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ABSG Consulting Inc. (ABS Consulting), a subsidiary of ABS focused on safety and risk management, and American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc. (the American Club) have joined forces to provide education, training and insurance guidance that address maritime cyber security.

As digital transformation in the maritime industry brings both opportunities and new challenges, owners and operators are relying more on smart technologies and operational data to drive decisions and run their businesses. Comprehensive cyber security programs are not only necessary to protect operations but are also critical to protect the overall safety of crew and the environment. More frequent cyber attacks, increased digitalization and emerging global regulatory focus are adding to immediate demands to address and reduce cyber risk across the industry’s value chain. Cyber security has become a business imperative and new measures will have an impact on how maritime vessels and facilities will be covered by insurers.

 

“The safety and security of our members is a priority. Having a better understanding of the tools available, the programs that can be implemented and the integration of these in the marine industry will help us provide better services to shipowners and charterers globally,” says Dr. William Moore, Director of Loss and Prevention at the American P&I Club. The work we are going to do with ABS Consulting is going to help us identify how to enhance our policies, and the offerings we need to incorporate to improve the coverage and services we offer to our members.”

 

“Collaborating with the American Club to build education programs for their members and industry will give us a better understanding of the real challenges we are collectively facing,” says Ian Bramson, Global Head of Cyber Security of ABS Group. “This alliance enables us to develop the tools, training and services that support compliance and help ship owners and operators put protections in place to secure their vessels – from the design and construction phases through continuous operation over their service life.”
Source: tankeroperator


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LIST OF NATIONAL OPERATIONAL IMO CONTACT POINTS

  • Flag State contact points for PSC matters, Casualty investigation services and Ships’ inspection services (including Secretariats of Memoranda of Understanding on Port State Control)
  • List of national operational contact points responsible for the receipt, transmission and processing of urgent reports on incidents involving harmful substances, including oil from ships to coastal states (see annex under Related Documents) – From January 2018 onwards, the official version of the updated list will be issued electronically and uploaded here on a quarterly basis (quarterly dates: 31 January, 30 April, 31 July and 31 October)
For ship inspection purposes, the only official version of the List of national operational contact points responsible for the receipt, transmission and processing of urgent reports on incidents involving harmful substances including oil from ships to coastal States annex is the updated version, which is issued electronically on a quarterly basis. The quarterly date for this official version is specified at the top of each page of the above list.
From January 2018 onwards, the quarterly dates for the official version of the updated list will be as follows:
31 January, 30 April, 31 July and 31 October. It will be available on the IMO website and can
be downloaded as stated in paragraph 5. In this connection, the next circular under this title
(MSC-MEPC.6/Circ.17) will be issued on 31 January 2019.

LIST OF NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CONTACT POINTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECEIPT, TRANSMISSION AND PROCESSING OF URGENT REPORTS ON INCIDENTS INVOLVING HARMFUL SUBSTANCES, INCLUDING OIL FROM SHIPS TO COASTAL STATES

 

Updates from 30 April 2020 to 31 July 2020
ALBANIA
ALGERIA
BERMUDA (UNITED KINGDOM)
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
CABO VERDE
CHILE
FIJI
FRANCE
GERMANY
GUATEMALA
HONG KONG, CHINA
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)
IRELAND
MALAYSIA
MOROCCO
QATAR
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
URUGUAY

  LIST OF NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CONTACT POINTS 30 April 2020 to 31 July 2020 (499.7 KiB, 10 hits)

Updates from 31 January 2020 to 30 April 2020

ALGERIA
BERMUDA (UNITED KINGDOM)
CHILE
COLOMBIA
CUBA
DOMINICA
ECUADOR
GREECE
KENYA
MARSHALL ISLANDS
MONGOLIA
NIGERIA
PAKISTAN
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PERU
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
SOUTH AFRICA
SWITZERLAND
TONGA
UKRAINE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
VANUATU

  SOPEP NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS (30 APRIL 2020) (839.8 KiB, 497 hits)

Updates from 1 November 2019 to 31 January 2020

ALBANIA
ALGERIA
BAHRAIN
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS (UNITED KINGDOM)
CHILE
COOK ISLANDS
CUBA
ECUADOR
FAROES, DENMARK
FIJI
GEORGIA
INDONESIA
ISLE OF MAN (UNITED KINGDOM)
KUWAIT
MADAGASCAR
MALDIVES
MYANMAR
PAKISTAN
PALAU
PANAMA
PHILIPPINES
SAINT LUCIA
SOUTH AFRICA
THAILAND
Note: This summary page will appear on the Internet whenever changes or amendments are received by the Secretariat before the printed copy of the list is re-issued.

