Liberian Registry Launches Dynamic Detention Prevention Program

June 1, 2020 POST STATE CONTROL

The Liberian Registry has developed and released a dynamic Detention Prevention Programme (DPP), which is an automated Port State Control (PSC) risk assessment system that focuses on preparedness before Liberian vessels enter into port.  This valuable tool and pl¬¬atform is offered to Liberian-flagged ships free of charge.

Liberia’s unique system is the ONLY Detention Prevention Programme of its kind offered by any Flag State. The system aggregates data from across the industry, including Flag State data, Port State data and Class Society data, for a PSC boarding analysis of its entire fleet in real-time.

The system calculates and assigns a PSC boarding risk category to all 4,500+ Liberian-flagged vessels, which allows Liberia to focus its efforts on vessels that are more likely to have a PSC boarding, detention or deficiency. The score for each vessel adjusts in real time based on the port which the vessel is entering. For instance, a vessel may be categorized as low risk for boarding in Singapore, while the same vessel may be high risk for boarding in Houston. Each PSC MoU, each country and each port have their own specific requirements and their own PSC trends that the system considers when determining a vessel’s risk score.

To help vessels prepare for port arrival, LISCR provides dynamic pre-arrival checklists, and schedules inspections upon arrival as necessary. This allows owners and operators to take early and effective action to ensure their vessels remain in compliance with applicable requirements, which of course leads to saving valuable time and money.

Alfonso Castillero, COO of the Liberian International Ship & Corporate Registry (LISCR), the US-based manager of the Liberian Registry, says, “We are proud to be recognised as the most technologically advanced flag, and we continually invest in technologies that help save our shipowners time and money.”

Castillero continues, “In 2019 we saw an increase in PSC activity in the United States, and a particular focus on ISM issues.  This led to an increase in detentions that was frankly unprecedented for us.  And though we still have many of these under appeal—having already won two, we felt we had to act.  We knew we had to invest in an early detection system that was dynamic, smart, and easy to use.  This gave birth to the new DPP. We immediately hired ex-USCG officers to build up our regional compliance manager team which is now represented on every US coast, and key international ports.  Further, with the right boots on the ground, this massive investment and sea-change in the way we proactively pre-vet Liberian vessel arrivals has yielded great results and a 54% drop in detentions in the US. This system will facilitate a fast return to Qualship 21 status, and ensure our continued top positioning on the White Lists of the Tokyo and Paris MOU’s.

“Liberia’s Detention Prevention Programme is automatic, real-time, completely dynamic and free of charge for Liberian-flagged vessels. LISCR’s dedicated IT and Fleet PSC Performance departments have spent countless hours working to perfect our Detention Prevention Programme, and what we have built is truly ground-breaking.

“By bringing together data from multiple key industry sources, we are able to see the complete picture of our vessels, their history and thus, their potential risk factor. Our accurate algorithm has already helped prevent detentions in various circumstances all over the world, and this is just the beginning.”

The Liberian Registry continuously monitors, evaluates and implements ongoing compliance efforts while maintaining its position as the world’s fastest growing open registry.

Source: https://www.maritime-executive.com/corporate/liberian-registry-launches-dynamic-detention-prevention-program

US MARITIME SANCTIONS ADVISORY: NAVIGATING CHOPPY WATERS

June 1, 2020 POST STATE CONTROL

In May 2020, the US Department of State, US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and US Coast Guard issued a joint Sanctions Advisory for the Maritime Industry. The Advisory builds on and expands several prior sanctions advisories for the maritime community issued in 2018-19.

“These sanctions often target the maritime sectors of the relevant countries, as well as shipments of oil, natural gas and various commodities.”

The Advisory is intended as a guidepost to help participants in the maritime sector achieve the desired level of compliance. Most of the guidance is couched in the language of suggestion (e.g., parties “may wish to consider…”), rather than as a mandate. However, it is clear that the US government wishes parties to follow the guidance in the Advisory as closely as possible. Accordingly, those in the maritime community, including owners, charterers, lenders, insurers and others should carefully review the Advisory, and make appropriate changes to their practices and operations.

