While the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has affected the global shipping industry, it has not derailed implementation of stricter environmental, social, and governance (ESG) regulations that are pushing investors to finance only less pollutive and more fuel-efficient ships or “clean” vessels.

The reason is IMO 2020, a new International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulation that took effect on January 1 2020, setting the maximum limit of sulphur content of marine fuels at 0.5%. The objective of the regulation is to reduce the air pollution created in the shipping industry by reducing the sulphur content of the fuels used by its ships and vessels plying the waters of the world.

The IMO is the United Nations body for the global shipping industry. In April 2018, it adopted targets aimed at reducing the industry’s greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50% before 2050 compared with those of 2008.

“What we’re seeing in terms of capital flow both from an equity perspective and from a debt perspective is that capital is very much aligned with companies that have a very prime focus on pursuing these technological innovations that improve fuel consumption,” says Andrian Dacy, global head of Transportation J.P. Morgan Asset Management. “We’re not seeing capital going to older vessels, it’s really focused on the newer ones.

“The shipping industry accounts for about 3% of global carbon emissions. So, if that can be reduced by 50% to 1.5%, or even better, that’s a positive thing.”

To comply with the more demanding fuel emission standards set by IMO 2020, vessels can either switch to low sulfur fuels or they can install exhaust gas cleaning systems, also known as scrubbers, to reduce their emissions of sulfur oxide and nitrous oxide. Over the past year, ships have been taken out of the market to install scrubbers.

“We expect these trends will continue in 2020, reducing industry-wide supply growth and providing support for rates,” Dacy notes. “We also anticipate that a number of older, less fuel-efficient ships will be demolished, further limiting supply.

“Finally, we project that average vessel speeds will slow to reduce fuel consumption. Such decreases in vessel speeds lead to supply contraction as vessels take longer to complete voyages, thereby supporting market rates.”

The shipping industry accounts for 90% of global trade, with its ships moving commodities like oil, iron ore and grain, and the vast majority of manufactured goods globally.

The industry’s 3% contribution to the world’s pollution is comparable to major emitting countries. “However, this industry is beginning to imagine a much cleaner future, with the help of investors who are financing greener investments,” Dacy states. “Protecting the environment has become a key consideration for extending shipping loans and investment.”

Even with the pandemic, trade continues to be a very important part of the global economy. For example, Chinese port volumes are about 110% above 2019 levels as of June 2020 despite the US-China trade war.

“Global trade oddly enough has not been that impacted by Covid-19 and the trade war,” Dacy points out “In some ways, the [Asian] region has strengthened with people ordering online and having goods delivered to their homes as opposed to going to shops. That is the broader recent economic development.”

Even as global transportation investments have grown in size and stature, the real asset class remains little known to institutional investors. Driven by decades of globalization, the diversity of transport assets has increased dramatically.

Transport assets, ranging from vessels and aircraft to rail and trucking, are integral components of global trade. While some of these assets provide attractive opportunistic returns, a significant part of them are seen as core-plus portfolio investments, characterized as capital intensive, stable, low leverage, and long-term income generators for high-quality end users.
Source: The Asset


The IMO defines the Voyage Data Recorder as a complete system, including any items required to interface with the sources of input signals, their processing and encoding, the final recording medium, the playback equipment, the power supply and dedicated reserve power source.

Akin to the ‘Black Box’ on airplanes, a Voyage Data Recorder is an equipment fitted onboard ships that record the various data on a ship which can be used for reconstruction of the voyage details and vital information during an accident investigation.

Information is stored in a secure and retrievable form, relating to the position, movement, physical status, command and control of a ship over the period and following an incident. This information is used during any subsequent safety investigation to identify the cause(s) of the incident. Aside from its usage in accident investigation, it can also be used for preventive maintenance, performance efficiency monitoring, heavy weather damage analysis, accident avoidance and training purposes to improve safety and reduce running costs.

Understanding VDR

As mentioned earlier, a VDR or voyage data recorder is an instrument safely installed on a ship to continuously record vital information related to the operation of a vessel. It contains a voice recording system for a period of at least last 12 hours (for VDRs installed post-July 2014, the period of the integrated details recorded is 48 hours as per the MSC Resolution 333.90). This recording is recovered and made use of for investigation in events of accidents in a compressed and digitised format.

A ship’s VDR is far superior to a black box of an aeroplane as it stores a variety of data and that too for not less than a period of 12 hours. The data records covering the last 12 hours are continuously overwritten by the latest data.

Voyage Data Recorder

Image Credits: wikimedia.org

 

A VDR is capable of withstanding heavy weather, collisions, fires and pressure conditions even when a ship is at a depth of several meters in water.

How VDR works?

The VDR can be classified to contain following units,

– the Data Collection Unit (DCU) (fitted on the bridge that pulls in data from all the integrated sources),

– a Data Recording Unit (DRU) (fitted on the monkey island that stores all of the data that is recorded via the unit within the wheelhouse) and microphones to record bridge audio. The DCU contains the Data Processor Unit, interface modules and backup batteries. It collects data from sensors as required by the IMO and IEC standards. The batteries supply power to the DCU to record bridge audio for 2 h in case of a main ship’s power failure. The flash memory in the DRU stores the data coming from the DCU. The data can be retrieved by using playback software for investigation after an incident. The DRU components are embodied in the protective capsule. The capsule ensures survival and recovery of the recorded data after an incident.

The flash memory in the DRU stores the data coming from the DCU. The data can be retrieved by using playback software for investigation after an incident. The DRU components are embodied in the protective capsule. The capsule ensures survival and recovery of the recorded data after an incident.

The DCU contains the Data Processor Unit, interface modules and backup batteries. It collects data from sensors as required by the IMO and IEC standards. The batteries supply power to the DCU to record bridge audio for 2 hrs in case of a main ship’s power failure. The flash memory in the DRU stores the data coming from the DCU. The data can be retrieved by using playback software for investigation after an incident. The DRU components are embodied in the protective capsule. The capsule ensures survival and recovery of the recorded data after an incident.

The data that is collected or pulled in from all the integrated sources is, as mentioned above, kept in the storage capsule and holds information for the 12 hours (or 48 hours) preceding it and continuously refreshed as the voyage progresses.