 

  MSC-MEPC.6Circ.17 Annex (SOPEP) - 31 Jan 2020 (497.4 KiB, 1,153 hits)

  sopep contact 31 jan 2020 (510.2 KiB, 1,008 hits)

Updates from 1 August 2019 to 31 October 2019

BAHAMAS
EL SALVADOR
GAMBIA
GIBRALTAR (UNITED KINGDOM)
GUATEMALA
GUERNSEY (UNITED KINGDOM)
INDIA
ISLE OF MAN (UNITED KINGDOM)
ITALY
KENYA
MARSHALL ISLANDS
MYANMAR
NETHERLANDS
NIGERIA
OMAN
PALAU
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
QATAR
SOUTH AFRICA
TURKEY

  LIST OF NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CONTACT POINTS 31 oct 2019 (503.8 KiB, 548 hits)

Updates from 1 May 2019 to 31 July 2019

ALBANIA
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
BELIZE
BERMUDA (UNITED KINGDOM)
BRAZIL
CAYMAN ISLANDS (UNITED KINGDOM)
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COOK ISLANDS
GIBRALTAR (UNITED KINGDOM)
QATAR
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
ROMANIA
SAMOA
SAUDI ARABIA
SOLOMON ISLANDS
SPAIN
SURINAME
SWITZERLAND
TURKMENISTAN
UGANDA
UKRAINE
UNITED KINGDOM

IMO CONTACT POINTS

  MSC-MEPC.6Circ.17 Annex (SOPEP) - 31 July 2019 (512.1 KiB, 835 hits)


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ABSG Consulting Inc. (ABS Consulting), a subsidiary of ABS focused on safety and risk management, and American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc. (the American Club) have joined forces to provide education, training and insurance guidance that address maritime cyber security.

As digital transformation in the maritime industry brings both opportunities and new challenges, owners and operators are relying more on smart technologies and operational data to drive decisions and run their businesses. Comprehensive cyber security programs are not only necessary to protect operations but are also critical to protect the overall safety of crew and the environment. More frequent cyber attacks, increased digitalization and emerging global regulatory focus are adding to immediate demands to address and reduce cyber risk across the industry’s value chain. Cyber security has become a business imperative and new measures will have an impact on how maritime vessels and facilities will be covered by insurers.

“The safety and security of our members is a priority. Having a better understanding of the tools available, the programs that can be implemented and the integration of these in the marine industry will help us provide better services to shipowners and charterers globally,” says Dr. William Moore, Director of Loss and Prevention at the American P&I Club. The work we are going to do with ABS Consulting is going to help us identify how to enhance our policies, and the offerings we need to incorporate to improve the coverage and services we offer to our members.”

“Collaborating with the American Club to build education programs for their members and industry will give us a better understanding of the real challenges we are collectively facing,” says Ian Bramson, Global Head of Cyber Security of ABS Group. “This alliance enables us to develop the tools, training and services that support compliance and help ship owners and operators put protections in place to secure their vessels – from the design and construction phases through continuous operation over their service life.”

About the American Club
American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc. (the American Club) was established in New York in 1917. It is the only mutual Protection and Indemnity Club domiciled in the entire Americas and its headquarters are in New York, USA. The American Club has been successful in recent years in building on its U.S. heritage to create a truly international insurer with a global reach second-to-none in the industry. Day-to-day management of the American Club is provided by Shipowners Claims Bureau, Inc. also headquartered in New York. The Club is able to provide local service for its members across all time zones, communicating in a large number of different languages, and has subsidiary offices located in London, Piraeus, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Houston, plus a worldwide network of correspondents. The Club is a member of the International Group of P&I Clubs, a collective of 13 mutuals which together provide Protection and Indemnity insurance for some 90% of all world shipping.

P&I Insurance
Protection and Indemnity insurance (commonly referred to as “P&I”) provides cover to shipowners and charterers against third-party liabilities encountered in their commercial operations; typical exposures include damage to cargo, pollution, death/injury or illness of passengers or crew or damage to docks and other installations. Running in parallel with a ship’s hull and machinery cover, traditional P&I cover distinguishes itself from usual forms of marine insurance by being based on the not-for-profit principle of mutuality where Members of the Club are both the insurers and the assureds.

About ABS Group
ABSG Consulting Inc. (ABS Consulting) is part of ABS Group of Companies, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of ABS, one of the world’s leading marine and offshore classification societies. Through its operating subsidiaries, ABS Group provides data-driven risk and reliability solutions and technical services that help clients confirm the safety, integrity, quality and efficiency of critical assets and operations. Headquartered in Spring, Texas, ABS Group operates with more than 1,000 professionals in over 20 countries serving the marine and offshore, oil, gas and chemical, government and industrial sectors.

Source:
en.portnews.ru

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In the Spring Edition of ITNOW, I wrote an article on why we should be moving away from traditional cyber security and focussing on cyber mission assurance and cyber resiliency techniques. This meant framing cyber security in a manner that focussed on the outcomes the organisation needs to achieve with the preparedness to expect, and the ability to respond and recover in response to an adverse cyber effect.

NIST SP 800-160 defines cyber resiliency as: ‘the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from and adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that use or are enabled by cyber resources.’

What do we mean by cyber safety?

Cyber Safety is a relatively new term but for this article The Royal Academy of Engineering, in their March 2018 document ‘Cyber Safety and Resilience’, defines cyber safety as ‘the ability of digital systems to maintain adequate levels of safety during operation, including in the event of a cyberattack or accidental event, protecting life and property’.

What this means is we have to understand and incorporate into our risk assessment, a consideration of what the potential impact is of a cyber event on the safe and secure operation of a safety-critical system, and therefore what controls and mitigations we need to introduce to ensure that the risk is as low as reasonably practical (ALARP).