THE MARITIME COMMUNITY: AT THE FOREFRONT OF SANCTIONS POLICING

While the maritime sector has always been a focal point of trade sanctions, since 2018, the Trump Administration has increasingly focused on the maritime sector in policing its “maximum pressure” campaign to enforce US sanctions. US “secondary” or “extraterritorial” sanctions largely prohibit non-US parties from dealing with North Korea, Iran and other sanctioned parties. These sanctions often target the maritime sectors of the relevant countries, as well as shipments of oil, natural gas and various commodities.

In order for these sanctions to be effective in putting pressure on the target countries, the US government needs the global maritime community to police itself, and for players to ensure that both they and their counterparts are in compliance. In a sense, this is similar to the push in the early years of the last decade to force international financial institutions to implement US sanctions worldwide. However, unlike banks, which are heavily regulated and have substantial compliance obligations outside of sanctions, many players in the maritime sector are small and do not have a sophisticated compliance infrastructure, which may make it more difficult to comply.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ADVISORY

The following are some of the more salient points in the Advisory:

AIS Transponders

Ships use Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders to transmit their location. In most cases, they remain active at all times, so the ship’s progress can be tracked. However, transponders may fail due to weather conditions or other technical problems, and may be turned off for legitimate reasons (e.g., in a location where piracy is a concern). OFAC is concerned that ships may turn off or disguise their transponders in order to engage in surreptitious trade in violation of sanctions. This follows news reports and allegations that various ships turned off their transponders when secretly transporting Iranian crude oil to East Asia.

The Advisory suggests that parties should research a ship’s history to identify previous AIS manipulation before entering into new contracts involving the ship, and monitor AIS manipulation and disablement when cargo is in transit. The Advisory also suggests that relevant contracts include a clause requiring the AIS to broadcast at all times, and permitting termination where the clause is breached.

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Ship-to-Ship (STS) Transfers

OFAC is concerned that STS transfers can be used to evade sanctions by disguising the origin or destination of the relevant cargo. While OFAC acknowledges that STS transfers can be conducted for legitimate purposes, OFAC flags such transfers as potential sanctions evasion, especially if conducted “at night or in areas determined to be high risk for sanctions evasion or other illicit activity.” The Advisory includes a map showing areas near the Korea Peninsula, China and Eastern Russia that are thought to be high risk for North Korean sanctions evasion. No similar map is shown for other areas (e.g., the Persian Gulf or offshore Syria).

“Name-and-Shame” Lists

Previous sanctions advisories have included a list of ships and shipowners identified as having traded with Syria, Iran and North Korea, and having engaged in STS transfers of cargo that ended up in these countries. The previous advisories made clear that they were not “sanctions lists” (i.e., that the parties listed were not blocked and generally could be dealt with), and that there was no determination that a sanctions violation had occurred. Nevertheless, the market largely reacted to these “name-and-shame” lists as if they were sanctions lists.

The new Advisory does not revise the “name-and-shame” lists, neither to add new parties to the lists, nor to “remove” existing parties (although given that the lists are not official, it is not clear what removal of a name would entail). The Advisory merely says that there may be further “updates” in the future, but gives no hint as to what such an update would involve.

Maritime Sector Participant Checklists

The Advisory includes an Annex containing “checklist” guidelines for maritime sector participants to follow. The Advisory does not require participants to follow all of the checklist guidelines, but adherence is clearly encouraged.

The Annex includes checklists for the following parties:

  • maritime insurance companies;
  • flag registry managers;
  • port state control authorities;
  • shipping industry associations;
  • regional and global commodity trading, supplier, and brokering companies;
  • financial institutions;
  • shipowners, operators, and charterers;
  • classification societies;
  • vessel captains; and
  • crewing companies.

“The Advisory seems to imply that most trade with Syria, whether or not conducted by US persons, may violate sanctions.”

Sanctions Program Annex

The Advisory includes a second Annex describing the relevant sanctions programs targeting North Korea, Iran and Syria, and including country-specific guidance. The inclusion of North Korea and Iran is consistent with the highly comprehensive US “secondary sanctions” targeting both countries, as well as UN sanctions against North Korea. While Syria’s inclusion is consistent with previous advisories, most trade with private actors in Syria is not subject to “secondary” sanctions (i.e., non-US persons generally can deal with Syria in a manner that does not violate US sanctions, so long as they do not deal with the Syrian government or entities or individuals designated as “terrorists”). Nevertheless, the Advisory seems to imply that most trade with Syria, whether or not conducted by US persons, may violate sanctions. Also of interest is the absence of a separate listing for Venezuela, which has been the target of a significant escalation of US sanctions over the past year and has been the focus of a crackdown on sanctions evasion.

