The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has called on all stakeholders including shipowners, and recognized organizations to provide input to the Experience Building Phase (EBP) designed to see just how the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004 (BWM Convention) is working.

The BWM Convention is a treaty adopted by the IMO to help prevent the spread of potentially harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens through ships’ ballast water. Principally, since 8 September 2017, all ships have had to manage their ballast water so that aquatic organisms and pathogens are removed or rendered harmless before the ballast water is released into a new location. This will help prevent the spread of invasive species as well as potentially harmful pathogens.

Following entry in to force of the BWM Convention, the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) immediately launched an Experience-Building-Phase (EBP) to monitor the implementation. This data-gathering and analysis process is designed to identify aspects of the Convention’s implementation that are working as required, and to further enhance the aspects that are not working. To build a complete and realistic picture, the process requires the input of all stakeholders to identify where challenges may have occurred that were not initially envisaged. The analysis covers a wide range of issues from operation of systems and the role of the crew through to testing and sampling.

The IMO has commissioned the World Maritime University (WMU) to supervise the data gathering and analysis as required by the exercise, and they are inviting BIMCO members to submit data and information that will be treated in the strictest confidence. This provides BIMCO members a unique opportunity to express any concerns with the way the Convention is being implemented.

At present, shipowners are invited to submit their reports to the flag State who duly submit the report. However, this new initiative will see the WMU, on behalf of the IMO Secretariat, collecting complementary data for the EBP. As such, BIMCO members are now able to submit more detailed “complementary data” directly to WMU if preferred, rather than using the stakeholder interface via the flag State.

BIMCO members willing to share information with the WMU rather than via the flag State as part are invited to firstly contact the WMU for further details by emailing EBP21@wmu.se. The deadline for all input is 22 October 2021.

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White House readies supply chain disruptions task force

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https://thedigitalship.com/news/maritime-satellite-communications/item/7343-east-african-shipping-company-signs-up-to-snakeways-communications-service

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has called on all stakeholders including shipowners, and recognized organizations to provide input to the Experience Building Phase (EBP) designed to see just how the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004 (BWM Convention) is working.

The BWM Convention is a treaty adopted by the IMO to help prevent the spread of potentially harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens through ships’ ballast water. Principally, since 8 September 2017, all ships have had to manage their ballast water so that aquatic organisms and pathogens are removed or rendered harmless before the ballast water is released into a new location. This will help prevent the spread of invasive species as well as potentially harmful pathogens.

Following entry in to force of the BWM Convention, the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) immediately launched an Experience-Building-Phase (EBP) to monitor the implementation. This data-gathering and analysis process is designed to identify aspects of the Convention’s implementation that are working as required, and to further enhance the aspects that are not working. To build a complete and realistic picture, the process requires the input of all stakeholders to identify where challenges may have occurred that were not initially envisaged. The analysis covers a wide range of issues from operation of systems and the role of the crew through to testing and sampling.

The IMO has commissioned the World Maritime University (WMU) to supervise the data gathering and analysis as required by the exercise, and they are inviting BIMCO members to submit data and information that will be treated in the strictest confidence. This provides BIMCO members a unique opportunity to express any concerns with the way the Convention is being implemented.

At present, shipowners are invited to submit their reports to the flag State who duly submit the report. However, this new initiative will see the WMU, on behalf of the IMO Secretariat, collecting complementary data for the EBP. As such, BIMCO members are now able to submit more detailed “complementary data” directly to WMU if preferred, rather than using the stakeholder interface via the flag State.

BIMCO members willing to share information with the WMU rather than via the flag State as part are invited to firstly contact the WMU for further details by emailing EBP21@wmu.se. The deadline for all input is 22 October 2021.

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https://www.bimco.org/news/environment-protection/20210608-bwm

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https://thedigitalship.com/news/maritime-software/item/7346-tech-driven-maritime-training-key-to-attracting-gen-z

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https://thedigitalship.com/news/maritime-software/item/7345-ugland-rolls-out-spectrum-by-navarino

Namely, OCIMF offers guidance to STS Service Providers, Masters, and operators of ships that use hose assemblies to transfer liquid-bulk cargoes via STS and to minimise hose damage from improper handling and storing.