There is also a record button provided in the bridge unit so that after pushing button (say during starting of any incident like collision or grounding), the recorder will start recording a new set of information from that period of time.

The capsule mentioned above is a very sturdy unit, capable of withstanding shock and pressures associated with a marine mishap (collision, grounding, bad weather etc). It might be a float-free arrangement as with the HRU or attached with the EPIRB for simultaneous release.

Carriage requirements for VDR

As with all the navigational equipment carried onboard, the VDR also comes under the purview of the SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 20 as well as Annex 10. The details of it are as follows:

 

Passenger ships constructed on or after 1 July 2002 VDR
Ro-ro passenger ships constructed before 1 July 2002 VDR
Passenger ships other than ro-ro constructed before 1 July 2002 VDR
Ships other than passenger ships of 3000 GT and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 VDR
Cargo ships of 20000 gt. and upwards constructed before 1 July 2002* VDR or S-VDR
Cargo ships of 3000 GT and up to 20000 GT constructed before 1 July 2002 * VDR or S-VDR
* Cargo ships built before 1 July 2002 may be exempted from requirements to carry VDR /S-VDR when they are to be taken permanently out of service within 2 years of the relevant implementation date.

 

The VDR at least must record the following:

  • Date and time (SVDR)
  • Ship’s position (SVDR)
  • Speed and heading (SVDR)
  • Bridge audio (SVDR)
  • Communication audio (radio) (SVDR)
  • Radar data (SVDR)
  • ECDIS data (SVDR)
  • Echo sounder
  • Main alarms
  • Rudder order and response
  • Hull opening (doors) status
  • Watertight and fire door status
  • Speed and acceleration
  • Hull stresses
  • Wind speed and direction

S-VDR

The SVDR is nothing but a simplified VDR, that records information that is only absolutely necessary and does not record information as extensive as the VDR. Naturally, it is more cost effective and more in usage on board merchant ships. The concept of SVDR can be best understood by comparing the data below with that of the VDR. Mandatory information to be recorded in an SVDR are marked next to the category above. The last two interfaces of Radar and ECDIS may be recorded only if there are standard interfaces available.

General Operational Requirements

The VDR should continuously maintain sequential records of pre-selected data items relating to the status and output of the ship’s equipment and command and control of the ship. To permit subsequent analysis of factors surrounding an incident, the method of recording should ensure that the various data items can be correlated in date and time during playback on suitable equipment.

The system should include functions to perform a performance test at any time, e.g. annually or following repair or maintenance work to the VDR or any signal source providing data to the VDR. This test may be conducted using the playback equipment and should ensure that all the required data items are being correctly recorded.

Maintenance

As with all navigational equipment, checks and maintenance are important for proper operation of any electronic systems. Only qualified personnel should work inside the equipment. As far as routine checks are concerned, examine the cables for signs of damage and also check that all connections are rigid. The battery should be replaced every four years, the backup battery must be replaced with new one by a qualified service engineer. Regulation 18.8 of SOLAS Chapter V states the requirements for maintenance. A certificate stating that the results of such tests were satisfactory is to be retained onboard.

Underwater Acoustic Beacon

This beacon can be seen in the capsule on the monkey island and is fitted as a homing device to locate the capsule after a mishap. It is attached to a bracket on the capsule. Triggered by immersion in water, they give out pulses in the ultrasonic that can be detected by airborne or shipborne units.

The importance of the VDR cannot be stressed enough. While it is always in every seafarer’s best endeavour that a mishap does not occur at all, it is imperative to know the importance of a VDR in such a situation.

It is important to understand that the VDR/SVDR is not just a way to record data for use later on during accident investigation but it gives the trainers as well as the trainees to understand real life situations at sea and the ways they could be combatted to further prevent any future mishaps, enabling better practical approach towards ship operations at sea.

Disclaimer: The authors’ views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of Marine Insight. Data and charts, if used, in the article have been sourced from available information and have not been authenticated by any statutory authority. The author and Marine Insight do not claim it to be accurate nor accept any responsibility for the same. The views constitute only the opinions and do not constitute any guidelines or recommendation on any course of action to be followed by the reader.

Source: marineinsight


[By Wei Chen, Oliver Jost, Niclas Karlsson, Markus Joswig and Mark Beavis]

This short paper reviews food waste and food waste reject water (FWRW) from ships and how FWRW has been caught up in non-compliant practices across much of the passenger ship sector.

Food waste and its characteristics

A ship’s food waste is regulated under the IMO’s MARPOL Annex V Convention. When food waste is offloaded from an international ship to ports, it is also regulated under the national biosecurity regulations in force in countries such as the EU Member States, the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, among others.

Studies showed that there are significant variations in the food waste characteristics and generation rate, depending on the system designs, operational practices, passenger behaviours, food services, and voyage itineraries. Each study has its own unique circumstances. Taking representative food waste samples and having them suitably prepared for analysis is not without challenges. To simplify and rationalise a broad spectrum of findings, a cruise ship generates approximately 1 kg/person/day at 25 percent dry solids (DS), as collected in the bins, which has an organic content of about 1,200 g COD/kg DS or 600 g BOD/kg DS.

Food waste reject water (FWRW) and its characteristics

Many merchant ships dispose food waste from the bin to the sea. This is simple, compliant, and sustainable. To take food waste bins up and down a cruise ship is prohibitive due to hygiene and resource constraints. Instead, food waste is sorted at the pulper station to remove bones, plastics, and occasionally cutlery. It is then macerated and transferred from the pulper station to a holding tank by pumping or vacuum. Fresh water is added to aid the transfer and cleaning. This results in a food waste slurry of about 10 percent DS in the holding tank, accumulating at a rate of about 2.5 kg/person/day. 30~50 percent of the organics can be soluble, with most particles being less than 2 mm.

Not many facilities on land can receive this slurry. It causes odour, is too thick to flow freely in the sewers and too wet to be incinerated.  It carries the risks of disease or pests, which may prevent it from being anaerobically digested under biosecurity rules. Traditionally, this slurry has been discharged into the sea 3 or 12 nm from the nearest land, which is simple and compliant.

