A joint European / Japanese research project aims to lower the energy requirements and costs for manufacturing green methanol, the future fuel of choice for Maersk and one of the leading candidates for decarbonizing deep-sea shipping.

Methanol can be synthesized from carbon dioxide and hydrogen at high temperature, then converted to methanol for use as fuel. If the carbon comes from CO2 capture and the hydrogen feedstock is produced using renewable power, the product – green methanol – is considered a net-zero fuel.

However, it takes a lot of energy to make. CO2 is a stable, unreactive molecule, and it takes a push (a catalyst and a lot of heat) to get it to react with hydrogen. In 2018, researchers at Penn State found a way to do it using a palladium-copper catalyst at a relatively cool temperature of 350-480 degrees Fahrenheit, but this is still quite hot. Maintaining that kind of temperature requires industrial scale heating, which raises energy consumption and cost of production.

Courtesy Laurelin

The Laurelin project, a four-year international research initiative, hopes to cut that cost down. Its experts hail from Belgium, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, and they are combining their efforts to survey multiple combinations of catalysts and reaction chambers in search of the best arrangement.

“Reducing the e-methanol production costs would lead to an increase in the opportunities to use it as fuel. This would directly benefits society thanks to the reduction in GHG emissions and costs, creating further jobs and wealth,” explained Professor Teruoki Tago of the Tokyo Institute of Technology.

The team will test out more than 100 different catalyst materials and three reactor technologies (microwave heating, magnetic induction and plasma induction). “Catalysts are the key for methanol to become the main product, minimising the production of undesired complex mixtures,” explains Adolfo Benedito Borrás, head of technical coordination for the project.

If successful, the Laurelin project’s efforts would complement the push for higher efficiency in green hydrogen production, and would help expand the availability of green methanol for shipping.

The initiative has about $4.8 million in funding from the EU and additional funding from Japan.

Source: https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/joint-eu-japan-project-aims-to-reduce-cost-of-green-methanol

The UK MAIB has published a report on the death of a chief officer who was struck in the head by a tensioned mooring line aboard a bulker in 2021, finding that a short-handed operation and an unfamiliarity with the mooring arrangement contributed to his death.

On August 29, 2021, the bulker Teal Bay arrived at Kavkaz, Russia, to rendezvous with a transloading vessel and take on grain from small powered barges. With guidance from the local pilot, Teal Bay tied up with the geared bulker Kavkaz V on the Kavkaz’s port side. The crew had never made fast to another vessel of this size, nor had they conducted ship-to-ship loading operations in this manner before. They used a combination of three head lines, three stern lines, two bow spring lines and two stern spring lines. (Spring line naming conventions vary among maritime nations, and “stern spring line” refers here to an forward-leading spring line originating from the stern.)

The transloading operation got under way, and the crane operators aboard the Kavkaz V scooped up grain from small barges on Kavkaz’s starboard side, swung the cargo over the deck and over the port side, depositing it into Teal Bay’s holds. As the operation proceeded and her holds filled up, Teal Bay’s freeboard decreased. Over the course of the next day, her main deck level dropped to about 25 feet below the deck of the Kavkaz, and her mooring lines took on an upward lead.

At about 2220 on August 30, loading was nearly complete. The third officer aboard Kavkaz V asked Teal Bay to move ahead so that the crane operator could reach another part of Teal Bay’s hold. Teal Bay’s master decided to warp ahead, since this was a small move. He could have treated this as a full mooring operation per the SMS, but this would have meant waking up the off-watch crew to add more personnel on deck. He did not want to wake the crew, so he sent the chief mate to the stern and the third mate to the bow, each with one AB.

At about 2235, as the team on the bow slacked off their spring line, the AB on the stern spring line activated the winch to pull in and warp the ship ahead. The line was run through an open roller fairlead, and the chief mate was standing next to the fairlead near the deck edge, where he would have been able to watch and supervise the evolution. As soon as the line came under tension – with a vertical lead towards the Kavkaz’s higher main deck level – the line popped up and out of the roller fairlead and struck the chief mate in the head. He fell immediately unconscious to the deck.