To remind, hose strings used during Ship-to-Ship (STS) transfers in a side-by-side configuration are a critical link between the two ships. They are subjected to repeated lifting, bending and folding and to the dynamic forces of ship movements at sea. All of these can result in loads and stresses within the hose.

To provide greater reliability and longer life, hoses should be handled, stored, maintained, inspected and tested correctly at appropriate intervals.

Information about the size, length, type and quantity of the hose strings being delivered should be provided to the ships involved in the transfer so they can prepare their manifolds in advance. Any hoses supplied for the transfer should be provided with the most recent test certificate for tests undertaken at intervals not exceeding one year. More stringent testing frequency may apply based on local regulations.

When employed, the STS Provider’s representative should be on deck in the manifold region of one of the vessels and visible to both ship’s crew in order to ensure safe hose-handling practices are observed during hose connection and disconnection.

A competent ship’s officer should be on deck during the handling and assembly of the STS transfer hoses and take a lead role in the management of STS hose operations aboard their ship, including:

• Lifting hoses from the Lightering Support Vessel (LSV) onto the ship
• Hose deployment to other ship including verification of hose securing/supporting arrangement
• Hose string assembly
• Hose connection
• Hose deployment to the other ship
• Hose disconnection and draining
• Hose recovery
• Disassembly
• Lowering hoses down from the ship deck into the LSV

In 1990, a new type of rubber cargo hose was developed to meet the unique requirements of offshore STS transfers. It is important to note that rubber STS hoses do not conform to any internationally recognised standard such as the International Standards Organization (ISO), British Standards (BS) or European Standards (EN). Manufacturers generally align with BS EN 1765 Rubber Hose Assemblies for Oil Suction and Discharge Services for the assemblies.

Rubber STS hose assemblies closely align with the specifics of EN 1765 Type L (Light Weight) Hoses. Type L hoses are helix-free, do not suffer permanent deformation and are designed to be used where light weight, ease of handling and increased flexibility is required. They differ from the standard in that:

• They feature a heavy-duty design with a high burst safety factor.
• The cover may be designed to be more durable but with reduced oil-resistant properties.
• STS hoses are commonly rated for 15 bar Maximum Working Pressure (MWP).

Other hose types may be used in STS operations depending on geographical location, local requirements and other specific operational needs. Further guidance on specific hose types should be sought from the hose manufacturer.

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https://safety4sea.com/ocimf-proper-handling-and-storage-of-sts-hoses/

According to the UCOC, on June 4 an LPG gas tanker that was in transit almost collided with the structures of the Miraflores Locks.

UCOC added that the tugs in the Panama Canal ”do not meet the standards required to attend to daily operation.”

The union explained that during the maneuver, the tugboats suffered damage to their machines. However, thanks to the expertise of the tugboat captain, it was possible to brake the ship in time, avoiding an accident.

That is why, as professionals responsible for the maritime industry, we ask the administration of the ACP to conduct an exhaustive investigation into the true causes of this fact, which transcended public opinion through social networks

UCOC stated.

What is more, the union hoghlighted that the following must be clarified in reference to the incident:

1. Did the tugs arrive on time for their assignment?
2. Where they moored to the ship correctly and according to the procedures?
3. The bow tug did not push the vessel when moored and did not deviate it from its course.
4. The stern tug did not push the vessel when moored and did not increase its speed.

On the other hand, the UCOC denounced the alleged intentions by the administration to use ”these deficient and unreliable equipment in the Expanded Canal”, as such an action entails a risk of possible damage to the canal facilities, and potential injuries.

We want to express once again, as Tug Captains and Deck Officers, our commitment to continue working so that our nation’s greatest asset, the Panama Canal, continues to offer the world a free, safe, reliable and uninterrupted transit

concluded the association.

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https://safety4sea.com/deficient-equipment-could-cause-catastrophic-accident-at-panama-canal/

has technical causes.