In order to achieve zero-discharge and to ‘go beyond the rules’, the food waste slurry is dewatered to a paste of 20~25 percent DS, then dried to a powder of 70~90 percent DS for incinerating on board. This is done at great expense in terms of capital costs, space, fuel, chemicals, and man-hours.

The waste management hierarchy governing the waste policies of our society would suggest that food waste incineration is a worse option than compliant discharge at sea. The absence of effective heat recovery during drying and incineration blurs the line between ‘waste to energy’ and wasting energy.

There are also mixed messages on system availability. But when they are operating, it is evident that only half of the food waste is converted into incineration emissions and ashes. The other half is in the so-called food waste reject water (FWRW) which is produced during dewatering of the food waste slurry.

Grey water or FWRW?

Setting aside the issue of efficiencies, the industry’s zeal for ‘zero-discharge’ can be well intended and compliant. The problem starts when the FWRW is wrongly considered as being grey water.

Is FWRW grey water? No, being a food waste derivative and carrying half of the food waste, FWRW is clearly not grey water. Grey water is generated from showers, wash basins, laundries and kitchen sinks, and is unregulated by the IMO rules. The definition of grey water does not include food waste or food waste derivatives. When FWRW goes into a spider web of piping diagrams and reappears as grey water, it renders compliant entries to the Garbage Record Book impossible. The practice does not comply with the IMO’s MARPOL Annex IV Convention. When this ‘grey water’ is connected to the sewage treatment plant onboard, it also causes non-compliance with the MARPOL Annex IV convention.

But the implications do not stop here.

Some insist the FWRW is grey water because ‘it looks better than grey water’. But its clarity or concentration are never the criteria when it comes to the risks of diseases and pests under the national biosecurity rules. Foreign food waste must be kept separately in tightly covered containers and transported to the approved facilities ashore for safe disposal. It is not permitted to change the physical structure of such food waste. These national rules are recognized and respected by the IMO’s Guidelines. To consider food waste derivatives as grey water and to allow it into the coastal waters and local sewers flouts the biosecurity rules.

However, such non-compliant designs and practices were often approved by the approval authorities serving some of the flag states at the expense of the agricultural interests of some of the port states.

Such approvals make any corrective actions difficult if not impossible. There is safety in numbers. But the issues will not go away. They serve as a long-lasting reminder to maritime and biosecurity professionals about the status of some of the marine rules.

The industry is innovative by nature. The regulations are often playing catch-up. But when we crave to be green, to achieve zero discharge, to ‘go beyond the rules’, can we do so without breaking the rules?

Co-authored by:

Dr Wei Chen, Future Program Development Manager, Wartsila UK Ltd, UK
Oliver Jost, Maritime Environmental Affairs, Wasserschutzpolizei (Water Police) Hamburg, Germany
Niclas Karlsson, Managing Director, Clean Ship Scandinavia AB, Sweden
Markus Joswig, Head of Marine Department, PIA GmbH, Germany
Mark Beavis, IEng IMarEng FIMarEST, Sales & Special Projects Director, ACO Marine s.r.o., Czech Republic, ACO Marine Systems GmbH, Germany

Endorsed by:

Benny Carlson, Chairman and owner, Marinfloc, Sweden
Ed White, Environmental Consultant, former Alaska DEC cruise ship compliance manager
Felix von Bredow, Board of Hamman AG, Hamman AG, Germany
Antony Chan, Engineering Manager, Victor Marine Ltd., UK
Helge Østby, Senior Technical Advisor, Jets Vacuum AS, Norway


Many predictions were made in the run up to the imposition of the MARPOL 2020 sulphur cap, none of which was that the transition to Very Low Sulphur Fuel Oil (VLSFO) would be smooth sailing. From Gard’s experience, the transition has been smoother than many predicted but not without challenges.

Introduction

In 2019, there were numerous discussions in the marine industry over how the transition to 0.5% fuels would pan out, with concerns about a wide variety of issues. Which predictions were right? To address this question, Gard held a series of webinars in July 2020 for our members and clients where we discussed the technical, compliance related, and legal challenges which owners, crew, and charterers faced when using very low sulphur fuel oil in the first six months of 2020.  A video of the webinar presentation and the materials are available to view and download here.

A number of important and pertinent questions were posed by the attendees during and after the webinars, touching upon technical, contractual, insurance and enforcement related areas. In this Insight, we will briefly summarize our experience with the transition based on the claims and inquiries received from our members and clients. Then we turn to some of the attendee’s questions to provide more detailed answers.

 

Our experience with the transition

Initial experience suggests there has been significant variances in the composition of residual VLSFOs. They have been found off-specification on a variety of ISO 8217 parameters such as aluminium plus silicon (catalytic fines), pour point, acid number and several others. The most commonly experienced problems with fuel reported to Gard were high total sediment potential (TSP) and marginal exceedance of sulphur. In fact, the results of an industry wide survey jointly carried out by BIMCO, ICS, Intercargo and Intertanko has produced similar findings.

The most common operational problems faced onboard was an increase in sludge formation in purifiers and filters, although so far these have not led to a high frequency of major breakdowns or engine damage cases. This could be because the crew were either able to manage these fuels or they were de-bunkered. Again, our experience is reflected in the wider industry survey.

Our data for fuel related machinery damage claims shows that the first six months of 2020 saw fewer claims than the same period in 2018 and 2019. This data only captures incidents where there was damage to machinery and the repair costs were above the deductible, so it does not take into account purely operational problems faced by crew. On the Defence side, the number of case files opened this year on contractual bunker disputes is similar to previous years. So, from Gard’s perspective, the more dire predictions regarding potential engine damage, and a deluge of litigation between owners and charterers have not materialized, at least in this first six-month period. Yet challenges remain as evidenced by the questions put to us below.

 

Testing bunkers before use

Question: Is a shipowner obliged to test for bunkers before consuming them?

Although there are no regulatory requirements obliging owners to test bunkers before consumption, testing by specialized laboratories has become the norm given a vessel owners’ lack of insight into quality control of marine fuels on the supply side. From an insurer’s perspective, the question is ‘how would a prudent uninsured act in the circumstances?’. Best practice is therefore to seek to avoid using a new batch of bunkers until its quality has been confirmed to be satisfactory by the laboratory analysis report. There can, of course, be situations where testing and analysis before use is not feasible.