What this approach doesn’t cover is recognising the overlaps between cyber security and Safety. We know all too well that we need to adopt an approach of layered security, or defence-in-depth, to protect and defend our systems; making it hard for our adversaries to achieve their goals. It would be wrong of us, however, to believe that we can stop every single attack. It is for this reason why our systems have to be resilient and have to be able to continue mission-essential functions during periods of attack. This means ensuring that these systems remain safe to operate and can continue their safety-critical functions. Starting at the higher level of abstraction makes it easier to spot the similarities of H&S to cyber security and therefore identify cost and resource savings.

So, what is new?

A key question you might ask is whether there is anything new by considering safety as part of the totality of cyber risk. The answer is quite simple: Yes. My major concern with current cyber security approaches is that they focus almost entirely on the risks to information, and therefore the risks this presents to the organisation (business objectives):

  • What is the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information? My perspective is that very few organisations ask the (additional) key questions:
  • What is the risk to the system itself and the wider environment? (I.e. Is it the system itself which is the target, rather than it information it processes?)
  • What is the risk to the people using the system or those who are reliant on its undisrupted operation?

With the rapidly increasing prevalence of the internet of things and cyber-physical systems, this consideration needs to be considered by all industrial sectors. Let’s not forget that it was the compromise of programmable logic controls by Stuxnet that caused a series of centrifuges to rotate rapidly outside of their set parameters resulting in their physical destruction. If that effect can be achieved on a standalone system, then what can happen on a networked system?

What is important is that I am not suggesting that organisations need to conduct considerably more work to understand the safety considerations of their systems, but instead they need to understand the potential hazards that may be introduced should safety-critical functions be disrupted due to a cyber event. Once these hazards have been identified they can be assured through existing cyber security standards and frameworks. The key is we need to ensure that our cyber systems are not just ‘Secure to Operate’ but also ‘Safe to Operate’.

For the purpose of this article, I’ve made the broad assumption that organisation have taken a system-level approach to understanding the overall threats to the organisation (System) rather than focussing on a component-driven approach and building up (further advice on this is available from the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Starting at the higher level of abstraction makes it easier to spot the similarities of H&S to cyber security and therefore identify cost and resource savings.

Why should an organisation care?

I’d urge you to read a short article written by Nick Richards in Tripwire during 2018 ‘Why Cyber security is the New Health and Safety’ Nick argues that in order to prevent serious damage that could be caused by a cyber-attack, including the risks to individual safety, organisations should pay as much attention to cyber-security as they do to Health and Safety (H&S).

The ultimate aims of cyber-security and H&S are aligned. They are all designed to prevent loss to the organisation, its assets, and its personnel. There is another point to make which is that all assurance teams have an obligation to work together since all are trying to prevent the same types of losses albeit through different causes.

What happens if a building management system is compromised during a period when H&S is vital? The consequences of a ‘hack’ on this system which causes security doors and barriers to fail closed when they should fail open could be catastrophic. Ultimately, the H&S consequences directly relate to IT and mitigations should be employed with the input of both specialist functions.

It wouldn’t be an article on safety without mentioning the HSE

The TRITON malware, designed to disable safety-critical functions within the industrial setting, was discovered during 2017 within a Saudi Arabian petrochemical plant. Although the malware was discovered and contained before it was able to do any actual damage. One aspect which may have enabled this is the convergence of IT and operational technology (OT). I’m not going to speculate on what vulnerabilities may have afforded access to the attackers in this instance, instead I’m going to say something that should be obvious. We need to understand the risks posed by the convergence of these different technologies; that are beyond the scope of this article.

The NCSC recognise that there is a need to apply an integrated approach which adapts and applies best practice from both the safety and security communities. The 14 principles within the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) provides useful guidance for ‘organisations managing cyber-related risks to public safety’ (one of the three broad areas where NCSC believe the guidance is useful).

We can’t talk about safety without mentioning the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Back in March 2017, the HSE published its guidance OG86 ‘Cyber Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS)’. Although this guidance is primarily aimed at HSE Inspectors, particularly around applying a consistent approach to regulation, this document is freely available to all organisations and provides useful guidance on how compliance might be achieved. If you know me, you know how much I hate a compliance-based approach as it encourages a ‘do-minimum’ mentality, but I fully support that this is guidance that takes us in the right direction.

International Maritime Organisation (IMO) resolution on cyber risk management

What has prompted me to write this article is the imminent enforcement of the International Maritime Organisation Resolution MSC.428(98) – ‘Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems’. If you haven’t guessed from the title, what this resolution requires is that organisations within the maritime industry ensure that cyber risk is appropriately included within their respective safety and environmental management systems (SEMS). I’m not intending to go into the detail of the resolution, it is easily searchable on the IMO website. Instead, I want to focus on the core message.

We need to be able to ensure that we can safeguard shipping from cyber-attacks and have processes in place to improve resiliency for when these are successful. The IMO resolution provides a massive step forward as it allows shipping companies to simply complement existing safety and security management practices already established by the IMO with cyber risk management practices.