The open fairlead and chief mate’s position (far left) and a diagram of the mooring arrangements (MAIB)

The open fairlead (center) and the substantial height difference between the decks of the Teal Bay and Kavkaz (MAIB)

The local maritime rescue coordination center was contacted and Teal Bay’s second officer gave the chief mate first aid, including oxygen. The victim had a pulse and was breathing, and there were no outward signs of injury.

A tug arrived to evacuate the victim at 2316, but the crew would not take him aboard before receiving permission from the port. Alternate arrangements for a helicopter were discussed but none were available. The tug ultimately took the chief mate aboard, getting under way for shore at 2350. At this point, the officer’s pulse had weakened. By the time a paramedic met the tugboat at the pier at 0045, the chief mate had no vital signs.

An autopsy determined that he had died from a brain hemmorhage resulting from blunt force trauma.

Through its investigation, MAIB determined that the crew’s decision to run the line through an open roller fairlead, combined with the vertical lead from the deck of the Teal Bay to the deck of the Kavkaz, allowed the line to pop out of the fairlead when it came under tension. The appropriate choice would have been to select a closed roller fairlead; the crew may not have known this as they were unfamiliar with this particular mooring operation. No risk assessment was conducted before the evolution, and so the opportunity to identify this hazard was lost.

The short distance of the move and the desire to complete the loading operation quickly could have motivated the master to warp ahead without making a fuller assessment of the situation. As the captain did not bring out the crew for a full mooring operation, the chief mate was operating with fewer people on hand than he usually would have, and was tasked with supervising both the aft deck and the evolution as a whole. If the full crew had turned out, the chief mate would not have been on the stern.

The extra time taken up in making medevac arrangements reduced the officer’s chances of survival, MAIB determined, though it is impossible to know whether he would have survived even with prompt care.

Among other post-casualty recommendations, the shipmanager has been advised to remove all open fairleads from its fleet and replace them with closed or universal type fairleads, which will not release a line with an upward lead.

Source: https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/uk-maib-improper-mooring-arrangement-led-to-chief-mate-s-death

Panama Canal Authority (PCA) said the new structure will assume a simplified, value-based pricing structure, reducing the number of tariffs from 430 to fewer than 60.

On transits of vessels in ballast condition for all market segments except for containerships, tolls will be calculated by applying 85 per cent of the laden toll instead of the originally proposed 9 per cent.

On containerships, the charge for empty containers will be reduced to $2/TEU in 2023, $4/TEU in 2024, and $6/TEU in 2025, instead of the $5, $6.50, and $8 that were initially proposed for each year, respectively.

All other tariffs will be implemented gradually from January 2023 to January 2025 at the originally proposed levels, including the proposed modifications to the loyalty program for containerships, which will be phased out by January 2025.

Incentives for return voyages applicable to containerships and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vessels will be eliminated by January 2023 when the new structure comes into effect.

“The proposal aims to strengthen the tolls structure in a way that is consistent with the value provided by the Canal transit service while providing greater visibility and predictability to customers,” said Panama Canal Administrator Ricaurte Vásquez Morales.

The tolls proposal was issued on 1 April 2022 and went through a formal consultation period during which 17 interested parties submitted their comments or opinions in writing.

The public hearing was held in Panama on 20 May 2022 with the participation of seven parties, representing local and international customers.

The visibility charge currently applied to full container vessels, and classified as Other Marine Services, will be eliminated prior to the implementation of the new tolls to avoid an overlap with the Total TEU capacity (TTA) charge.

In June 2021 the PCA increased its waterway’s maximum allowable length for commercial and non-commercial vessels transiting the Neopanamax Locks.

The PCA said the maximum length overall (LOA) for regular transits of the Neopanamax Locks is 370.33 metres, an increase from 367.28 metres.

The increase means that now 96.8 per cent of the world’s fleet of containerships can transit the Panama Canal, shortening routes and benefiting economies around the world.

Source: https://www.porttechnology.org/news/panama-canal-toll-restructure-receives-governmental-approval/