From our engagements with owners and managers over the past few months, we understand that it is now common to perform pre-consumption analysis as per ISO 8217, table 2 parameters. A few are also supplementing these basic tests with investigative tests to identify and quantify contaminants, which helps to assess whether the fuel satisfies the requirements under Clause 5 of ISO 8217.

Question: As a charterer, we have seen owners trying to claim for non-compliant fuel and alleging damage by fuel which they have burned without testing it. How does a failure to test affect such claims?

If normal testing would have revealed the contaminant that caused the damage, and thereby allowed the damage to be avoided or reduced, then there could be an argument that the failure to test broke the chain of causation or was contributory negligence by the owners, but it would depend on the facts of the case. If standard testing would not have revealed the problem, it may be difficult to criticize the owners.

 

Representative sample and bunker delivery note (BDN)

Question: Should binding fuel quality test results be based on (a) the supplier’s sample (i.e. the one taken on bunker barge), or (b) the ship’s sample (taken at receiving ship’s manifold)?

In the majority of claims handled by Gard this year, there have been arguments over which sample to test. Both charterers and bunker suppliers usually opt for the supplier’s sample to be tested, whereas owners prefer to test their own ship’s sample, i.e. the receiving ship’s sample taken at the manifold. From an owner’s perspective, there may be legitimate concerns about a supplier’s sample not being representative of the fuel supplied, especially if the crew on the receiving vessel were unable to monitor and oversee the sampling on the bunker barge. In a few cases the different samples have produced very different results, with the supplier’s sample found to be on-spec but the receiving ship’s sample off-spec.

MARPOL does not regulate commercial samples and its requirements are only limited to the MARPOL sample which is to be taken at receiving ship’s manifold, sealed and carried on board to be made available to port or flag state authorities. It is nonetheless in the interest of all parties for the commercial samples and MARPOL sample to be taken from the same source. Absent regulatory requirements, reliance must be placed on:

  • Domestic requirements of the state where bunkering is taking place, such as Singapore’s SS600; or
  • Industry standards (ISO 13739) and good practices, including IMO guidelines (MEPC.1/Circ.875/Add.1); or
  • Contractual agreement.

It is worth highlighting that the 2020 version of ISO 13739 requires representative samples to be taken at the receiving ship’s manifold. The previous version allowed the sample to be taken from either end of the bunker hose. The ISO standard can be incorporated into bunker supply contracts and charterparties. Masters are also encouraged to seek guidance from charterers about sampling well before bunkering.

An associated issue is that in a few cases bunker delivery notes have been found to incorrectly state that all samples were taken at the receiving ship’s manifold and ship’s crew have signed them without taking note of this. It is important that Masters and Chief Engineers do not sign BDNs without verifying the information in them, and if there are discrepancies the matter should be raised with their managers and charterers, and perhaps consider issuing a protest and/or clause the BDN.

 

Liability for machinery damage caused by poor quality fuel

Question: If there is a machinery breakdown caused by contaminants in the fuel which could only have been detected by advanced investigative tests, who is liable – owners or charterers?

This is a question with which we at Gard are familiar. We insure shipowners for physical damage to the vessel and we insure charterers for their liability to owners for such damage. We also cover both owners and charterers for costs of legal disputes under the charterparty for uninsured losses.

This question assumes that the cause of the engine breakdown is a contaminant in the fuel. It is often difficult to establish the cause of breakdown as there are many substances that are found in fuel that are not part of the fuel specifications and require investigative tests like GC-MS analysis to be found. There is  also the question of establishing a causal connection between the substance and the damage which, as the “Houston Bunkers Saga” demonstrated, is no easy task.

Let’s assume, as the question suggests, that the experts – chemists and engineers – have opined that a contaminant in the fuel as supplied has caused the engine breakdown. The question of liability is then contractual – did the charterer breach an obligation in the charterparty rendering the charterer liable for the breakdown?

Each charterparty is different but generally the time charterer is obliged to supply the vessel with bunkers meeting the charterparty specification.  This is normally done by reference to a version of ISO 8217 that contains a catchall provision requiring that the fuel is free from any material at a concentration that is “harmful to personnel, jeopardizes the safety of the ship, or adversely affects the performance of the machinery”.

Thus, assuming that there is evidence to support the claim that an identified contaminant caused an engine breakdown, the owner could in theory recover damages from the charterer. Damages would normally include repair costs, hire and costs. Investigating these claims and proving or defending them can be an expensive proposition given the cost of enhanced testing and expert attendance often seen in these disputes.

 

Question: If the charterer refuses to debunker fuel and the owner refuses to consume it – the ship will stop trading. Where does the risk lie in such cases?

Some of the VLSFO blends can be challenging to deal with, and when there is a dispute over suitability for consumption both owners and charterers face financial risk until the dispute is resolved. If owners are correct that the fuel is off-specification and cannot be consumed safely then the vessel remains on hire and charterers face hire payments while the vessel remains idle. On the other hand, if charterers are correct and the fuel is suitable for consumption, owners risk that they will not receive hire. The key is for both sides to act quickly to identify if the fuel is off-specification and what, if anything, can be done to allow it to be safely used, both of which likely require input from an expert. It is also essential to involve the bunker supplier quickly in case the vessel must be de-bunkered. Many bunker supply contracts have short notice provisions and time bars. Reputable suppliers will likely assist in removing bunkers proved to be off specification under the bunker sale contract.

 

Owners procuring bunkers for time charterers

Question: In a few cases, a time charterer has asked us, the owners, to procure VLSFO and pass on the costs to them. Does this alter the risk landscape and what precautions are to be taken as owners?

We do see this sometimes, for example where the owners are bunkering for their own needs and the charterer wants to make use of the same supplier to save time/costs. In at least one case this year, the successive stems of the bunker provided by the charterers were off-spec and they had to be de-bunkered following which the charterers requested the owners to procure the next stem.