What we do need to remember is a ship may be in service for some decades and therefore will have been designed and built during a period when the cyber threat was different. That does not preclude the organisation, however, from having the appropriate policies and processes in place to respond to a cyber-event.

The resolution is an excellent step forward to ensuring that maritime organisations consider the impacts that cyber events could, and would likely have, on safety. The resolution, however, is not prescriptive on how this should be achieved but it does provide guidance on how a maritime organisation should approach the assessment of cyber risk. Interestingly, the supporting document MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 maps some of the considerations, which are not exhaustive, to the NIST Cyber Security Framework function areas (identify, protect, detect, respond, recover).

You might sense a bit of repetition in this article as this takes me back to an earlier point. I am not suggesting that organisations that already have cyber risk management processes have to conduct a significant amount of further work. Existing methodologies can be used to help assess the impacts that a cyber event can help on safety. This is possible through the use of ISO27001 and the NIST CSF, as well as other frameworks, to ensure that systems are both designed and operate in a manner that is safe and secure. They just have to be conducted and viewed through a safety lens; i.e. what would prevent that system from operating safety?

But another question I have is: Has cyber been considered as apart of the SEMS for the other sectors, namely rail, aviation, automotive? If the answer is they haven’t, then maybe they need to.

What is the takeaway?

Organisations need to ensure that both cyber security and cyber safety risks are understood, documented, and ensure that processes are in place to manage these at a level which is ALARP for both H&S and security. The mitigations should be planned jointly to maximise effectiveness. The message is simple. Gone are the days of considering cyber security and H&S separately. We must ensure that we follow an integrated approach that ensures that our systems are both secure and safe to operate.
Source: bcs


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Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (“ClassNK”) joined the Maritime Transportation System Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MTS-ISAC) as part of a growing list of maritime community partners. This is an innovative relationship between the two nonprofit organizations aimed at strengthening vessel and shoreside cyber risk management. The partnership provides ClassNK with actionable insights from community-sourced cyber threat intelligence to reinforce ClassNK’s Cyber Security Guidelines to help prevent cyber incidents from negatively impacting the safety and security of maritime operations. ClassNK is the first classification society and the first non-U.S. organization to formally join the MTS-ISAC, helping broaden the reach of the MTS-ISAC’s efforts to support the maritime community.

Both vessel and shoreside cybersecurity efforts will be under increasing scrutiny starting in 2021. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has a deadline of January 1, 2021 for Maritime Cyber Risk Management to be addressed in Safety Management Systems. Meanwhile, the U.S. Coast Guard will be inspecting Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 regulated facilities for cyber risk management efforts for the first time starting with annual inspections occurring on or after October 1, 2021. Both of these organizational efforts have signaled to maritime stakeholders that cybersecurity is a priority that must be addressed to ensure safe and secure MTS operations.

Hirofumi Takano, Executive Vice President at ClassNK, explains, “We have been working with the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), maritime stakeholders and cyber security professionals to understand and promote cybersecurity best practices across the maritime transportation system (MTS). By joining the MTS-ISAC, we will have increased visibility to current, real-world examples of cyber threats targeting MTS stakeholders. This provides us an opportunity to reinforce how, and periodically update, ClassNK’s Cyber Security standards to provide our stakeholders with the latest security recommendations to protect their assets from cyber threats. With IMO 2021 right around the corner, this relationship is perfectly timed to add increasing value to our stakeholders, and we are excited to be a part of the active and growing MTS-ISAC community. We hope ClassNK stakeholders will quickly understand the value of this partnership.”

“We are excited that ClassNK is bringing a proactive, classification society perspective into the MTS-ISAC community,” adds Scott Dickerson, the MTS-ISAC’s Executive Director. “The MTS community’s resiliency is improved when we can quickly address cyber risks with meaningful cybersecurity controls. ClassNK joining the MTS-ISAC is a perfect example of how community partnerships provide win-win situations while reinforcing to stakeholders how the implementation of guidelines and recommended security controls can reduce their exposure to risks the community is actively seeing. The MTS-ISAC’s Board of Directors understands the importance of cyber risk prevention efforts and are supportive of the inclusion of class societies into our information sharing ecosystem as a key component to building a stronger culture of community cybersecurity.”

The MTS-ISAC, which was formed in February of this year, has seen rapid adoption of its Cybersecurity Information Sharing Services, and has produced a number of maritime cybersecurity advisories sourced from member shared information. The MTS-ISAC strives to incorporate best practices into their intelligence products so that MTS critical infrastructure stakeholders can be better protected. While ClassNK is the ISAC’s first international member, it anticipates additional international stakeholders to be joining the community.

Source:
hellenicshippingnews.com

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  • COVID-19’s impact is being felt at sea as well as on land.
  • The pandemic offers an opportunity to start building a sustainable ocean economy fit for the future.
  • Here are 8 areas for policy-makers to consider.

Almost no facet of our global economy has been immune to the COVID-19 crisis.

Much has been said about the disruption in more familiar sectors such as airlines, restaurants, and sports – but the long arm of COVID-19 has also reached out to sea, and is affecting our “blue economy”. This collection of formal and informal marine jobs, products, and services has been valued at $2.5 trillion a year. If the ocean were a nation, it would rank as the 7th largest economy in the world.

