution to identify and mitigate risks
Define and maintain a stock of equipment for vessel hardening as per BMP 4 guidelines.
Define Operational Security Area and monitor the number of transits of vessels as per Operation Security Reports made in the solution.
Circulate travel advisory and threat level data sharing to vessels using the document system.
Verify armed guards qualification criteria before employing them onboard vessels using our standard measurement list

SOURCE

Shipping Industry Launches New Security Resources for World Fleet

28 June 2018 – (London) International shipping industry organisations, with military support, have launched a new website dedicated to providing comprehensive maritime security guidance to companies and mariners. Launched today, the new website www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org provides security-related guidance produced by the industry as well as links to other useful maritime and military security resources.

“In a world of increasingly complex security risks, it is essential that mariners and ships are protected. The new website will be a freely available facility where companies and mariners can access essential guidance and information to help them comprehensively prepare for voyages through areas of security risk,” the authors said.

The aim is to ease access for companies and seafarers to maritime security related information and guidance. Central to the website are new best practice guides to help companies and mariners risk assess voyages and mitigate against external threats to their safety. These are covered in three publications:

Global Counter Piracy Guidance for Companies, Masters and Seafarers is a new publication containing guidance on piracy and armed robbery that can be used by mariners around the world.
BMP5: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Safety in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea contains guidance for region-specific threats in this region.
The third edition of the Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea region is also provided.

All three publications are free to download and free printed copies of Global Counter Piracy Guidance and BMP5 will be available soon.

Knowing that not all shipping companies have the means, resources, time and/or know-how to keep the standards of completion of Oil Record Books under close scrutiny, SHIP IP is available to offer a new service that can assist your company in the early detection and correction of deficiencies and, as well, in the harmonization of ORB completion standards throughout your fleet.

For a mutually agreeable fee we can remotely conduct periodic or sampling screening of scanned copies of Oil Records Book entries, looking for warning signs of unusual or suspicious operations, errors, incorrect practices, aspects with room for improvement in your SMS or EMS, etc. Feedback will always include the identification of noted deficiencies and guidance on how to correct and/or avoid its recurrence.

Screening of Oil Record Book entries will be made against:

ORB Flag State Instructions;

IMO Guidelines (MEPC.1/Circ.736/Rev.2 – Guidance for the Recording of Operations in the Oil Record Book Part I – Machinery Space Operations (All Ships))

INTERTANKO – A Guide for Correct Entries in the Oil Record Book (Part I – Machinery Space Operations), 3rd Ed. March 2014;

INTERTANKO – A Guide for Correct Entries in the Oil Record Book (Part II – Cargo/Ballast Operations), 1st Edition, March 2014;

Owners or Managers own / additional requirements (if provided)

Please download our SERVICE presentation from link below for more details:

https://goo.gl/ytmNlz

We remain to your disposal for any additional info you may require !

IMPORTANT NOTE : A quick scroll through the section “Justice News”of the U.S. Department of Justice website (https://www.justice.gov/justice-news) or a simple google search for keywords like “oil record book violations” will reveal a long trail of criminal prosecutions, indictments and court convictions held in recent times, which regrettably do not seem to be falling in number or severity.

Records, documentation and information needed for screening of Oil Record Books:

From Vessels:

1. Scanned copies of pages of the Oil Record Books Part I and Part II (if applicable) showing all entries made during the period subject to screening – Scanned copies should be sent in PDF format without gaps and in the correct chronological order;

Note for screening of ORB Part II: In case such operations were not carried out in the period subject to screening, vessels should additionally include scanned copies of pages of the ORB II containing entries about the most common operations on tankers such as the last cargo loading, cargo discharge, Crude oil washing, tank washing, slop decanting and de-slopping to shore operations.

2. To facilitate the review job and for cross-checking purposes, the following information should be also provided by each vessel:

· List of ports called during the period concerned (port and dates of arrival/departure)

· List (with date and place) of operations carried out in ports during the period subject to screening such as cargo loading, cargo discharge, fuel oil bunkering, lube oil bunkering (in bulk), de-slopping, disposal ashore of slops, bilge water or sludge, etc.

From Owners/Managers:

1. Scanned copy of the IOPPC Supplement Form B for each vessel (needed for cross-checking of records with tank names, locations and capacities).

2. Extracts from the SMS or EMS documentation showing the Company’s own particular/additional requirements for environmental-related activities/operations required to be recorded in the ORB. Examples: Signature of ORB entries and their endorsement by the Master and Chief Engineer, pre-use testing of OWS alarms and 3-way valve, sealing/tagging of valves in the OWS overboard disposal system, periodic cleaning / inspection of bilge holding tanks, etc.

3. Information about reported failures of MARPOL equipment (Oily Water Separator, Sludge Incinerator) occurred in the period subject to review. The information should indicate:

· Date of failure(s);

· Type of failure(s)

· Date(s) when rectified

· Whether a Flag State dispensation or a class intervention (survey for issuance of short term IOPPC) was involved.

MARITIME CYBER SECURITY

As technology continues to develop, information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) onboard ships are increasingly being networked together – and more frequently connected to the worldwide web.
This brings the greater risk of unauthorized access or malicious attacks to ships’ systems and networks. Risks may also occur from personnel having access to the systems on board, for example by introducing malware via removable media.
Relevant personnel should have training in identifying the typical modus operand of cyber attacks.
The safety, environmental and commercial consequences of not being prepared for a cyber incident may be significant. Responding to the increased cyber threat, a group of international shipping organizations, with support from a wide range of stakeholders, have developed these guidelines, which are designed to assist companies develop resilient approaches to cyber security onboard ships.
Approaches to cyber security will be company- and ship-specific, but should be guided by appropriate standards and the requirements of relevant national regulations. The Guidelines provide a risk-based approach to identifying and responding to cyber threats.

Guidelines_on_cyber_security_onboard_ships_version_1-0

MARITIME CYBER SECURITY

The threat of cyber space is building up rapidly with the potential of posing even bigger risks, also for the crews. The maritime industry seems to be rather unaware and unprepared!

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INTERTANKO Archives - Page 4 of 4 - SHIP IP LTD

Indian Naval Ships Sahyadri, Kamorta on 3-day visit to Jakarta

Iran Reports Greece Released Disputed Tanker and Returning Cargo