Source: https://www.wfw.com/articles/us-maritime-sanctions-advisory-navigating-choppy-waters/

Tokyo MOU: Detentions Up in 2019

May 19, 2020 GENERALPOST STATE CONTROL

The Tokyo MOU has released its Annual Report on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region noting that the number of detentions was up in 2019 after seven years of decline.

Detention percentage also increased in 2019 after 10 continuous years’ decrease. The number of under-performing ships published and number of individual ships involved also rose in 2019. “These increases are considered as the encouraging outcome of improvement and enhancement on targeting or selecting ships for inspections and, emphasis on inspection of under-performing ships by the member Authorities, based on the observation of continuous increase of inspections of high risk ships and under-performing ships,” states the report.

ISM related detainable deficiencies have remained in the top three detainable deficiency categories for several years. One third of all detentions are on the grounds of a major non-compliance with ISM.

The average number of detainable deficiencies per detention is trending slowly upwards. As a result the Tokyo MOU will refine measures to inspect under-performing ships. These inspections will focus on the safety management system implemented on board ships and familiarization and understanding of operational requirements by the crew. Operational requirements continue to be an area of concern due to the increasing complexity of shipboard systems and the pace of change, and the MOU is looking at mechanisms to address this.

The MOU’s concentrated inspection campaign (CIC) on Emergency Systems and Procedures was conducted from September 1 to November 30, with 7,174 CIC inspections. The most notable deficiencies found during the campaign were related to the muster list details in accordance with the requirements (178 deficiencies, 2.48 percent), emergency source of the electrical power supply to essential equipment (151 deficiencies, 2.10 percent), damage control plan readily available (137 deficiencies, 1.91 percent), steering gear system and its related emergency alarm operation (127 deficiencies, 1.77 percent) and capability of the public address system (112 deficiencies, 1.56 percent). Fifty-five ships were detained as a direct result of the CIC, which represents a percentage of 0.77 percent, lower than the overall detention percentage of 2.62 percent for the same period.

Membership of Tokyo MOU was further expanded in 2019 upon with the acceptance of Panama as the 21st full member of the MOU. With Panama, four of the top five world largest flags (Panama, Marshall Islands, Hong Kong and Singapore) are members of the Tokyo MOU.

The report is available here.

Paris MOU: Temporary Guidance Related To Covid-19 For Port State Control Authorities (Rev.2)

May 12, 2020 POST STATE CONTROL

Paris MOU has issued its latest guidance related to COVID-19 for Port State Control Authorities.

1 MAB has considered and agreed that, noting the global impact of COVID-19, there is need to apply flexibility under these special circumstances. In Paris MoU member States, national measures are implemented which are to a large extend affecting the port State control regime. In view of a common approach in the region, not withstanding any possible national measures, and in view of the continued effects of the COVID-19 crisis, as a general principle the following guidelines would be applied on a case by case basis by the relevant port State Authority.

2 This guidance focusses on the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on the Paris MoU in relation to:
– preventive measure to halt the spread of COVID-19
– non-compliance with the Relevant Instruments due to COVID-19

3 A summary of relevant publications can be found on a dedicated COVID-19 page of the Paris MoU website:
https://www.parismou.org/publications/covid-19/pmou-covid-19- publications/paris-mou-covid-19-publications/paris-mou-covid-0

Preventive measure to halt the spread of COVID-19

4 PSCOs should be guided by the preventive measures adopted by their Maritime Administrations, including the use of appropriate personal protective equipment in order to protect themselves as well as the ship’s crew. MAB has noted that Paris MoU member States have implemented measures to limit the number and/or extent of PSC inspections. As shortages in personnel and staffing may become more common, port States which encounter such difficulties could consider to carry out primarily overriding priority inspections.

5 Whether an inspection takes place remains the decision of the port State. A vessel can be considered self-isolating only if there are no ship-shore interfaces.

Ship Certification Issues due to COVID-19

6 In relation to the COVID-19 situation, it may occur that a ship cannot fulfill the requirements from the Relevant Instruments or the follow-up on inspection results as would normally be required. As a basic principle the primary responsibility regarding compliance with the Conventions remains with the owner and flag State. However in those case where the owner and flag State have demonstrated to take that responsibility, but due to the current situation cannot carry out those duties that normally would be required, the Paris MoU should adopt a pragmatic approach and also be flexible as this is a rapidly developing situation.