Maritime shipping has seen COVID-19-associated drops in activity of up to 30% in some regions. Lockdowns and reduced demand for seafood have seen fishing activity fall by as much as 80% in China and West AfricaEntire nations dependent on ocean and beach associated tourism have shut their borders. Globally, COVID-19’s impact on tourism may amount to a $7.4 billion loss and could put 75 million jobs at risk.

Some of the COVID-19 stimulus packages that are being designed to recover land-based industries and communities are also exploring ways to leapfrog forwards into greener modes of operation. However, little is being considered for bluer modes of operations. Similar opportunities, however, await us in our ocean and on our coasts.

Here are eight pathways for rebuilding an ocean economy that is both stronger and more sustainable after COVID-19.

1. Bluer blue tourism

Ocean tourism, before COVID-19, was directly valued at $390 billion globally and comprises a significant portion of the GDP of many nations. The millions of people that depend on ocean tourism, and consequently have a stake in ocean health, cannot be abandoned during the pandemic. Recovery funds could prevent furloughs by hiring people to restore coastal ecosystems, such as coral reefs and mangroves, given the massive return on investment that such ecosystems deliver to blue tourism. Similar nature-based job creation programmes were developed during the Great Depression, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps in the US. Stimulus funds could also keep workforces active installing sustainability upgrades in now empty hotels – drinking water stations to reduce plastic pollution and water treatment systems, for example – and training staff to diversify their sustainability skillset.

Millions depend on ocean tourism worldwide
Image: Isha@Seefromthesky on Unsplash

2. Reducing shipping emissions

Maritime shipping carries an estimated 90% of the planet’s cargo. This ocean traffic contributes significantly to global emissions of carbon and other air pollutants. The International Maritime Organization has mandated that shipping emissions be reduced by 50% by 2050. A reduction in shipping activity during COVID-19 provides a valuable opportunity to move towards this goal. Quiescent vessels can be fitted with upgrades to increase fuel efficiency and reduce emissions. Quieter shipyards can retool and secure political support to prepare for future demand to be met with zero-emission vessels. Such opportunities are greatest in Asia, where China, together with South Korea and Japan, represent more than 95% of the world’s shipbuilding by tonnage. Any aid directed to accelerate progress towards decarbonizing shipping should also include opportunities to electrify ports and prepare them to provide zero-emissions fuels.

COVID-19 has significantly impacted maritime shipping
COVID-19 has significantly impacted maritime shipping
Image: UNCTAD/ClipperData

3. Avoid squandering a post-COVID-19 fish bounty

Unlike other investments, living ocean resources literally grow during downturns. During World War II, many fishing vessels were forced to stop fishing. This reprieve allowed fish populations, such as cod, to increase. Should any such gains be accruing during COVID-19, we must resist the urge to immediately over-harvest them. Instead, we should use fisheries science to design intelligent harvest-yield protocols that maximize the long-term benefit of any possible COVID-19 gains.

Some fish stocks are likely benefiting from the global lockdown
Some fish stocks are likely benefiting from the global lockdown
Image: Francesco Ungaro on Unsplash

4. Supporting our mariners – delivery truck drivers of the sea

Ships are arguably the world’s most challenging work environment in which to confront a pandemic. Vulnerable mariners, such as those in the shipping and fishing industry, are vital to the functioning of society. They are the grocery clerks and delivery drivers of the blue economy. Ramping back up these sectors will require that crews be provided with viral and antibody testing and that they be extended dignified, safe transit home after being at sea for one month or more. Crews should also be given access to secure communication channels linking them to home. In the fishing industry, enhanced communications would confer the added benefit of combating slavery at sea.

It's time to recognise the contribution of mariners to the functioning of our society
It’s time to recognise the contribution of mariners to the functioning of our society
Image: Andy Li on Unsplash

5. Stay the course on ocean parks

Only 7.4% of our ocean is currently protected. These ocean parks benefit marine biodiversity and help boost breeding fish populations that spillover to enhance regional fisheries, create jobs in tourism, and potentially sequester more carbon. Some have suggested, however, that because of COVID-19 we must open up these ocean parks to industrial fishing. This would be folly. These parks are long-term ocean investments that take decades to mature, but only days to erase. In addition to short-changing future fishers, dissolving ocean parks would be a blow to sustainable blue tourism. Such actions would be akin to dismantling and selling off all the rides in Disneyland during COVID-19 – a short-sighted disservice to local jobs and economies.

The critically endangered hawksbill sea turtle, Hawaii
The critically endangered hawksbill sea turtle, Hawaii
Image: Don McLeish on Flickr

6. Farming the sea to feed billions

Scientists estimate that around 845 million people worldwide are nutritionally vulnerable to any decline in seafood. COVID-19 could exacerbate these challenges via disruptions to blue food trade and labour networks. We can avoid some of this trauma to food security systems by using stimulus funds to bolster smart aquaculture, or ocean farming which can provide nutritional support to vulnerable local populations, while minimizing environmental impact. Such investments could be patterned after environmentally and nutritionally aware investments in agriculture.