This was closely followed by

I have sometimes heard: “80% Human Error, what are we going to do about it”. Well, I have good news: if you would want to reduce it, that is very easy. Just build bad ships and put even worse equipment on board and you will see the percentage of Human Error in accidents reduce dramatically. The only downturn is that you will have to accept an increase in the number of accidents.

I have discovered that such a BOOM can be an overkill. I noticed that some people needed so much time to recover, that they missed part of the rest of the presentation. Some were taken aback, thinking that I was looking for a confrontation…

So I have developed a better sized BOOM, and hope that this is sufficient to raise your interest, without triggering negative feelings. My new start:

Just suppose you want to buy a car, and the seller notices that safety is an important issue for you. Just suppose that he will say: this is not such a good car: almost 100 % of the accidents with this car are because of “Human Error”. That other car is much safer: only 60 % of the accidents are because of “Human Error”, the other accidents are because of brakes failing, steering break-downs, etc etc. Would you agree with this seller?

In fact, what happens as soon as there is any systemic technical problem with a car? There will be a recall! In 2018, Toyota recalled more than 2,4 million Prius cars because of possible power stall in rare circumstances. Toyota declined to say if an actual accident did happen…. In road traffic we’re talking in excess of 99% “Human Error”…..and no one would want it differently. Actually we don’t even discuss it. I am quite sure that in road traffic 20% accidents due to technical failures would be absolutely unacceptable. It would be nice if we could reduce this irritating figure of 20% “Technical Failures” in shipping too! (realising that – while reducing the number of accidents – this would automatically increase the percentage “Human Error”)

My hypothesis is that any mature, well developed system is bound to have a high percentage “Human Error”. As the system develops, and the reasons for technical failures are analysed, these are remedied. The number of technical failures will then reduce. On the human side, as the system develops, risks are better known, and procedures will be developed, bringing down the number of accidents due to “Human Error”. However, humans will continue to have to make decisions based on incomplete information, while having to serve multiple, partly conflicting goals, in an imperfect designed and regulated environment. So it is much harder to bring down this number. The sum total is much less accidents, and as accidents attributes to technical failures reduce even more than accidents attributed to “Human Error” , the percentage “Human Error” will increase. A high percentage “Human Error” is an indication that the people at the sharp end are given tools that are ‘fit for purpose’.

I like to just play with numbers to gain a better understanding of what the ramifications of statements are. Let’s just do that with this statement: suppose that in a developing system there are 1000 incidents, 500 due to technical failures and 500 due to “Human Error”. As the system matures, and the technical requirements are better known, adding a bit of steel here, fixing that connection, making that part a bit more resilient, brings down the number due to technical failure to 50. Better selection, training and procedures brings down “Human Error” to 150. So over the years safety increased dramatically. Accidents due to technical failures reduced from 500 to 50. Accidents due to “Human Error” reduced from 500 to 150. The total number of accidents reduced from 1000 to 200. In percentages the total number of incidents reduced by 80%, but “Human Error” has gone up from 50% to 75%(!) while technical failure reduced from 50% to 25%. Although I don’t know of any research on the subject, I’m convinced that in the 17th century the percentage “Human Error” was much lower than presently, as many accidents happened because of technical failures, or uncontrollable circumstances.

By the way, although it can be assumed that mature, well developed systems have a high percentage of “Human Error”, this can not be turned around: a system with a high percentage “Human Error” does not necessarily have to be a mature, well developed system. There is always the possibility that a high percentage “Human Error” is due to insufficient selection, training, experience etc. However for a mature, regulated system it is unlikely that this would play a large part.

The message I want to bring across with this article is quite simple: Mature, well developed systems are bound to have a low percentage of technical failures. Consequently these systems will have a high percentage if Human Error. There is no need for a knee-jerk reaction to try to reduce this. Most likely it is a good sign and there is no need to reduce this percentage! We need other indicators to know what needs improvement and how that could be achieved.

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https://safety4sea.com/those-irritating-20/