7 Interval of surveys and audits required by Conventions
In the event that a ship has not complied with the requirements of the surveys, inspections and audits contained in relevant convention requirements (SOLAS Chapter I Regulation 10 etc.), the ship must provide evidence to the port State that the flag State has agreed to an exceptional delay specific to COVID-19. There should also be evidence that the ship has a plan that covers how the ship will be brought back into the regular survey or audit cycle.

8 Duration of statutory certificates
Giving consideration that an exceptional extension of validity of certificates specific to COVID-19 would be inevitable for certain ships, the flag State or RO, acting on behalf of the flag State, may extend the validity of certificates to an appropriate and proportional grace period specific to COVID-19. In such case the ship must provide the evidence to the port State that the flag State Administration has agreed to an exceptional delay specific to COVID-19 and that the ship has a plan that covers when the ship will be scheduled to be subject to the renewal survey and audits.

9 Installation of Ballast Water Management System
In the event that a ship cannot meet the requirements of Regulation B-3 of the Ballast Water Management Convention (ballast water management instead of ballast water exchange) due to delay of dry-docking caused by disruption from COVID-19, the port State should seek confirmation that the flag State has agreed to an exceptional delay specific to COVID-19. There should also be evidence that the ship has a plan that covers how the ship will comply with the requirements of Regulation B-3 of BWM.

10 Where, under par. 7 to 9, the required evidence from the flag State is missing, the ship should be treated in the normal manner as per the Paris MoU procedures. This also applies to any vessel operating beyond any indicated grace period.

11 The pragmatic relaxation of requirements, which may include the acceptance of copies of certificates of which the validity can be verified, should be applied by port States on ships which have not exceeded the requirements by the appropriate and proportional grace period specific to COVID-19, unless it is evident that the COVID-19 pandemic is used as an excuse to breach the Convention requirements.

Personnel issues due to COVID-19

12 MLC 2006
MAB has considered that there may be a need to apply flexibility under the circumstances on the issue of extending periods of service on board ships. In doing so the port State should request the operator of the ship to confirm that the flag State, the relevant crew members and relevant seafarer organisations (if applicable) have been involved in the process.

Further guidance regarding what the port State should look at in case of non- compliance with MLC due to force majeure related to COVID-19, could be found in ILOs “Information note on maritime labour issues and coronavirus (COVID-19)”: https://www.parismou.org/system/files/ILO%20Covid.pdf

13 STCW Certification
MAB has considered cases where seafarers have faced issues with completing refresher courses for the renewal of personal certification. This could be caused by cancelled courses, quarantine or travel bans. In such cases the maritime administration may have extended the validity of such certificates and this should be accepted as a case of force majeure. For foreign certificates if the flag administration has granted an extension due to force majeure then this should be accepted as similarly extending the endorsement of the flag state of the ship on which the seafarer is serving.

14 Medical Certificates
In cases where it has been difficult for seafarers to extend their medical certificate the flag administration may allow seafarers to remain on-board. PSCO should accept documents produced by flag States which acknowledges seafarers extended stay on board due to force majeure associated with COVID-19.

15 Rectification and follow-up on inspection reports
In relation to the rectification of recorded or outstanding deficiencies, guidance should be taken from PSCC Instruction 50/2017/11 – Guidance on Detention and Action Taken (including eg. AT code 48 – as in the agreed flag State condition) and PSCC43- 2010-11 – Flag State exemptions. In case a ship is detained on ISM, but no external audit can be organised, despite best efforts by the company and flag State (which may include temporarily authorization of another RO), the ship may be allowed to proceed to the next port to carry out the external audit. In order to use AT code 48 in combination with ISM deficiency 15150, a ticket with a justification has to be send to thetis@emsa.europa.eu to activate the possibility in THETIS.
Consequently, the guidance regarding the use of AT code 48 should then be applied.