Done right, aquaculture can provide nutritional security to hundreds of millions
Done right, aquaculture can provide nutritional security to hundreds of millions
Image: Alex Antoniadis on Unsplash

7. Digitizing our ocean

Another way to fast-track the reopening of our blue economy is to direct stimulus investing towards marine technologies that can help us more efficiently and effectively observe and understand our ocean. For example, fisheries observer programmes that help the industry collect vital data to enhance catch, enforce laws and protect endangered species have been suspended because of COVID-19. New AI-powered electronic monitoring systems can play a role in maintaining these data pipelines. Myriad other opportunities exist – from expanding machine learning-powered interpretation of satellite data and enhanced drones that can curtail illegal fishing in regions where COVID-19 has reduced conventional marine patrols to connecting sustainable fishers to local consumers via apps when restaurants and markets are closed.

Advanced ocean technologies provide myriad benefits, including improved ocean surveillance
Advanced ocean technologies provide myriad benefits, including improved ocean surveillance
Image: NOAA

8. Don’t prey on the moment

We must be intolerant of efforts to misuse COVID-19 to advance agendas of self-interest. For example, much positive progress has been made transitioning us away from single-use plastics, a major source of ocean pollution. Since COVID-19, however, interest groups have successfully reversed or suspended these regulations for products like plastic bags. There are many things that we must do together to slow the spread of COVID-19 – but using single use plastic bags, instead of paper or reusable bags, is not one of them. Similarly, while external investment in hard-hit nations, like ocean-dependent small island states, can be positive, we must not allow the attachment of predatory terms that take advantage of these nations’ financial vulnerability.

Plastic pollution near Puglia, Italy
Plastic pollution near Puglia, Italy
Image: Paolo Margari on Flickr

COVID-19 has exposed just how profoundly linked our economies and wellbeing are to the ocean. These actions illustrate the need to inject more blue into COVID-19 discussions of ‘green recovery’. We cannot miss a chance in the times ahead to benefit both people and our ocean as we bring our sustainable blue economy back online.

Source: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/how-to-build-a-bluer-ocean-economy-after-cobid-19/


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Maritime insurer, North P&I Club, has lent its support to a number of charities, drawing attention to the welfare of seafarers during the coronavirus pandemic.

Shipping is a vital part of the international supply chain which keeps supermarket shelves stocked, and many crews remain at sea, unable to see their loved ones until restrictions are eased.

North P&I Club has ring-fenced £40,000 of its North 150 Fund for maritime charities to support crews through this difficult period.

One of the charities North is supporting is the Sailor’s Society, which offers helplines to seafarers experiencing loneliness, especially at a time when their next visit home could be some time away.

North is also providing mental health resources for seafarers and their families alongside the grants, which will help maintain supply chains at sea.

Paul Jennings, chief executive of North, said: “The impact of this pandemic is huge, and the welfare of seafarers at this time is an issue close to our hearts.

“As a 160-year-old business with our roots here in the North East, we’re passionate about the shipping legacy of our region, and determined to support those working in the maritime industry in challenging times.

“Our seafarers play a pivotal role in ensuring our supply chain keeps going. They are among the unsung heroes of this crisis.

“Without them, we wouldn’t have access to everyday essentials such as food and medicine. That’s why we’re doing what we can to show them our support.”

In addition to funding maritime organisations, North has also been supporting a number of local charitable initiatives like the Greggs Foundation, Newcastle United Foundation, Clothe & Feed and Ouseburn Farm.

Paul added: “From food parcels for families in need and help for the elderly and vulnerable, to emergency hospice funding and counselling for NHS frontline workers, we’re proud to be supporting the work of these vital charities in and around Tyneside.”

Source:
https://netimesmagazine.co.uk/news/north-pi-club-supports-seafarers-during-coronavirus-pandemic/


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During April, there were zero new detentions of foreign flagged vessels in a UK port.

1. In response to one of the recommendations of Lord Donaldson’s inquiry into the prevention of pollution from merchant shipping, and in compliance with the EU Directive on Port State Control (2009/16/EC as amended), the Maritime and Coastguard agency (MCA) publishes details of the foreign flagged vessels detained in UK ports each month.

2. The UK is part of a regional agreement on port state control known as the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MOU) and information on all ships that are inspected is held centrally in an electronic database known as THETIS. This allows the ships with a high risk rating and poor detention records to be targeted for future inspection.

3. Inspections of foreign flagged ships in UK ports are undertaken by surveyors from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. When a ship is found to be not in compliance with applicable convention requirements, a deficiency may be raised. If any of their deficiencies are so serious, they have to be rectified before departure, then the ship will be detained.

4. All deficiencies should be rectified before departure.

5. When applicable, the list includes those passenger craft prevented from operating under the provisions of the EU Directive on a system of inspections for the safe operation of Ro-Ro passenger ships and high-speed passenger craft in regular service and amending directive 2009/16/EC and repealing Council Directive 1999/35/EC (Directive EU 2017/2110).