With such an arrangement in place the burden would be on the owners to do the due diligence in procuring the fuel, including:

  • Vetting the bunker supplier.
  • Check if they are dealing with an intermediary or the physical supplier.
  • Check the sale terms for acceptability including time bars, sampling clauses, disclaimer excluding warranty as to fitness of the fuel and so on.
  • Describe the fuel that is required, and address issues such as minimum viscosity, pour point; the ISO standard required. On which ISO standard to specify, our recommendation is ISO 8217:2017 rather than the more commonly found ISO 8217:2010.
  • Ask for and check the Certificate of Quality (COQ). Very old COQs might not correlate to the actual product.
  • Industry recommendation is to avoid co-mingling bunkers but if this is unavoidable, compatibility checks should be done before the bunkers are taken onboard.

Owners should be careful on three points where they are arranging a supply for charterers:

  • Make sure the purchase is done as agent for the charterers and not as a separate sale contract whereby the owner buys from the bunker seller and sells the cargo on to charterers under a separate sale contract. If the owner is not acting as agent, they may well owe the charterer obligations under the sale contract.
  • Check that the charterer is happy with the bunker seller’s price and sale terms before you proceed.
  • Warn the bunker seller of the arrangement and that you are acting as agent for the charterers only, and not as principal.

 

Hull & Machinery (H&M) cover

Most of the questions we received in our webinar on insurance cover related to whether the hull and machinery (H&M) insurance would cover claims for damage to ship’s engines in the following two scenarios:

  • Where the bunkers has to be consumed before the results of the sample analysis are ready
  • Where crew negligence is involved

Every case will depend on its own facts, so it is not possible to give a response covering all situations. Generally speaking, H&M cover is intentionally wide so it will cover most situations where owners take a commonsense approach to solving problems.  As an H&M insurer, we accept that getting samples tested is not always straightforward and that delays can happen for various reasons. If owners take a fact-based approach to assessing the quality of the bunkers, and that includes matters such as using the COQ, and based on that assessment they believe that the bunkers are likely to be compliant and fit for purpose, it is likely that any damage would be covered by H&M.

Coming to the point on crew negligence, H&M cover includes accidents arising from negligence by crew or of the shore-based owner’s office. The interpretation of crew negligence is subject to a commonsense standard which means doing something that one should not do, or not doing something which should have been done.  If the crew or the shore staff could reasonably foresee the outcome of their actions then this might affect the H&M cover, but if it was more an oversight or following incorrect procedures then cover would very likely remain in place.

 

Diversion costs to bunker compliant fuel

Question: If test results reveal that the bunkers are off-spec and the owner decide to make a diversion to debunker and take on compliant fuel, will the Club cover the associated costs?

Deviation costs to debunker and take on compliant fuel would not be covered by neither the H&M Policy nor the P&I policy. Defence cover would respond to legal and expert costs to establish a claim against the supplier (where owners purchased the bunkers) or against the charterer (if the charterer purchased the bunkers).  Deviation costs would form part of the claim in addition to the differential in cost between the stem and replacement stem and also any delay claim.

 

Role of experts

Question: In some cases of machinery breakdown or damage, it may be difficult to establish whether the quality of the fuel directly caused the incident. Should an expert be appointed in these cases?

In quite a few cases this year engineering experts and/or chemists had to be appointed or at least consulted, especially where the bunkers were on-spec on ISO 8271 Table 2 parameters and the crew were still finding it difficult to manage them. As highlighted in the question itself, establishing causation can be a complex affair, and also time consuming and expensive. In one case this year, the cost of the investigative tests alone was USD 20,000.

 

Port State Control (PSC)

Question: What has the Club’s experience been with enforcement by port state control?

In the first six months of 2020 the number of PSC inspections dropped by nearly 40% due to the Covid-19 outbreak. Despite that, detentions relating to SOx regulations of MARPOL Annex VI were in double digits in the Tokyo MoU region, with the majority of those being for high sulphur content in the fuel.

From our involvement in some of those cases, we note that PSC officers have generally been aware of and following the IMO’s 2019 Guidelines for Port State Control under MARPOL Annex VI and the guidelines in IMO resolution MEPC.320(74). However, we have seen some cases where further training may perhaps be needed for crew members and even shore management to increase their awareness of the PSC inspection guidelines, with an emphasis on two points in particular:

  • Results from portable devices of a sulphur content more than 0.53% can be considered as clear grounds for a more detailed PSC inspection, but they should not be treated as evidence of non-compliance. The results are merely indicative.
  • As part of more detailed inspection, the “in-use” or “onboard” samples have to be tested ashore by an accredited laboratory. If the sulphur content of such samples is found to be equal to or less than 0.53% verified as an average of two tests performed at the same laboratory, then the vessel should be deemed to be in compliance.

However, owners, managers and crew should be aware that if the “MARPOL” delivered sample is tested, i.e. one delivered in accordance with regulation 18.8.1 of MARPOL Annex VI, then under the IMO guidelines a strict limit of 0.50% applies, verified as an average of two tests performed at the same laboratory. To the best of our knowledge, authorities have so far limited the testing for sulphur verification to the “in use” or “onboard” samples and have not extended it to the MARPOL delivered sample. For a detailed explanation of testing procedures and the differences between the in use and onboard samples and the MARPOL delivered sample, see our Insight article “Are you 95% confident your very low sulphur fuel is on spec and MARPOL compliant?

We have also been made aware that some states may impose a nominal fee for testing of the samples ashore. Owners and managers should check with the local agents about this, as it may be provided for under the state’s domestic legislation.

 

General recommendations

There are quite a few challenges ahead for crew members, owners and charterers, mainly because of the variability in the fuel blends and the lack of oversight by authorities over the bunkering eco system. By way of general recommendations, we suggest:

  • Risk mitigation at procurement stage: the priority for the purchaser of bunkers, whether it is charterer or owner, should be to prevent poor quality fuel from getting onboard. When selecting the supplier, consider assessing the level of control the supplier has on the bunker supply chain; their market reputation; whether they have insurance cover for issues related to poor quality bunkers; and the terms and conditions of the bunker supply contract. Members can refer to our Insight where we have highlighted key considerations for the buyer. Where possible, the latest ISO standards should be incorporated.  We recommend use of ISO 8217: 2017
  • Notifying non-compliances to authorities: it is important that owners report instances where fuel fails to meet the requirements specified in regulation 14 or 18 of MARPOL Annex VI. Administrations, through the IMO, are then to upload this information on the IMO GISIS platform. In the first six months there were 152 reports uploaded by various flag states on this platform and is a good source of information for owners, managers and charterers.
  • Getting charterparty clauses right: although there are some good charterparty bunker clauses in circulation, check that you understand how these  clauses work before you agree to them, and make sure they meet your needs (which may change over time).
  • Preparing for disputes: do not wait until there is a problem to start collecting information and evidence – by then it may be too late. Make sure information in BDNs is accurate before they are signed off, seek instructions if a bunker supplier is not following standard good practice, and keep good records of all steps in the bunkering, storage, and combustion process.
  • Cooperation between owners and charterers: Currently, much of the focus is on areas of dispute and not so much on how the parties can come together to address the various challenges each side is facing in their respective roles. There are various areas where owners and charterers can cooperate for mutual benefit, such as vetting bunker suppliers, knowing more about the fuel composition, sharing costs for tests and getting feedback on how bunkers performed operationally. Cooperation can lead to better financial results for all parties.Source: gard

Drewry and the European Shippers’ Council publish a bunker adjustment factor indexing mechanism for shippers’ reference and guideline.

Drewry and the ESC have defined and published a simplified BAF indexing mechanism and bunker charge guide to help shippers monitor and control bunker charges as shipping lines switch to the more expensive bunkers required under the IMO 2020 low-sulphur regulation.

The mechanism is the result of the ESC-Drewry IMO toolkit reference group, a European shipper experts, Drewry and the ESC tasked in particular with gathering views and best practices on IMO 2020 low-sulphur fuel-related topics.

If you are interested to download the toolkit, please fill the interest form ion this LINK:

Source: europeanshippers


September 15, 2020 IMO

The following news release was issued by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on September 8.

Allow crew changes to resolve humanitarian crisis, insists IMO Secretary-General

humanitarian crisis is taking place at sea and urgent action is needed to protect seafarers’ health and ensure the safety of shippingthe IMO Secretary-General Kitack Lim has warned. In a strong statement issued ahead of the General Assembly of the United Nationshe called on governments to take swift action to resolve the crew change crisis.  

 It is estimated that more than 300,000 seafarers and marine personnel are currently stranded at sea and unable to be repatriated despite the expiry of their contracts. A similar number of seafarers have been unable to join ships and relieve them. This is due to restrictions imposed by several governments in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, including restrictions on travel, embarkation and disembarkation in ports, quarantine measures, reductions in available flights and limits on the issuing of visas and passports. 

Some seafarers have now been on board their ships for more than 17 months, exceeding the 11-months limit set out in the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC). Many have been denied proper access to medical care and shore leave, in breach of their rights under the MLC and other international instrumentsThis creates serious concerns, not only for seafarers’ health and wellbeing, but also for the safety of shipping. Overly fatigued and mentally exhausted seafarers are being asked to continue operating vessels, increasing the risk of shipping casualties.  

“Seafarers cannot remain at sea indefinitely, Mr Lim insisted. “If the crew change crisis is not resolved soon, ships will no longer be able to operate safely pursuant to the Organization’s regulations and guidelines, further exacerbating the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic,” he declaredShipping moves more than 80 per cent of global trade and is a crucial component of the global economy. 

Mr Lim said that resolving the crew change crisis will require a “whole of government” approach involving several ministries. He reiterated his call to all Member States to designate seafarers as key workers providing an essential service, and to implement the IMO-approved Protocols to allow for safe and secure crew changes. The IMO Secretary-General also insisted on the importance of removing other barriers to crew changes, such as visa and travel restrictions, and of providing seafarers with immediate access to medical care and medical facilities on shore, when needed  

This fresh call to action from the IMO Secretary-General is in line with months of action by the Organization, including numerous top-level statements, bilateral meetings at a diplomatic level, as well as the establishment of the Seafarer Crisis Action team to directly help stranded seafarers. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has also urged all countries in the world to recognize seafarers as key workers and provide the necessary travel assistance to ensure safe crew changeovers and repatriations.

While significant progress has been made by many countries in allowing for crew changes for all seafarers, the rate of progress is not keeping pace with the backlog of ships requiring crew changes.   

Mr Lim has invited Member States to raise the issue of seafarers and the crew change crisis during the upcoming High-Level Week of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, beginning on 22 September 2020. ILO, IMO and the UN Global Compact will host a side event during that week in order to raise the visibility of the crew change crisis on World Maritime Day24 September 2020. 

Read the full statement here 

For more information on issues surrounding crew changes and repatriation, read the IMO comprehensive FAQ here. 

For more information on the work achieved by IMO to help seafarers around the world and specific examples, click here. 

For more information on the impact of the pandemic on the shipping sector, including advice for seafarers and the industry, visit our dedicated COVID-19 webpage http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Coronavirus.aspx


The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), the voluntary association of oil companies, announced it has overhauled its committee structure to focus its resources on identifying and mitigating issues of highest-risk to its members and to the marine industry.

While its scope of operations and remit remains the same, OCIMF’s strategy places a renewed emphasis on the way it identifies, analyses and assesses the issues that have the biggest impact on the safety of lives, the natural environment and property. Using a risks and barriers (or bowtie) methodology, a newly established risk advisory function within the OCIMF Secretariat is now responsible for identifying those risks that are most likely to impact on the activities of OCIMF members.

According to OCIMF, the reorganization also provides a more reliable operational model for ensuring continual assessment, review and action in line with industry changes and emerging risks. This new approach is enabled through its realigned committee structure and the implementation of new ways of working, including a much wider collaboration with the entire membership. The changes will enable OCIMF and its members to share expertise more efficiently, engage a broader range of specialist input from across the industry, and respond with greater agility to developing risks, the association said.

Rob Drysdale, Managing Director, OCIMF, explained, “As a voluntary organization, we depend upon the expertise and input of our member companies and partners in order to develop our best practice publications and inspection programs, and to advocate these and global regulation successfully to the marine industry. We need to optimize this input by working in a more effective and efficient way by focusing our efforts on the issues OCIMF is best placed to address.

“By restructuring our committees to focus on fewer, but higher risk activities, and implementing new ways of working which will enable us to respond with greater agility in producing relevant best practice publications, programs or advocacy, we believe OCIMF can deliver greater value for our members and the industry as a whole.”