Review of the guidance

16 This PSCircular will be reviewed, as appropriate, to keep aligned with developments of the COVID-19 virus and future initiatives by relevant stakeholders.
Source: Paris MoU

New Guidance For IMO Global Sulphur Cap 2020 Compliance & All PSC Inspection Regimes

November 1, 2019 IMOPOST STATE CONTROLRegulation

The new IMO global sulphur cap requirements enter force on 1st January 2020 and a robust and consistent approach to compliance is expected by all Port State Control (PSC) regimes. PSC inspections will be carried out in accordance with the IMO PSC procedures, the 2019 guidelines for PSC under MARPOL Annex VI.

In order to establish whether a ship is in compliance, PSC inspectors will likely focus their attention on documents and procedures maintained on board. In certain jurisdictions PSC inspectors will carry portable sulphur testing kits and if the results of these tests are inconclusive or indicate potential non-compliance then additional sampling will take place for verification ashore.

It is important therefore that ships’ crews are aware and familiar with the new regulations, associated documentation and procedures and are able to confidently demonstrate this knowledge to a PSC inspector.

Bunker Delivery Notes (BDNs) and Fuel Sampling

Details of fuel delivered on board for combustion purposes should be recorded by means of a BDN. The BDN should be accompanied by a Representative Sample of the fuel delivered – the MARPOL Sample. Most ships will also take commercial samples in the normal way. The Representative Sample is to be sealed and signed by the supplier’s representative and the Master (or senior officer in charge of the bunker operation) on completion of bunker delivery and retained on board until the fuel has been substantially consumed, but in any case for a period of not less than twelve months from the time of delivery. BDNs and associated samples should be easily identifiable and filed properly on board. BDNs should be retained on board for at least three years after the fuel has been received on board.

There are two locations where fuel sampling might be required by PSC: (1) downstream of the fuel oil service tank and (2) the storage tanks, “in use” and “on-board” respectively. In accordance with ISO 4259-2: 2017, and allowing for a 95% confidence limit, the maximum amount of sulphur allowed in these samples is 0.11% m/m for ECA fuel and 0.53% m/m for global fuel.

In situations where the Commercial Samples (taken during bunkering) indicate a higher sulphur content than noted on the BDN then the flag administration and PSC at destination need to be notified in writing without delay. Note that the ship will have likely sailed by the time these test results are known. In the event of any further investigation by PSC, the Representative Sample (MARPOL sample) will be used by PSC for further verification procedures and the ship may be ordered to de-bunker the fuel at the next port.

 

SOURCE : MARINE INSIGHT

India to ban single use plastic on all calling ships

October 28, 2019 POST STATE CONTROLRegulation

India has decided to act on reducing plastic litter pollution and has introduced a ban on the use of single-use plastics onboard calling vessels.

The ban will require some items to be locked away and introduces a new requirement for recording all single-use plastics onboard vessels. The ban applies to all Indian vessels and to foreign flag vessels calling at Indian ports.

The ban will take effect in two stages – the first effective immediately and the second stage on 1 January 2020.

The immediate ban applies to single-use plastic items used as:

  • Cutlery, plates and cups
  • Water and other drinks bottles up to 10 litres
  • Garbage and shopping bags
  • Dispensing containers for cleaning fluids which are less than 10 litres.

Taking effect from 1 January 2020, the following single-use plastics are prohibited:

  • Bags, trays, containers, food packaging film
  • Milk bottles, freezer bags, shampoo bottles, ice cream containers
  • Bottle for water and other drinks, dispensing containers for cleaning fluids, biscuit trays
  • Hot drink cups, insulated food packaging, protective packaging for fragile items
  • Microwave dishes, ice cream tubs, potato chip bags, bottle caps.

The North of England P&I club has advised that enforcement will be done by Port State Control and that affected plastic items must be stored prior entering Indian territorial waters. Vessels calling at Indian ports are required to make a log entry identifying the ‘Single Use Plastic Items’ on board the ship, along with the onboard location of where these items are stored, and the time and ship’s position of when this is done. No single use plastic items are to be discharged to a port reception facility at Indian ports.

PSC inspectors may verify compliance with this regulation as part of a PSC inspection. However, the Directorate General of Shipping (DGS) has stated that no detentions of foreign ships will be enforced. A handwritten deficiency in the printed PSC Form ‘B’ (to be rectified prior departure) may be issued.

Tokyo MOU Welcomes Panama as Full Member

October 26, 2019 POST STATE CONTROL

Port state control organization Tokyo MOU has accepted Panama as the 21st member authority.

This was decided at the Tokyo MOU’s 30th meeting in Majuro, the Marshall Islands, held from October 14 to 17, 2019.