Notes on the list of detentions:

• Full details of the ship: The accompanying detention list shows ship’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) number which is unchanging throughout the ship’s life and uniquely identifies it. It also shows the ship’s name and flag state at the time of its inspection.
• Company: The company shown in the vessel’s Safety Management Certificate (SMC) or if there is no SMC, then the party otherwise believed to be responsible for the safety of the ship at the time of inspection.
• Classification society: The list shows the classification society responsible for classing the ship only.
• Recognised organisation: Responsible for conducting the statutory surveys: and issuing statutory certificates on behalf of the flag state.
• White (WL), grey (GL) and black lists (BL) are issued by the Paris MoU on 01 July each year and shows the performance of flag state.
• Deficiencies: The deficiencies listed are the ones which were detainable. Further details of other deficiencies can be provided on request.

SHIPS DETAINED IN APRIL 2020
DETENTIONS CARRIED OVER FROM PREVIOUS MONTHS
Vessel Name: LIVA GRETA
GT: 851

IMO: 8801072

Flag: Lativa (white list)

Company: Liepajas Trading & Shipping Agency Ltd

Classification society: RINA

Recognised organisation: RINA

Recognised organisation for ISM Doc: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: RMRS

Date and place of detention: 11th January 2020 at Birkenhead

Summary: Nine deficiencies with two grounds for detention

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020

Vessel Name: KUZMA MININ
GT: 16257

IMO: 7721263

Flag: Russian Federation (Grey list)

Company: Murmansk Shipping Co

Classification society: RMRS

Recognised organisation: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM Doc: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: RMRS

Date and place of detention: 18th December 2018 at Falmouth

Summary: Thirteen deficiencies with six grounds for detention

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020

Vessel Name: POSEIDON
GT: 1412

IMO: 7363217

Flag: Iceland (White list)

Company: Neptune EHF

Classification society: NA

Recognised organisation: NA

Recognised organisation for ISM Doc: DNV-GL

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: DNV-GL

Date and place of detention: 19th July 2018 at Hull

Summary: Ten deficiencies with two grounds for detention

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020

Vessel Name: TECOIL POLARIS
GT: 1814

IMO No: 8883290

Flag: Russian Federation (Grey list)

Company: Tecoil Shipping Ltd

Classification society: RMRS

Recognised organisation: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM DOC: RMRS

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: RMRS

Date and place of detention: 6th June 2018 at Immingham

Summary: Twenty-seven deficiencies with eight grounds for detentions

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020

Vessel Name: CIEN PORCIENTO (General Cargo)
GT: 106.

IMO No: 8944446.

Flag: Unregistered.

Company: Open Window Inc.

Classification society: Unclassed.

Recognised organisation: Not applicable.

Recognised organisation for ISM DOC: Not applicable.

Recognised organisation for ISM SMC: Not applicable

Date and place of detention: 4 March 2010, Lowestoft

Summary: Thirty deficiencies including seven grounds for detention

This vessel was still detained on 30th April 2020
Source: UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency

Source:
https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/foreign-flagged-ships-detained-in-the-uk-during-april-2020/


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This Circular is an update on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) sanctions enforcement Circular published in January 2019. This serves as an update following the recently published 2019/2020 UN Panel of Experts of North Korea Sanctions Report (see Report).

Background

The report notes that the DPRK regime has not taken steps to end its nuclear programme, which continues in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Stringent sanctions measures have therefore remained in force. According to the Panel of Experts, the DPRK regime has continued to raise revenue for its ballistic missile programme through the illicit import of refined petroleum and export of commodities such as sand and coal. Maritime activities have been identified as facilitating this revenue stream for DPRK.

The message from the UN and national enforcement agencies is clear. Shipowners are strongly advised to take note that sanctions monitoring, and surveillance continues at a pace and through the co-operation of UN Member States more evidence is being collated and reported where there has been such a breach.

Evidence of use of non-DPRK vessels

The report notes a continuing use of non-DPRK flagged vessels that are used to perform illicit ship-to- ship (STS) cargo transfers at sea. The report further notes that DPRK has changed its trading methods to evade detection using STS transfers between non-DPRK flagged vessels in international waters and subsequent delivery of unlawful cargo direct to Nampo. Such vessels have conducted operations several times over before they are detected. These operations have amounted to the DPRK receiving almost three times the UN specified total cap of 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum (paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017)). With the assistance of a UN Member State, 14 vessels were designated, though none are entered with an International Group Club. To conceal the true identification of the ownership and financial interests behind the vessels carrying out these activities, it was reported that most of the vessels’ registered owners were dissolved or struck off company registers or were operating under false or fraudulent flags.

The Panel noted the need for regulators, enforcement agencies and the maritime industry to remain vigilant and maintain proper and effective due diligence. Tanker operators in particular should make every effort to identify and confirm the true intended destination of cargoes carried on board. STS transfers frequently take place at night with the automatic identification systems (AIS) being disabled and subsequent transfers of cargo are made to smaller vessels without IMO numbers.

The report notes that the DPRK is continuously innovating and adapting to avoid detection of its activities and a further trend reported by the Panel was the exploitation of the scrap vessel market where onward sale of vessels of larger bulk carriers (destined for scrap) were being used to transfer coal, as opposed to the previous use of smaller vessels.

Exercise Caution when fixing contracts

On 3 May, 2019, the United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) published a “Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments” (the “Compliance Framework”), which sets out OFAC’s views of the essential elements of an effective sanctions compliance programme.