OCIMF, which has consultancy status at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), leverages the expertise and experience of its 111 member companies and industry partners to develop publications, inspection programs and advocacy work that has successfully advanced the safety of the industry. This has included the development of the Ship Inspection Report (SIRE) Program, Offshore Vessel Inspection Database (OVID) and Tanker Management Self Assessment (TMSA) programs, alongside books, guidelines and information papers.

OCIMF’s new committee structure comprises three Principal Committees which will drive the strategic priorities of the organization and will convene specialist Expert Groups and Working Groups to deliver on specific outcomes. Four Functional Committees will feed sector-specific expertise on legal, human factors, environment and maritime security across all work conducted by the organization. To ensure wide participation from the entire membership on safety-critical issues, Communities of Practice (CoPs) – virtual forums for members and industry stakeholders – will be convened to share knowledge and insight.

The new Committees and Expert Groups comprising representatives from its member companies and invited industry partners are currently being established.

Steve Alder, Strategy Implementation Manager, OCIMF, said, “The new committee structure will enhance and diversify member engagement by making it easier for OCIMF and its members to collaborate more efficiently. Providing expertise to OCIMF will become far less resource-intensive and as a result OCIMF will be able to leverage a broader range of experience and expertise in the development of publications, programs and advocacy for the benefit of the entire industry.”

OCIMF was formed in April 1970 in response to the growing public concern about marine pollution, particularly by oil, after the Torrey Canyon incident in 1967. Today, OCIMF’s membership includes every oil major in the world along with the majority of National Oil Companies.

Source: marinelink


International Maritime Organization (IMO) Secretary-General Kitack Lim is urging governments to take swift action to resolve the crew change crisis that has left several hundred thousand seafarers stranded at sea and unable to be repatriated despite the expiry of their contracts.

It is estimated that more than 300,000 mariners are stuck at sea, and a similar number of seafarers have been unable to join ships and relieve them due to restrictions imposed by several governments in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, including restrictions on travel, embarkation and disembarkation in ports, quarantine measures, reductions in available flights and limits on the issuing of visas and passports.

Lim, who has called the situation a humanitarian crisis, expressed concern not only for seafarers’ health and wellbeing, but also for the safety of shipping, as overly fatigued and mentally exhausted seafarers are being asked to continue operating vessels, increasing the risk of shipping casualties. Some seafarers have now been on board their ships for more than 17 months, exceeding the 11-months limit set out in the Maritime Labor Convention (MLC). Many have been denied proper access to medical care and shore leave, in breach of their rights under the MLC and other international instruments.

This week the IMO head issued strong statement ahead of the General Assembly of the United Nations calling on governments in fresh call to action to resolve the crew change crisis.’

“While significant progress has been made by many countries in allowing for crew changes for all seafarers, the rate of progress is not keeping pace with the backlog of ships requiring crew changes,” Lim said.

“Seafarers cannot remain at sea indefinitely,” Lim continued. “If the crew change crisis is not resolved soon, ships will no longer be able to operate safely pursuant to the Organization’s regulations and guidelines, further exacerbating the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.”

Lim said that resolving the crew change crisis will require a “whole of government” approach involving several ministries. He reiterated his call to all Member States to designate seafarers as key workers providing an essential service, and to implement the IMO-approved protocols to allow for safe and secure crew changes. The IMO Secretary-General also insisted on the importance of removing other barriers to crew changes, such as visa and travel restrictions, and of providing seafarers with immediate access to medical care and medical facilities on shore, when needed.

Over the past several months, the IMO has issued numerous top-level statements, held bilateral meetings at a diplomatic level and established the Seafarer Crisis Action team to help stranded seafarers. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has also urged all countries in the world to recognize seafarers as key workers and provide the necessary travel assistance to ensure safe crew changeovers and repatriations.

Lim invited Member States to raise the issue of seafarers and the crew change crisis during the upcoming High-Level Week of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, beginning on September 22. ILO, IMO and the UN Global Compact will host a side event during that week to raise the visibility of the crew change crisis on World Maritime Day, September 24.

“Working together, this challenge to shipping and seafarers can be overcome,” Lim said.

Source: marinelink


In an effort to protect Arctic waters from the harmful effects of heavy fuel oil (HFO) the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and its member states have been working on a ban of HFO for more than a decade.

Now researchers warn that the draft regulation for the Arctic contains too many exceptions and waivers which would exempt most ships from the new regulation until 2029.

“The IMO’s proposed HFO ban contains so many loopholes that it’s no ban at all,” the new study by the International Council on Clean Transportation, an independent nonprofit organization, concludes.

Heavy fuel oil is the cheapest and dirtiest type of marine fuel resulting in harmful Black Carbon emissions and posing a serious risk to the marine environment in the event of a spill. Its use has been banned for all vessels without exceptions in the waters surrounding Antarctica for almost a decade.

It’s well beyond time that the Arctic receives the same protection as Antarctica.
Dr. Bryan Comer, senior marine researcher at the International Council on Clean Transportation.

The proposed ban comes at a time when the use of HFO and Black Carbon emissions in the Arctic have increased at a worrying pace, researchers say. Between 2015 and 2019 HFO use increased by 75% and Black Carbon emissions from HFO grew by 72%. More than 700 vessels using HFO as fuel traveled throughout the Arctic carrying more 500,000 tons of HFO as fuel.

In its currently proposed form the ban would only cover a small fraction of vessels traveling in the Arctic and reduce the use of HFO by only 16% and Black Carbon emissions by only 5%.

“The IMO’s proposed HFO ban is nothing of the sort. As written, it bans less than one-third of HFO carried and less than one-sixth of HFO used by ships in the Arctic,” explains Dr. Bryan Comer, senior marine researcher at the International Council on Clean Transportation.

Too many exemptions and waivers

Earlier this year the IMO’s subcommittee on the Prevention and Response to Pollution had agreed on a draft text proposing a ban on the use and transport of HFO to take effect by mid-2024. At the time environmental groups criticized a number of loopholes, including that vessels flying the flag of Arctic coastal states would be exempt until 2029 under certain conditions.