Having completed a three-year term as a cooperating member authority, Panama applied for full membership of the Tokyo MOU. The committee considered the application and the report of a fact finding mission, which confirmed full compliance with the qualitative membership criteria by Panama.

In accordance with provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo MOU), the committee unanimously agreed to accept Panama as the member authority.

As explained, the committee considered and adopted amendments to the memorandum relating to full membership of Panama.

Tokyo MOU was signed among eighteen maritime authorities in the region in December 1993 and came into operation in April 1994.

Current full member authorities include Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philipines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu and Vietnam, with Mexico being a cooperating member.

Inspections from the EU port States to enforce provisions of the ship recycling Regulation Inventory of hazardous materials Overview IHM

October 26, 2019 IMOPOST STATE CONTROL

Guidance on inspections of ships by the port States in accordance with Regulation (EU) 1257/2013 on ship recycling Inventory of hazardous materials Overview IHM

 

The purpose of Regulation (EU) No 1257/20131 on ship recycling (hereinafter the “SRR”) is to prevent, reduce, minimise and, to the extent practicable, eliminate accidents, injuries and other adverse effects on human health and the environment caused by ship recycling. The Regulation is also designed to enhance safety, the protection of human health and of the Union marine environment throughout a ship′s life-cycle; in particular to ensure that hazardous waste from such ship recycling is subject to environmentally sound management. The Regulation also lays down rules to ensure the proper management of hazardous materials on ships.

The aim of this EMSA guidance is to assist the Member States and their designated inspectors in their efforts to fulfil the requirements of SRR and PSC Directive, in relation to inspections covering the respective requirements of these two instruments. It is a reference document that provides both technical information and procedural guidance thus contributing to harmonised implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the SRR and the PSC Directive.

Inventory of hazardous materials Overview IHM

During each inspection of a ship initiated under the PSC Directive regime, the port State control inspector (PSCO), as a minimum, must check the inventory certificate s (IC) or a ready for recycling certificate (RfRC) or a statement of compliance (SoC) as applicable is kept on board and report this in THETIS.
The IC and RfRC formats, which have been established, respectively, under Commission Implementing Decisions (EU) 2016/2325 and 2016/2321 can be found in Annexes 4 and 5 of this guidance document. A model of a SoC that may be used for ships flying the flag of a third country is provided in Annex 3 of this guidance document.
It should be noted that, any initial check of the SR certificates or the PSCO’s observations of the ship may reveal clear grounds to imply that the ship is not in compliance with the SRR. In this case, the PSCO will continue the inspection under the SRR regime.

Before boarding, relevant information about the ships in port may be obtained from THETIS or THETIS-EU and other sources (e.g. from AIS, NGOs, port Authorities etc). This may include information on ship particulars, last and next port of call, arrival and departure times, port stay duration, possible intention to send the ship for recycling etc. Further information may directly be obtained through the port Authorities or the ship’s agent

The general application date of the SRR was 31 December 2018. From thereon, new EU ships6 have to carry a the inventory certificate (IC) and EU ships going for recycling have to carry a ready for recycling certificate (RfRC).
However, it should be noted that existing EU ships7 shall only carry a certificate on the inventory of hazardous materials (IC) from 31 December 2020.
Moreover, non-EU ships should only be requested to submit a statement of compliance (SoC), together with the inventory of hazardous materials, from 31 December 2020.

Inventory of hazardous materials Overview IHM

  INSPECTIONS FROM THE EU PORT STATES TO ENFORCE PROVISIONS OF THE SHIP RECYCLING REGULATION INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OVERVIEW IHM (2.8 MiB, 693 hits)

Paris MOU port state control action code list

November 11, 2018 POST STATE CONTROL

Paris MOU port state control action code list

  • Code 10: Deficiency rectified
  • Code 15: Rectify deficiency at next port
  • Code 16: Rectify deficiency within 14 days
  • Code 17: Rectify deficiency before departure
  • Code 18: Rectify deficiency within 3 months
  • Code 30: Detainable deficiency
  • Code 40: next port informed
  • Code 45: rectify detainable deficiency at next port 50 flag state/consul informed
  • Code 55: flag state consulted
  • Code 70: recognized organization informed
  • Code 85: investigation of the contravention of discharge provision (MARPOL)
  • Code 99: Other

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