All clubs in the International Group issued a Circular at the time drawing attention to its publication emphasising the importance for any shipowner, charterer or trader to adopt measures that mitigate the risk of breaking sanctions.

In the light of the most recent UN report, the Club once again advises all members to continue to apply the highest level of due diligence to mitigate the risk of performing activities with a DPRK nexus. The penalties for doing so could result in designation, asset freezing and listing by the UN, OFAC and other enforcement agencies.

Any trade with a DPRK nexus will be subject to surveillance and scrutiny by monitoring agencies, including vessel movements, using AIS and long-range identification tracking, satellite imagery and other assets. Vessels that are suspected of breaching sanctions against DPRK may be listed by national authorities and/or subject to search and detained at ports whilst investigations are carried out.

Ramifications on Club cover

Any activity assessed to be in breach of sanctions will result in the withdrawal of insurance cover. Even if it were possible to undertake legitimate trade with DPRK and/or DPRK interests, members should consider that an International Group Club is unlikely to be able to support vessels trading to DPRK, with payment of claims and fees and the provision of security liable to be delayed and perhaps completely prohibited.

All Members are therefore strongly urged to mitigate the risks of undertaking any business with DPRK or which may have a DPRK nexus, including but not limited to STS operations, and exercise the fullest possible due diligence to ensure that they do not knowingly or inadvertently perform prohibited activities with DPRK entities.

All International Group Clubs have issued a similarly worded Circular.
Source: Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Limited

Source:

https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/uk-report-on-dprk-sanctions/


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2020 Financial Statements – Britannia Declares Another Strong Set of Results

Highlights

  • Satisfactory year with an underwriting surplus of USD29.3m
  • Strong investment return (7%) yielding USD61.9m
  • Increase in total capital resources net of USD25m capital distribution
  • Steady tonnage growth during the year and a strong 2020/21 renewal
  • The Association is well placed to meet the financial and operational challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic

Financial overview

After a third consecutive renewal with a zero general increase, total calls and premiums for 2019/20 were down marginally on the prior year.  However, lower claims incurred in the financial year resulted in a satisfactory underwriting surplus of USD29.3m and a net loss ratio of 79.9% (2018/19 – 83.8%).  The well diversified investment portfolio produced a strong return of 7% overall, with equities being the strongest performer at 16.5%.  All asset classes produced a positive result and the overall investment gain was USD61.9m, nearly twice the long-term target.

Capital resources grew by USD31.4m, after taking account of the USD25m capital distribution made to mutual Members in the year and remain above the economic capital target set by the Board.

In the period immediately after the year end, investment markets were impacted by the uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and much of the investment gain made during the year was reversed.  However, the Association’s strong financial position leaves it well placed to face the challenges posed by the uncertain global economic conditions likely to be experienced in the months and years ahead.

Claims

The aggregate value of retention claims incurred during the 2019/20 policy year was in line with expectations and was USD20m lower than the previous year at the equivalent stage. The number of notified claims was 4% lower than in the previous year. Whilst claims within the International Group Pool were higher than recent policy years reserves held against Britannia’s share of those claims have been set at a level sufficient to absorb any further deterioration.

Chairman’s statement

Commenting on the results for the year ended 20 February 2020 and the outlook for the current year, the Association’s Chairman, Anthony Firmin, stated:

“Britannia continues its mission to be the finest provider of P&I and FD&D insurance and for 2019/20 has achieved another strong set of results. The Association’s robust operating model and financial strength also allows it to support our Members through further investment in service, including IT and our regional hubs.  We recognise that since 20 February 2020, COVID-19 has had a material impact on the world economy and the maritime sector.  Despite the majority of our staff worldwide currently having to work from home, we are maintaining ‘business as usual’ standards of service and we do not anticipate that the effect of COVID-19 will have a material impact on Britannia’s own claims for the 2020/21 policy year.

Britannia’s Review of the Year – 20 February 2020 is available on the Association’s website.

Contacts
Jo Rodgers, CFO, Tindall Riley (Britannia) Ltd:            +44 (0)7921 233714
Andrew Cutler, CEO, Tindall Riley (Britannia) Ltd:         +44 (0)7738 997329

KEY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
20 Feb 2020 20 Feb 2019 20 Feb 2018
(gt million) (gt million) (gt million)
Entered tonnage (owned) 117.5 112.0 107.0
Entered tonnage (chartered) 45.0 19.0 20.0
USD(000) USD(000) USD(000)
Calls and premiums 201,185 204,415 208,147
Net claims incurred (111,667) (119,600) (93,552)
Investment income 61,868 (2,643) 48,626
Net operating expenses (31,891) (28,649) (25,666)
Net income after taxation 56,427 (9,297) 80,615
Free reserves* 422,088 390,660 429,957
Net loss ratio 79.9% 83.8% 61.4%
Average expense ratio 11.5% 10.9% 9.7%
Standard & Poor’s rating A (stable) A (stable) A (stable)

*The Association benefits from a reinsurance contract with Boudicca Insurance Company Limited.

Source:
https://www.allaboutshipping.co.uk/2020/05/15/2020-financial-statements-britannia-declares-another-strong-set-of-results/