However, it wasn’t fully understood until now just how ineffective the proposed regulation would be at curtailing the carriage and use of HFO and black carbon emissions.

The draft regulation allows for exemptions and waivers for certain vessels in internal waters, territorial seas and the Exclusive Economic Zones of the Arctic coastal states.

Ships that separate their fuel tanks from their outer hull by at least 76 centimeters can continue to use HFO as fuel until mid-2029. In addition, vessels flagged to the five Arctic coast states – Russia, Canda, the U.S., Denmark, and Norway – can choose to exempt their vessels when operating in their waters. Together these loopholes would allow almost 75% of vessels that operated in the Arctic in 2019 to continue using HFO.

Time to protect the Arctic

The researchers highlight the urgent need to protect the Arctic marine environment.

“HFO has already been banned in the Antarctic since 2011, without exemptions or waivers. It’s well beyond time that the Arctic receives the same protections,” urges Comer.

A number of recent shipping accidents, including the spill of 1,000 tons of HFO when the Wakashio bulk carrier broke apart off the coast of Mauritius last month, highlight the need for action.

Thus far the Arctic Ocean has escaped a large-scale spill but has come dangerously close on several occasions. In 2017, Danish bulk carrier Nordic Barents collided with the nuclear icebreaker Vaygach fortunately not resulting in any spill. In 2013 the tanker Nordvik was struck by ice and started to take on water before the crew was able to stop the ingress and in July 2010 two fully-laden Russian oil tankers, the Indiga and the Varzuga, collided in medium ice conditions and poor visibility.

Russian opposition to stronger regulations

The study calls for fewer exemptions and waivers or at least to more clearly specify where waivers can be issued. In total the study suggests and evaluates six alternatives on how to strengthen the currently-proposed ban.

“IMO member states should at the very least clarify where waivers may be issued. The current text is so vague that it could allow Arctic countries to grant waivers inside their entire Exclusive Economic Zone [extending 200 nautical miles from shore],” says Comer.

If waivers were to be limited to internal and territorial waters – 12 nautical miles – the use of HFO could be reduced by a factor of two.

It is unlikely that Russia will agree to such a change as it was the lone Arctic state opposing a HFO ban and only conceded after it secured the aforementioned waiver for Russian-flagged vessels within its waters.

Russian vessels traveling along the country’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) routinely violate Russian safety and navigation rules, adding even more urgency to putting in place an effective HFO ban under the auspices of the IMO.

As High North News reported, in 2017 nearly 100 ships, accounting for 20% of all Russian-flagged vessels along the NSR, violated safety rules. Russia’s Northern Sea Route Administration stopped publishing data on these violations in 2018 and has not made the data available to HNN for the years 2018-2020.


I wasn’t surprised when I stumbled on numerous news and information, telling about pandemic-immune class of people – rich people. They fly around the world and visit their favorite places, hardly aware of all that pandemic chaos and mess. They don’t care, they have private jets and enough money to be considered and treated, as absolutely immune. So far, I singled out three groups of – well, kind of people, who’re immune to virus, by definition:
Rich, celebs, politicians – elites, to put it short;
Members of mobs and “movements”, such as BLM/Antifa, Green, pro-migrant, anti-Trump;
Illegal migrants.
Common, hard-working and honest folks, who’re feeding the abovelisted scum, are looked at, and treated, as either criminals, or rabid animals.
Crew change crisis could be solved already, but instead, it is continuing to worsen. No maritime organization did offer any valid, realistic, radical solutions, such as:
Organizing private jets (and commercial planes) net with several main hubs around the globe;
Enforcing governments to accept and practice Seamen Green Pass Rule;
Removing all the unnecessary, rights abusive, restrictions and rules, such as listed in disgusting, Gestapo-style, IMO 12-step plan;
Imposing heavy surcharges on all import/export freights to countries, which continue treating seamen in a hostile, abusive manner;
Implementing special charter clause, which will compel nations’ shippers to share financial burdens of crew change.
Maritime bodies led by IMO/ILO, do essentially, nothing, except paying lip-service, mixed with the abundance of cheap, pathetic rhetoric. It is not accidental or a mistake or because these bodies are run by wrong persons. They are run by exactly the kind of persons required for the fulfillment of UN agenda – wiping out private shipping and taking all the shipping, including seamen, under total control.
Tactic the use is very simple, nothing new – divide and conquer, drive a wedge between seamen and shipowners. They attack private shipowners and do all they can, to make shipowners responsible for crew changes, hampering and foiling each and every attempt to work out universal solution to this crisis. MUA and AMSA activities in Australia (or should I say, Socialist Republic of Australia?) are the best illustration.
They develop and try to implement, most insane, humiliating and ineffective, plans to standardize crew change requirements, IMO 12-step plan being the best illustration.
Now it’s time for next step – for branding seamen like cattle, with electronic devices:
Dario Alampay, chairman of the Joint Manning Group based in Manila, is calling for a global approach to have all seafarers of all nationalities adopt a common digital quarantine pass recorded via blockchain as well as a seamless contact tracing system.
He didn’t go into details, but his idea is clear, it’s already propagated by mainstream media and politicians – it’s an electronic bracelet, at best, but the final goal is implanted chip. Chip which will spy on us, track us, and send all our private and sensitive information, to organizations we know nothing about, to unknown for us use. I don’t know who this Alampay is, and don’t want to know. The only thing I’m interested in, is this idea – did Alampay thought it out all by himself, or was he “advised” by some third party?
In the end, I invite readers to listen to an interview, given by one “Brandt Wagner, the International Labour Organization’s point man for shipping”, specifically on crew change crisis occasion.
Try to listen to all of it, and then listen again. Try to find out an atom of something directly related to crew change crisis and ways to solve it. It’s like, you know, an interview with a person from another planet or universe. ILO and Maritime Labor Convention are the key, that’s the golden thread of the speech. Key to what? Why should we talk about this nonsense anyway, in the middle of the heaviest human crisis shipping ever encountered? Interview is just one more illustration of “elites” priorities and attitudes, morals (lack of it) and principles. You want to hear about some resolute, decisive steps and decisions to solve unbearable problem of crew change? Instead, you’re giving a lecture on importance of Maritime Labor total control by means of MLC.

Source: maritimebulletin


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